Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

177. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 1, 1957,11:41 a.m.¹

Washington, March 1, 1957,11:41 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Israeli Withdrawal from the Sharm el-Sheikh Area and the Gaza Strip

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador
• Dr. Abrahim Anis, Sudanese Ambassador
• Dr. Victor A. Khouri, Lebanese Ambassador
• Dr. Zeineddine, Syrian Ambassador
• Dr. Moussa Al-Shabandar, Iraqi Ambassador
• Mr. Faisal Hegelan, Third Secretary, Embassy of Saudi Arabia
• Mr. Mahmoud A. Rousan, Embassy of Jordan
• Mr. Assayed Ahmad Ali Zabarah, Chargé ad interim, Legation of Yemen
• Mr. Mahmud Galbun, Second Secretary, Libyan Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. William M. Rountree; Mr. Wilkins, NEA

The Secretary said that he had asked the Chiefs of Mission of the Arab states to call because he thought it might be of interest to them if he were able to report our efforts at the United Nations and directly through diplomatic channels to bring about an Israeli withdrawal from the Sharm el-Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip.

The Secretary said that it was a matter of public record that we had given an Aide-Mémoire to Israel on February 11 and that President Eisenhower had made a radio-television address on February 20. Meantime, we had pushed forward with a proposed resolution which would condemn Israel and provide for sanctions if it remained obdurate. The Secretary thought the President’s statement had had an effect in Israel and on the friends of Israel in this country. He wished to note in passing that the President had been criticized regarding the substance of this statement to a greater extent than on any other he had made. The Government of Israel had endeavored to obtain more extensive commitments from the United States but we had declined to give them. Yesterday afternoon Ambassador Eban had informed the Secretary that, following recent meetings of the Israeli Cabinet, Israel had decided to withdraw promptly and unconditionally. According to the Ambassador, Israel was taking into account developments in the United Nations and the substance of the President’s remarks of February 20. The Secretary understood that the Israeli Cabinet was now having another session regarding the matter and, while he could not say for certain what final action Israel would take, he understood Israeli withdrawal would be announced to the General Assembly this afternoon.

The Secretary said he understood that rumors were circulating, based on a Tass report, that there was a secret agreement between the United States and Israel under which the United States would receive bases in Israel in return for $125 million. The Secretary said that absolutely nothing whatsoever had been offered by the United States to Israel which was not a matter of public record. There was not one iota of truth in the rumor. There had been no agreement or understanding, expressed or implied, to induce Israel to withdraw. It was true that Israel had suggested that the United Nations provide more definite assurances but we had replied that they could not expect any prize or reward to result from their invasion of Egypt. It was our view that the arrangements which were being made by the Secretary General, based on action of the General Assembly, provided the assurances which Israel desired and that nothing further could be granted by the United Nations or its individual members, including the United States, until Israel had withdrawn.

The Secretary said that although we did not know what Israel would say this afternoon, we believed matters had advanced sufficiently to discuss it with the Arab representatives, especially with Egypt. We considered the withdrawal as of utmost importance to the United Nations and to the world because, as indicated in Article I of the Charter, acts of aggression should be suppressed. If Israel now withdrew, it would be a great achievement for the United Nations.

The Secretary added that at the United Nations in October he had presented the first resolution calling for Israel’s withdrawal. He had indicated at that time that hostilities in the area were the result of unstable conditions, in which there had been breaches of the general Armistice Agreements by the parties. He had hoped that the United Nations could suppress these breaches and could re-establish conditions in accord with justice and international law. There was a heavy responsibility in this respect; peace and justice were two sides of a single coin and were so recognized in the Charter. He hoped that out of the present unhappy experience a new brighter prospect for the nations of the area and for the United Nations would develop.

The Syrian Ambassador thanked the Secretary for the information which he had given and said that each of them would convey it to their governments. He added that they understood that the Israeli agreement to withdraw had not yet been announced but wished to ask questions about it. How quickly would it be effected? The Secretary said that he expected that Israeli withdrawal would commence at once. He assumed that physical arrangements would be made between General Burns of the United Nations and Israeli officials. They would probably meet to work out the details. He hoped the withdrawal would not be dilatory.

The Syrian Ambassador asked what arrangements had been made regarding the UNEF? The Secretary said that we had not discussed this subject with the Government of Israel other than in the terms laid down by the General Assembly and the Secretary General. We did not consider that we had any authority to speak for the United Nations or for Egypt. We understood that Israeli representatives had discussed this question with the Secretary General.

The Syrian Ambassador inquired what arrangements had been made regarding the return of Egypt to Gaza. The Secretary said that this question had risen in discussions with Israel and we had replied that we had no authority to speak for the United Nations or for Egypt. We considered that any steps taken regarding the Gaza area should be within the framework of the general Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt. We had pointed to the report of the Secretary General of February 22 which dealt with this question and had not expanded upon it in any way.

