224. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2899. Have just returned from seeing Nasser (11:30 p.m.) and delivering message contained Department telegram 3030.2 He received it soberly and thoughtfully but seemed at loss to know what to reply except to repeat statements of last night to effect he had thought his action was within his rights and also justified by circumstances, [Page 420] both immediate (preserving calm in Gaza) and longer range (removing uncertainty re internationalization of Gaza). He referred repeatedly to effect of provocative and challenging statements of Ben Gurion and also mentioned declaration of Selwyn Lloyd today as being indicative of problems GOE facing.
However, burden of conversation tonight was on fact that matters have progressed to point where difficult reconcile with admonition of “utmost caution.” Not only did Governor of Gaza actually enter city this afternoon but (Nasser volunteered this) Egyptian troops have been moved into Sinai (but not into Gaza) and are now as far forward as El Arish. Nasser repeatedly maintained that these actions were entirely normal and had been taken without provocation or aggressive intent but, by dint of considerable argument, he finally admitted that others might view them in another light and that this was fact to be seriously considered as far as world opinion, especially as formulated in UN, concerned. He would not concede, however, that there was much point in trying to court Israeli opinion.
I then referred to the deep concern of President Eisenhower in this matter and asked what I might report to him regarding his (Nasser’s) intentions. He said he wanted to express his appreciation for the President’s advice and to give assurance that he had no aggressive intentions. I asked if that was all. He looked rather helpless and asked what more could be said in the circumstances. I replied that it was not merely question of assuring the President of what he had in mind but also a question of taking some action to reduce tension and apprehension. To be specific, would he withdraw the Governor from Gaza and his troops from Sinai or both. Nasser said he did not see how this could be done. Would he then undertake to act as prudently as possible and also to make a public statement himself in which he would clearly state his good intentions to reduce pressure pending arrival of Hammarskjold? Nasser replied would certainly attempt follow cautious line but hesitated make statement for fear of becoming embroiled in argument with Ben Gurion. I replied that, if one’s intentions good, there is no reason become involved in dispute. He said he would think it over and mentioned that he had already instructed the Director of Information, Hatem, to issue a statement as result of our conversation last night.
Despite fact that Nasser had already taken action which we sought to prevent before this message delivered, I believe that it made real impression on him re gravity of situation and there is some reason to hope that he will think twice before he makes any further moves. [Page 421] As a consequence, message certainly served useful purpose despite being largely repetitive of that delivered night before and fact that possible use President’s name seemed have telling effect.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–157. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 12:02 a.m. Repeated Niact to Tel Aviv and to USUN.↩
- Document 220.↩