145. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, February 24, 1957, 7:02 p.m.1
TELEPHONE CALL TO AMBASSADOR LODGE
The Sec said Eban had made a presentation of his new instructions which on the whole were good. The Sec said it cleans up the Gulf of Aqaba. Re Gaza they have dropped the demand for Israeli administration and police and are entirely prepared to accept some UN administration and policing of the area. The Sec said he thought what they asked for was what Hammarskjold said he would do in his statement of Friday. The Sec said they were not quite clear about that. Eban was therefore going to New York tonight or first thing in the morning to talk to Hammarskjold about the future administration of Gaza. The Sec said assuming that can be clarified, he thought the problem was resolved. L. said the thing is all over then? The Sec said they were prepared to take their troops out of Sharm el Shaikh and Gaza. They want to be sure that their administration is turned over to the UN and not turned back to Egypt as before. They will not agree to a resumption of the status quo ante in Gaza. The Sec said he believed the Hammarskjold statement met their views, according to his interpretation of it, but he felt that he could not take the responsibility for that, and the Israelis should talk to Hammarskjold. The Sec said they had one other question: before they pull out the UNEF forces, Hammarskjold should announce in advance so the UNGA could deal with the resulting situation—this would not be a veto power, but merely advance notice. The Sec said he presumed that would be the case. The Sec said what he feared re Gaza was that the problem is more of form than substance. They want to put Ben Gurion in a political position where he can say he had gotten the Egyptians out. Under the Armistice agreements Egypt has a right to the territory. The problem must be worked out according to Egyptian legal rights in Gaza. The Sec said [Page 270] we can meet what they want, but they cannot go about shouting about it. L. asked what he could tell he Arabs. The Sec said the Israelis are asking for postponement, and the Sec felt Hammarskjold should take the burden of asking for postponement now. The Sec read the statement Eban had made at the end of the meeting. The Sec said L. should talk this over with Hammarskjold and work out with him the procedure. The Sec said L. should not talk to the Arabs before Eban sees Hammarskjold, but L. should give the substance of the above report to Hammarskjold in strictest confidence. L. said he hoped they were not just stalling waiting for Congressional pressure to build up. The Sec said he thought they were sincere, they do not want to antagonize the Eisenhower Administration for four years. That is more important than any sanctions. The Sec said we should get another 24 hours postponement. We could wind up then, if Hammarskjold can give reasonable assurances re Gaza Strip. The Sec said the President feels strongly that we should be able to give such assurances; the UN had responsibility in the area, taking care of refugees, etc. The Sec said Israel had gone so far that he did not think we could ever vote sanctions. The Sec said it would all come out, the Israeli concessions, within the next 24 or 36 hours. They were prepared to, subject to the talk with Hammarskjold, to make an unconditional statement that they would withdraw from both areas. L. said he would call in the morning.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Proctor.↩