185. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, March 3, 1957, 6:40 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Israeli Withdrawal
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister
- The Secretary
- U—Christian A. Herter
- NEA—William M. Rountree
Ambassador Eban said he could describe the position of his Government more definitively than yesterday. The Prime Minister would like tomorrow to complete the arrangements for withdrawal. He planned to carry the matter through the Government and Parliament in the morning, to arrange a meeting between the Israeli Chief of Staff and General Burns “to finalize everything” during the early part of the day, and to be prepared for the Israeli representatives to make an announcement in the General Assembly during the afternoon, New York time. The Prime Minister had asked whether, on this basis, the United States would be willing to help in one more respect. Carrying the program through the Government and Parliament would be very difficult. The Prime Minister would, however, be able to overcome these difficulties if he had an “inner-conviction” regarding the American attitude in certain respects. He wanted to know, in order to facilitate his efforts, whether we understood each other fully with respect to Gaza. If Egypt, while in a state of war with Israel, were to return to Gaza and thus recreate conditions set forth in Mrs. Meir’s statement, Israel would be prepared to act in defense of its rights. The Ambassador hoped that we would be able to understand this position. This would not involve a public statement on our part. The Secretary had indicated last night that if the Ambassador wrote a letter setting forth Israel’s position regarding its intentions to act under Article 51 to defend its right of transit of the Straits, he would consider replying to the letter. Perhaps, the Ambassador said, a similar arrangement could be made with the United States taking full cognizance of what the Israelis said with respect to Gaza. In her speech Mrs. Meir had said, on the basis of the arrangements worked out with Mr. Pineau and the Secretary, that Israel reserved its right to act under Article 51 if conditions in Gaza should impose a threat. The problem was whether we understood each other regarding the circumstances in which Israel [Page 352] would act. His Government believed that such a situation calling for Israeli action would be created if the United Nations abandoned Gaza and Egypt should return. His Government would like to say to us that in such a case of a premature breakdown of the United Nations in Gaza, and a return of a belligerent Egypt, Israel would be justified in considering that rights of defense would become operative. He did not know how exactly Israel would protect its rights, but it would expect to be able to act effectively. This matter had been discussed with Mr. Mollet in Canada by the Israeli Ambassador there. Mr. Mollet had suggested a text which in his opinion would be consistent with the original suggestion discussed in Washington.
The Ambassador showed the Secretary the text of the Mollet proposal. He said it is not intended that the statement be public and that it would not necessarily be formally submitted, but a similar statement from the United States on an informal and personal basis would give the Prime Minister the feeling that we had not misunderstood each other.
As to the form, the Ambassador said he might address himself to the Secretary concerning the statements made by Mrs. Meir and state the determination of the Israeli Government to protect its rights regarding shipping through the Straits of Aqaba. He might go on with regard to Gaza and spell out that the occupation by Egypt of Gaza would place into operation Israel’s rights to act. He would request the United States to take cognizance of that policy declaration. The basis of the proposal was that there was not a feeling, especially after the Friday General Assembly session, that Israel was producing a situation in which Egypt would not move back, and the Israeli Government would like to make it clear that in fact such a situation preventing the Egyptian return had been created. The Prime Minister’s feeling was that the Aqaba problem was of greater importance to Israel in the future, and he believed that the arrangements made with respect to Aqaba were adequate. On the other hand, although the Gaza problem was of less importance in the long run, it evoked much stronger feelings particularly among the people in the general area. It was therefore urgent to obtain some recognition of Israeli rights of self-defense in the Gaza, even though this might be on a confidential basis. His Government hoped that it would be possible to effect a speedy withdrawal. If things went well it was the expectation that arrangements would be completed before the Monday General Assembly meeting.2
The Secretary observed that the United Nations already had assumed that the departure would be prompt, based upon what Mrs. Meir said on Friday. Unless there were a concrete move, the situation [Page 353] would deteriorate very rapidly. Mrs. Meir had stated her Government proposed that a meeting be held immediately with the United Nations Commander with regard to withdrawals from both Aqaba and Gaza.
The Ambassador said that four members of the Cabinet had voted against the plan, which had created a considerable problem. If the parties which they represented took a strong position in the Parliament, a real difficulty might be involved, and that could bring about new elections.
