Office of the Historian

237. Memorandum for the Record of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Bermuda, March 20, 1957, 5 p.m.1

March 20, 1957, 5 p.m.

In his first briefing session with the President on 20 March, Mr. Dulles suggested that the general issue which probably influences all else at this moment is what attitude we should take toward Nasser. The choice is a very difficult one, particularly in light of the pressure the British feel they are under regarding a Suez Canal settlement. To have the best chance of obtaining a satisfactory settlement, we must “do business with Nasser,” and try to lead him into cooperating with us, giving him concessions etc. which would have the incidental effect of building him up.

If on the other hand we wish to dispose of Nasser, by continuing and perhaps intensifying the subtle but substantial pressures that are working on him, then we cannot expect from him much other than hostility, and specifically actions regarding the Suez Canal which will be very damaging to the British.

There was then discussion of some of the advance indications of the line Nasser is likely to take with Hammarskjold, and discussion also of the problem of timing, in that it is difficult to take a position until the results of Hammarskjold’s visit become more clearly known. The Secretary showed the President a rather strong message he had sent to Hare for delivery to Nasser2 if Hammarskjold deemed advisable, putting the matter very squarely to him and obliging him to show whether he would try to work toward a solution or not.3

G
Brigadier General, USA
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 22. Secretary Dulles arrived in Bermuda via airplane at 3:30 p.m. on March 20; President Eisenhower, who had traveled by ship, arrived shortly thereafter and the two met at 5 p.m. in President Eisenhower’s quarters. (Dulles’ Appointment Book; Princeton University Library; and Record of the President’s Daily Appointments, Eisenhower Library)↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. According to a separate note written by Goodpaster on March 20, “the Secretary had typed up to show to the British a copy of his message to Hare to deliver to Nasser if Hammarskjold thought this advisable.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)↩