Office of the Historian

244. Diary Entry by the President, March 21, 19571

March 21, 1957

BERMUDA CONFERENCE

The principals attending the meetings today were the President, Prime Minister Macmillan, Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd.

Each side was represented at the table by three other individuals and a few staff officers were behind this delegation.

I.
The meeting was by far the most successful international meeting that I have attended since the close of World War II. This had three causes:
(a).
The pressing importance of the problems discussed and the need for reaching some Kind of definite answer rather than merely referring the problems to a study group, as is so often done in international conferences;
(b).
The atmosphere of frankness and confidence that was noticeable throughout the day; this possibly resulted, in part, from the fact that Macmillan and I are old wartime comrades and friends of long standing;
(c).
The obvious fact that each side was well informed on the several subjects taken up. Consequently conversations were far more definite and to the point than is normally the case when generalizations and protestations of good will take the place of informative exchanges.
II.
We discussed all phases of the Mid East problem and it was apparent that there was a very large measure of agreement on most of the matters that have filled the pages of the public press for the past maity weeks. Some of the items that came in for very special and searching investigation were:
A.

The question of our future relationships with Nasser and a satisfactory arrangement for the future use of the Suez Canal.

Here, very early in the conversation, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Lloyd, delivered a tirade against Nasser, saying that he was not only an evil, unpredictable and untrustworthy man, but was ambitious to [Page 462] become a second Mussolini. He thought also that in pursuing his ambitions he would probably, just as Mussolini became the stooge of Hitier, become the stooge of the Kremlin.

This was followed up by a presentation by the British of the need for obtaining promptly a satisfactory arrangement for the use of the Canal. They felt the matter of tolls was probably the most important single consideration in such an agreement. They were quite clear that if we should fail to get a satisfactory arrangement, we should not later dodge the issue and pretend that it was at least a half-victory and one with which we could live. Rather, they believe we should under these conditions denounce the whole affair, including the intransigence of the British government. But they re-emphasized their need both economically and politically for obtaining a truly satisfactory agreement and this very quickly.

I immediately pointed out to them the inconsistencies in their approach to these two problems. If we were at this moment to begin an attack on Nasser (and we admit that he is far from an admirable character) and do everything in our power overtly and covertly to get rid of him, then the hope of getting an early and satisfactory settlement on the Canal would be completely futile.

They quickly saw the point of this and … quickly agreed that we should first stick with the task of getting a satisfactory agreement on the Canal operation.

B.

Gaza and Aqaba. We found ourselves largely in agreement on these two subjects and the consensus was that we must do our best to prevent extreme action by either side in the region. We believe that if we can have a period of tranquility during which time these two regions will be largely under the control of the United Nations, that we can probably work out satisfactory answers.

[Here follow Eisenhower’s comment on the Anglo-American discussions concerning oil production in the Middle East.]

. . . . . . .

[Here follow Eisenhower’s comments on the situation in Cyprus; for text, see the editorial note, volume XXIV, page 466.]

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret.↩