Office of the Historian

242. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 3:45 p.m.1

USDel/MC/4
Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 3:45 p.m.

The Prime Minister opened the session at 3:45 P.M. with the discussion of Palestine. The Prime Minister referred to the Joint US–UK working level paper, prepared before the Conference,2 the general conclusion of which was to the effect that there is not much present hope of an over-all Palestine solution, and we must therefore concentrate on individual aspects as they arise.

Selwyn Lloyd mentioned that a number of problems would have to be settled such as frontiers, waters, etc., but these could only be solved and an overall solution obtained, if peace were maintained meanwhile. The British believed the UNEF should be continued for the time being.

The Secretary referred to his statement of August 19553 with which Eden had concurred, as presenting the basic US position. He mentioned that the British had been informed of the Four Power [Page 459] memorandum which King Saud had brought to the US,4 which had struck us as a reasonably moderate statement since it did not take the point of view that Israel could not exist.

The Prime Minister commented that this point was certainly important.

The President concurred, adding that King Saud had taken that position while in Washington.

The Prime Minister asked about the views on this issue of the other Arab States.

Selwyn Lloyd replied that, while privately many of them would probably agree that Israel was here to stay, they could not say this publicly. The best we could hope for right now was the maintenance of peace and the gradual development of conditions which could eventually permit a real Palestine solution.

The discussion on Palestine was closed by approval being given to the working level paper.

[Here follows discussion of Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean area. For the portion of the conversation on Cyprus, see volume XXIV, page 465.]

The Prime Minister and President then considered and approved the report of the working party on Suez (reference Secto 7),5 and also agreed that great care should be taken that there be no publicity at all regarding this matter or the dispatch of the British message to Hammarskjold in Cairo.6

[Here follows discussion of the communiqué to be issued to the press after the session’s adjournment.]

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. Drafted by Morris. The participants at the meeting were the same as at the 10:30 a.m. meeting (see supra), except that Timmons attended instead of Walmsley for the U.S. Delegation, and J.A.N. Graham, a personal assistant to Lloyd, attended instead of T.W. Garvey for the British Delegation.

    The Delegation transmitted a summary of this conversation to the Department of State in Secto 9, March 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/3–2257)

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  2. The final paper and related documentation concerning the U.S.-British discussions in Washington which preceded the drafting of the paper are ibid.,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Political Affairs & Relations 1952–1963. Pol 22 Incidents, Disputes, Arab-Israel Dispute.↩
  3. August 26, 1955; see vol. XIV, pp. 378 ff.↩
  4. On January 18–19, four Arab heads of state (President Nasser, King Saud, King Hussein, and Prime Minister al-Assali), meeting in Cairo, determined that King Saud should convey to President Eisenhower their viewpoints on many of the current problems in the Middle East. Consequently, Saud delivered to Eisenhower a memorandum containing these views during a conversation in Washington on January 30. See vol. XIII, p. 417.↩
  5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/3–2157) The paper was subsequently amended and is printed as Document 246.↩

  6. In telegram 3 from Bermuda to Cairo, March 21, Dulles instructed Hare to convey Lloyd’s views to Hammarskjold. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/3–2157) The text of the telegram is printed as the annex to Document 246.

    Telegram 3 was sent at 9 p.m., March 21. At 12:18 a.m., March 22, the Delegation at Bermuda received Hare’s report that Hammarskjöld had asked the United States to defer its proposed message to Nasser. See footnote 4, Document 236.

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