Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

171. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, February 28, 1957—2 p.m.

2744. Re Embtel 2733.² King Saud asked me call on him late last night after conclusion of conference and signature communiqué.³ Since he was occupied on my arrival, I had half hour with Youssif Yassin who took lines conference had gone well and that there had been agreement on all points. He then dwelt at considerable length and with considerable heat on two points which he said had caused especial difficulty for Saudis in conference. First was economic pressure exerted by West, including US, on Egypt with result that it forced turn to Soviet bloc to dispose of products and satisfy needs. This subject, including blocked funds, had apparently been discussed at length in conference and Saudis had not only been at loss defend US position but had been convinced of justice of Egyptian case. Second point was Straits of Tiran. Without going into legal aspects of matter Yassin worked himself into a fine lather on this subject, going so far as to say it was unthinkable that Israeli ships should be able to transit Straits of Tiran either in foreseeable future or at any time whatsoever. Furthermore, he maintained, with display of belligerency which is his trademark, that any country which undertook to assist Israel in securing right of navigation in Gulf of Aqaba would be regarded as placing itself in same position as British and French in their attack on Egypt. I said I knew Yassin had discussed this matter recently with responsible American officials⁴ and I would not therefore undertake to debate substantively with him. However, I also knew that this was matter to which we had given great thought and expressed ourselves publicly for the purpose which we mutually sought of effecting Israeli withdrawal from Sharm el Shaik. In circumstances, my suggestion was that as between friends any discussion of matter should be kept on calm note. Yassin indicated agreement but still insisted was up to us to find way to avoid any support of Israeli case.

At this point King Saud came in. . . . General situation, he said, had not changed from that which he had described night before and communiqué finally agreed on. Actually communiqué contained little that was new and consisted largely of repetition themes of communiqué after last conference. This was his nearest approach to direct criticism.

King then gave me personal letter to President⁵ having as enclosure memorandum mentioned in reftel.⁶ He asked this be given special handling. He then went on to ask that in transmitting this letter I should also convey to President that he was a friend of United States, that he would remain our friend and that his trip to US had meant great deal to him. When I responded with few words regarding success of his trip, he brightened up noticeably. . . .

King left this morning, being seen off by Nasser, members Cabinet, and number diplomatic representatives, including Russian. I had no opportunity for further exchange with him except wish him bon voyage but did have short talk with Abdullah Balkhair, Saudi director general of press, who frankly admitted that communiqué was sorry product as far as Saudis concerned but was best they could do in circumstances.

Letter to President and enclosure being transmitted in two separate and following telegrams. Originals being forwarded by pouch. Since these telegrams subject Presidential handling they will not be repeated addressee posts.

Embassy will submit its comments on conference from Cairo angle as soon as possible pull loose ends together. Our immediate reaction is naturally one of regret that some constructive progress could not have been registered but by no means one of despair that this did not come about. Saud at least put up a fight and fact that his efforts did not bear immediate results does not necessarily mean effort was in vain.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.11/2–2857. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:18 p.m. Repeated to Jidda, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, and London.
2. Telegram 2733 from Cairo, February 27, transmitted a report which Hare received from King Saud concerning the recent Arab conference in Cairo. (Ibid., 786.11/2–2757)
3. See footnote 2, Document 166.
4. See Document 126.
5. In this letter, King Saud described his efforts during the Arab conference to bring the U.S. point of view closer to that of King Hussein, President Quwatly, and President Nasser. Saud’s message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 2745 from Cairo, February 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2857) A copy of telegram 2745 in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File bears a marginal notation by Goodpaster: “President has seen”.
6. Telegram 2746 from Cairo, February 28, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2857)