Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

241. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/3

Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Ambassador Whitney
  • Senator George
  • Mr. Hagerty
  • General Goodpaster
  • Mr. Phleger
  • Mr. Elbrick
  • Mr. Rountree
  • Mr. Wilkins
  • Mr. Morris²
  • Mr. Macomber
  • Mr. Walmsley
• United Kingdom
  • The Rt. Hon. Macmillan, Prime Minister
  • Rt. Hon. Lloyd, Foreign Secretary
  • Rt. Hon. Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to Cabinet
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, Permanent Under-Secretary Foreign Office
  • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador to U.S.
  • Mr. P. H. Dean, Deputy Under-Secretary, Foreign Office
  • Mr. Harold Beeley, Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
  • D. S. Laskey, Personal Assistant to Foreign Secretary
  • Mr. C. P. Hope, Foreign Office, Press Director
  • C.O.I. Ramsden, Personal Assistant to P. M.
  • Mr. F. A. Bishop, Personal Assistant to P. M.
  • Mr. T. W. Garvey, Secretary of Delegation

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters. The full text of this memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII]

As to the matters at hand, he [Macmillan] hoped the two sides could attack urgent matters first, and he identified the most urgent as the problem of Nasser and the Canal. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom likes him even though he may have been originally inspired by patriotic motives. With regard to Nasser he recognized that the U.S. considered the UK had acted rashly although the UK may differ in this judgment. He urged the United States to exert pressure on Nasser and on Hammarskjold, and hoped that with respect to the methods to be employed in connection with Nasser the UK would be consulted. Concerning the Canal, the immediate problem was the dues and, in the longer-term, the arrangements. He still believes there is a chance for success, but if we fail or get an unsatisfactory settlement, he hopes the U.S. will say its part and will condemn Nasser, not calling the result a victory or a draw. The British people will not be fooled nor will his Government attempt to fool them. Should the U.S. report the situation resulting from a poor or no settlement “not so bad”, it would cause a “real rift” which will take longer to repair then the world needs allow.

He acknowledged in closing his remarks that he had used this frankness because of the closeness of UK–US friendship.

The President’s reply, after expressing his delight to be sitting down with his former comrade-in-arms and recalling their past association, expressed the expectation that their mutual experience would help make the conference successful. The President acknowledged the need of frankness among friends.

The President thought that Mr. Macmillan had put extremely well the situation today against the historical background. He agreed that Anglo-American solidarity was the core of the Western alliance; that if the English-speaking peoples cannot live and work together there is little hope.

The President wanted to comment on one or two points in Mr. Macmillan’s remarks.

First, as to nationalism, he thought this was a spirit stronger than Communism. If some of the newly-independent nations accept or make accommodations with Communism, it is because they believe it promotes their particular nationalist aspirations.

Concerning secondly the neutralism identifiable in many of these countries, the President thought they should be divided between those who do not care to choose between right and wrong and those who are neutral or neutralist in the military sense. He thought that we should work on the moral aspect of neutralism in the first sense. As to military neutralism, he thought there might frequently be advantages to us when we are unable to provide the military guarantees which are expected of a military alignment with us.

In the event of failure with respect to Nasser, the President warned against the danger of generalization. He said that we should in the first instance identify the essentials of acceptable or desirable solutions and then decide what we might say about them.

As to the disillusion, the Prime Minister had attributed to the British people, the President, without pretending that all of our views are sacrosanct, wished to remind Mr. Macmillan that from the beginning of the crisis last summer we had kept his Government fully informed of our positions and of the limitations on our field of action.

The President agreed however that it is the moment to look forward and that we must examine how to implement our great programs of the future. To do this we should examine the problems around the world and move to action always in solidarity.

The meeting moved to consider the agenda items under the Middle East.

Aqaba and Gaza

Mr. Macmillan asked the Secretary to describe the situation in these areas as he sees it.

The Secretary stated it was obscure, there being a difference between what Nasser says and what he will do. Israeli withdrawal had been based on “certain expectations”. The U.S. and certain other maritime powers had made statements with respect to innocent passage through the Straits. It had expressed its understanding in the Aide-Mémoire, February 11 and in Lodge’s exposition. He acknowledged that under international law the Straits are territorial waters, but this does not bar innocent passage between international waters in the absence of belligerency. He noted that while Nasser and the Saudi Arabians made statements they would defend the Straits as territorial waters these statements were carefully worded.