The Secretary observed that if he understood the Ambassador clearly he was suggesting that we acquiesce at least in the Israeli position that termination of the United Nations’ exclusive control in Gaza, both civil and military, would in itself be a cause for action by Israel. The Ambassador interposed that this would be true only if it were at a time, as at present, when Egypt considered itself to be at war with Israel. Continuing, the Secretary said that while it might be said that if Egypt should return that would involve threats to Israel such as those which existed before, he did not think we would from a juridical standpoint be entitled to make such an assumption. What Mrs. Meir had said was that if conditions were created which would threaten Israel, then Israel would be entitled to act. It would not be our view that Israel would have such rights merely because Egypt occupied territory which under the Armistice Agreement Egypt was entitled to occupy. One might consider that to be a threat, but he did not as a legal proposition agree that the mere fact of occupation would give rise to a claim that Israel was threatened to the extent that it was entitled to take action. We of course did not want Egypt to exercise its legal rights and move back in the Gaza. We had said that we would try to obtain a continuation of a situation in which the United Nations would carry responsibility for the administration of Gaza. We had some influence in the matter, and there were various ways in which that influence might be exerted. We did not think, however, that our influence would be effective if we should maintain that merely because Egypt exercised certain rights it has under the agreement that would give rise to the use of force to oust Egypt. This, the Secretary said, involved a difficult problem of determining how long Israel would have to wait after the return of Egypt, and of how imminent the danger must be, before there was the right of defense. Israel took the view that any Egyptian participation in Gaza would carry a threat. On the basis of past experience that was not surprising, but it was not a conclusion to which we would come.
Mr. Shiloah said the Secretary had previously stated that Egypt, for various reasons, was not keen on returning to Gaza. For all practical purposes they might not be keen, although there were perhaps political and prestige reasons why they might feel that they should go back. If they did make an effort to restore their position in Gaza, he [Page 354] would assume that their motives would be evil. The Secretary responded that while they might be evil, they probably would be motivated first by questions of national prestige, which any of us were prone to be.
The Ambassador said perhaps a new formulation could be agreed. He asked whether the Secretary would regard the Israeli safeguards as coming into effect not only upon the return of Egypt but upon the recreation of conditions which would threaten Israel’s security, using the words in Mrs. Meir’s statement. The Secretary said that even that would be an over-simplification. There were many variations, and it would be difficult to say exactly what our position would be in the many contingencies which might arise. It might be, for example, that an Egyptian return to Gaza would be accompanied by so many bellicose statements that Israel might feel justified in acting without waiting to be struck first. We would not want to set ourselves up as arbiters to say how long Israel should wait before taking action. On the other hand if the Egyptian return were merely for prestige reasons, and involved no large numbers of Egyptians, clearly there would be no such rights on the part of Israel. This situation simply did not lend itself to an expression of opinion in advance. He thought that Israel would be much better off to let the matter stand as at present. He thought it essential to the integrity of the United States position that we be able to state that we had not given any secret assurances or guarantees to Israel. We could honestly state that now, and must keep it that way. He did not think that any public statement which we could make would make it easier for Israel to withdraw, and perhaps with the qualifications which we have to impose it would make it more difficult. The United States could not assume the position of being the guardian of Israel’s rights and he did not think Israel wished to put us in that position. Any statement which we made would lack any binding effect and would serve to confuse rather than clarify the situation. The matter should be left to stand as it was. If, after completion of the withdrawal, Israel wished to ask us questions about any such matters, we would consider making replies, although even then we would not want to work too much on a hypothetical basis. We knew what the Israelis wanted and they knew what we wanted. Surely we both understood that there was no guarantee that things would happen as we would like. We would try, but if the situation should not develop according to our wishes and Israel should feel itself threatened, Israel had unilaterally reserved its freedom of action. He did not think that Israel could be any better off than that in the circumstances.
The Ambassador said he would of course have to accept the Secretary’s position. He wondered whether the situation might be looked at in this broader context: The Israeli representative had made a statement in the General Assembly; the American representative [Page 355] said he had taken note and commented that the Israeli hopes and expectations were not unreasonable. The Ambassador wondered whether he could address a letter to the Secretary saying that he attached great importance to two specified aspects of Mrs. Meir’s statement, which would be quoted along with parts of Ambassador Lodge’s statement. The Secretary would reply that he had taken note of what Mrs. Meir had said in this specific regard.
In response to the Secretary’s question as to what he thought about the suggestion, Mr. Rountree said he was concerned with the implications of a further exchange along these lines. The fact that part of the statements made by Mrs. Meir and Ambassador Lodge had been extracted from their total context and were the subject of a special exchange between the Israeli and United States Governments would undoubtedly lead to widespread speculation as to their import.
The Secretary told Ambassador Eban that he would consider the matter. He felt that no time should be lost in this respect, however. He was afraid that if the withdrawal was not well underway before the General Assembly met on Monday, Arab representatives would make statements to the effect that the Israeli assumptions were unjustified and unacceptable. If that should happen, the Israeli position would be much weaker than if they proceeded with the withdrawal program under the assumptions which had not been knocked down. The Israeli position would be stronger if they could proceed on the basis of the statements made and which up to the time of the announced withdrawal had not been denounced.
It was agreed that the Ambassador would immediately prepare the text of the letter which he would like to send to the Secretary asking that the United States take note of the specific statements made by Mrs. Meir. He would then consider whether he felt it would be possible or useful to reply along the lines requested. The Ambassador said he would return to the Embassy and send back a draft promptly for the Secretary’s consideration.