The Syrian Ambassador observed that the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement was not a decision of the United Nations but an agreement between two states which could not be changed without the consent of either Egypt or Israel. The Secretary said he assumed that Egypt had consented to what the Secretary General had said in his report.

The Syrian Ambassador suggested that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution providing for sanctions keyed to the pace of Israeli withdrawal. He added that the whole question should be handled through United Nations action rather than through statements of its individual members in the General Assembly. He noted that the Arab states had endeavored to cooperate by not pressing for action in the General Assembly during the past few days.

The Secretary said that if there were a positive pledge from Israel to withdraw it did not seem possible to vote sanctions. On the other hand, if Israel did not carry out its pledge it might then be possible to vote sanctions. Ambassador Lodge had been discussing these possibilities with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi and with others. The Syrian Ambassador said that they had been so informed but they found their own resolution more acceptable than the proposed American resolution.

The Secretary said that the practical problem of obtaining a majority of two-thirds confronted us. The proposed American resolution had been designed to take into account other views. We believed any vote for sanctions would be very close. If Israel did not withdraw a stronger resolution might then be adopted. However, we have no grounds at this moment for believing that Israel would not withdraw. The Syrian Ambassador hoped that the United States Delegation and the Arab Delegations in New York would keep in close touch.

The Lebanese Ambassador inquired how long Israel would take to withdraw. The Secretary said that he believed withdrawal would commence immediately but he did not know exactly how long it would take. He had the impression from Ambassador Eban that he was anxious to complete withdrawal promptly and fully. The Secretary said we would endeavor to ascertain when the Israeli withdrawal would be completed.

The Syrian Ambassador again referred to the question of the deployment of the UNEF in relation to the exercise of Egyptian rights. The Secretary said that it would be unfortunate if, following Israeli withdrawal, a better situation could not be created than had existed in the past. He did not believe that any one wished a return to conditions of hostilities in violation of the general Armistice Agreement. We would have forces on the demarcation line between Israel and Egypt and a return of peaceful conditions to the area. There would be no change in the juridical situation and nothing would be taken away from Egypt, but there would be a better situation than had existed before.

The Syrian Ambassador observed that the question of Aqaba and Gaza had arisen as a result of the Palestine situation and were inseparable from it. He added that none of the Arab representatives had any new information from their governments except the recent declaration of Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Secretary said that no one wished a return to conditions of warfare but rather desired the establishment of a new peaceful order. If a final peace settlement did not now seem practicable, conditions of tranquillity could at least prevail as had been indicated in the Declaration of the four Arab nations.

The Egyptian Ambassador said that in returning to peaceful conditions Israel should receive no gain in any way from its aggression. The Secretary replied that Israel should not be rewarded but that actions approved by the United Nations as in the general interest should not be rejected. He thought that we should not deny to ourselves forward moves merely for the purpose of denying them to Israel. The Secretary added that we could not repudiate the steps which had already been taken by the United Nations and the Secretary General, such as the establishment of the UNEF and the arrangements worked out by the Secretary General in consultation with the Advisory Committee. The Syrian Ambassador said that the Arab states wished to cooperate with the United States and believed that consultation should take place between them in advance rather than with other countries that were less concerned with the area.

The Secretary continued that the United States had endeavored to persuade Israel to withdraw in accordance with the appeals of the United Nations. We had made no additional commitments. We would welcome further consultation with the Arab states leading to tranquillity in the area. One of the purposes of the Eisenhower Program would be consultations and talks with the individual states. We had considered, however, that it was necessary first to persuade Israel to withdraw; otherwise, there would have been a serious deterioration of the situation which might have resulted in hostilities. It had taken tremendous courage for the President to make his radio-television statement on February 20. This statement had subsequently been bitterly denounced as had the views of the Secretary. Israel was now apparently in the process of deciding to withdraw. The American stand accordingly seemed to deserve a certain respect. In the final analysis this stand should prove to be more effective than sanctions itself. Economic and financial sanctions were exceedingly difficult to formulate and hard to place into effect.

The Secretary believed that, if Israel withdrew as he thought it would, a real success would have been achieved. He hoped the Arab representatives would agree that adherence to principles had been useful. We had done so because of the importance we attached to the establishment of international peace and justice as spelled out in the Charter of the United Nations, although it had made it necessary for the United States temporarily to split with such old friends as the United Kingdom, France and Israel. If Israel now withdrew, its relations with the United States would return to normal as had United States relations with the United Kingdom and France. If Israel did not withdraw, United States relations with Israel would not be improved. The Secretary thought it essential that the position of the United States be based on principle.

The Syrian Ambassador thanked the Secretary for his remarks and said that the Arab representatives admired the courage with which the President and the Secretary had approached current matters relating to Aqaba and Gaza.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–157. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)