A serious problem is created by the fact that Egypt and Israel each unilaterally accepts and rejects terms of its choice of the Armistice Agreement. On the one hand Israel claims that Egypt has no rights of belligerency in the Straits, but also relies upon the Armistice Agreement with respect to the borders which are more favorable to Israel than those defined in 1947. On the other hand Israel denies Egyptian rights in Gaza, the administration of which is attributed to Egypt under the Armistice, and as for its own domestic political purposes called the Armistice Agreement a dead issue. In our conversations with the Israelis we have pointed to the danger of the latter position (the borders and Gaza) with respect to rights of innocent passage; we have stated that innocent passage can be claimed if the Armistice Agreement operates. Egypt claims Armistice rights in Gaza but also claims rights of belligerency regarding the Straits and Suez.

In any case with respect with [to] passage through the Straits, no immediate problem exists since Egyptian forces are not present. The Saudi Arabian position is not relevant to passage through waters of the Straits since the channel is on the West side through Egyptian territorial waters. In this connection, the Secretary made reference to the Saudi Arabian emotional feeling over the proximity of the Straits to the Moslem holy places. In reply to a question, the Secretary stated that we had no immediate plan to make a test passage with a U.S. vessel. However, if Israel should charter a ship of U.S. registry, we would urge the owner to send the ship through the Straits and in the Gulf on Israeli request. If Egypt should attempt to block transit, we would be prepared to consult with the UK and others.

The question was raised at this point whether innocent passage permits search. The U.S. position is that it does not. It was suggested that our respective lawyers should compare notes on the subject.

Mr. Macmillan asked how long UNEF is expected to stay at Sharm-el-Sheikh. He said we must be ready for this problem. The Secretary stated that the Hammarskjold–Nasser talks should throw some light on this. Would UNEF have to go, in U.S. opinion, Macmillan asked, if Egypt so requests? The Secretary referred to the “constitutional” difference between rights of the GA under the uniting for peace resolution, and those of the SC under the Charter. The GA can only make recommendations and can send observers, troops, etc., only with the consent of the receiving country. The British position is that while consent is required to send, withdrawal should be decided by the General Assembly. The Secretary stated that the U.S. did not disagree but pointed to Hammarskjold’s responsibility to determine within the terms of the resolutions when the UNEF Mission was completed. To be argued by him that the UNEF Mission would be completed when the chance of renewal of clash was eliminated. The urgency of nailing down a position on innocent passage and how to handle the issue when it arises was agreed, and the Delegation’s legal advisers were requested to study and report at once. In this connection, the President noted his disbelief that the issue would arise by Egypt’s firing on non-Israeli vessels. In connection with the possibility of reference of the problem to the International Court of Justice, the Secretary mentioned the Corfu case as pertinent.

Turning to Gaza, the Secretary stated that there is a basic difference between the US and the Israeli positions. Our position is that a solution must be within the framework of the Armistice, whereas Israel asserts the Armistice is dead. Mr. Lodge in the General Assembly clearly stated our position. The great importance the Israelis attributed to the issue, however, was evident from the pressure they exerted on us to the very last minute but to which we confined ourselves to an expression of hope that the UNEF would exercise administering function, in fact notwithstanding Egyptian titular responsibility. Our hope was founded on Hammarskjold’s belief he had Egyptian acquiescence although events are not bearing this out.

The Secretary mentioned that the facts within Gaza are difficult to establish. The published accounts make it appear very bad and seem to substantiate Israeli apprehensions. On the other hand, Hammarskjold with whom the Secretary had spoken by phone just before the Secretary’s [Hammarskjöld’s] departure for Cairo, had said that Burns reported the situation to be calm, the UNEF to be stationed throughout, and Egyptian representation in the Strip to be nominal.

The Secretary also recounted his most recent talk with Mrs. Meir who seemed to wish to leave the impression that if Egypt took over Gaza, even in the absence of fedayeen activities, Israel would reoccupy the territory. This statement and the fact of Mrs. Meir’s trip itself testified to the extreme domestic importance in Israel of the Gaza issue.

She also said Israel would like to see the UNEF out of Gaza.

He said that Mrs. Meir offered an interesting, if unconvincing, explanation of Israel’s opposition to UNEF’s being astride the border and of opposing UNTSO activities there. She said that Israeli territory is very limited and its borders very extended and that any “occupation” was harmful to its economy.

The Secretary mentioned the story from Paris of alleged commitment by the French Ministry of Defense of air cover should Israel return to Gaza, and Mr. Macmillan replied that the first he had heard of this report was from a message from Washington. Mr. Macmillan assured the President and the Secretary that while UK sympathized with Israel it would not be in his country’s interest for Israel to make trouble, having in mind, among other things, the flow of oil from the Arab countries and the need to stabilize the situation.

Selwyn Lloyd asked the Secretary in what manner we would act if Egypt announces it would fully take over Gaza. The Secretary thought that the General Assembly should be reconvened but that it was important to match announcement with words before acting. He mentioned that Hammarskjold had felt let down by Egypt with respect to the report he had made to the General Assembly on the subject of Gaza and that moreover he doubts that Israel would take violent action while the Secretary General was in the Middle East. On the other hand, if Hammarskjold returns empty-handed, the danger arises of Israel re-entry.

Lloyd next mentioned the receipt from the UK Mission in New York of a telegram saying that Eban had stated that, there was complete Israeli identity of views with the Americans to which the Secretary replied that this was not the case and all that he thought he could expect from them was that they would not act without prior consultation. The United States, however, did hope that Israel could be restrained short of the status quo ante in Gaza; but if Nasser did reassume complete responsibility in Gaza, leaving UNEF only along the border, we would have to consider immediately convening of the General Assembly.

Canal:—Lloyd asked the Secretary’s views on the Egyptian memorandum of March 19.³ The Secretary did not find it good but considered it did not slam the door. Hare had reported (Cairo’s 2971)⁴ that the Egyptians had told him that it was not to be considered definitive but as a basis for negotiation. The Secretary outlined the interim arrangements which the US had developed in consultation with the British, etc. and which it still supports. There was a brief discussion of the unsatisfactory provision in the Egyptian memorandum for tolls to be paid to the Egyptian Government or its nominee.

The Secretary went on to say that emphasis should be placed upon working out of a permanent settlement which could have the effect of speeding up the interim arrangements or of overtaking them. Lloyd asked whether it was not true that Nasser does not want any interim arrangements, and who actually is negotiating with the Egyptians, Hammarskjold or the United States. It seemed there was no disagreement about Nasser’s coolness toward interim arrangements and the Secretary thought that under the circumstances it would be wise not to consume all our ammunition to attain them to the detriment of solutions of other important outstanding problems including the definitive regime for the Canal. As to the character of the negotiations, it was conceded that our side is disorganized by difference of views among using companies and among countries; and Nasser is better able to deal, as he likes, directly with companies. Hammarskjold is conducting the negotiations but under these circumstances he can speak only for himself even though he acts more or less for the users having checked in New York with, among others, the United Kingdom, the United States, the French and the Norwegians. He has very little more than his moral authority however and there is always the specter of private owners shifting their registry to Panama and Liberia. Thus the effectiveness of a boycott in the absence of satisfactory arrangements would even in the short run appear impracticable.

The Prime Minister intervened to invite attention to the very great difficulty that would accordingly be generated by Nasser’s declaring in the near future the opening of the Canal. He proposed that the problem be studied at once at the official level of the delegations, including examination of the possible role of SCUA or other organization and that they submit recommendations to the principals.

The Secretary interjected a caution with respect to the authority of the Executive Committee of SCUA to speak for the eighteen, and raised a question whether there is time for SCUA to be brought into the interim arrangements. He warned that the kind of statement the Prime Minister had urged upon us, if there is a bad or no settlement, is not apt to affect ex post facto such arrangements as may be reached. He thought it a better tactic to let Nasser know in advance the consequences of intransigence. He proposed that the official level include in its study a suggestion that, should Egypt insist on payments to itself or nominee, the Egyptian blocked accounts in the US, UK and France be debited correspondingly.

Before proceeding to the subject of pipelines, the President asked the Prime Minister whether it is the level of tolls or payments which the British consider crucial to a satisfactory settlement, to which the Prime Minister stated that it was the payments in the interim arrangements and the level of tolls for the future.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. The Delegation at Bermuda transmitted a summary of this conversation to the Department of State in Secto 8, March 22. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.41/3–2257)
2. Brewster H. Morris, Political Counselor at the Embassy in the United Kingdom, was a member of the Delegation at the Bermuda Conference.
3. The text of the Egyptian memorandum is in telegram 2929, Document 231.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/3–2057)