Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

134. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Caccia), Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, February 22, 1957, 5:30 p.m.¹

Washington, February 22, 1957, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Israel

Ambassador Caccia called upon the Secretary at his house at 5:30 p.m. at the Secretary’s invitation. The Secretary said he was glad to find the Ambassador had returned to Washington from his trip and that he wanted to discuss the situation as it related to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory and the situation in the United Nations. The Secretary referred to the efforts which have been made via the United Nations to obtain Egyptian concurrence to UNEF moving into the Gaza Strip. He hoped also that our declaration regarding Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran would be strengthened by several other nations. The Secretary mentioned that Ambassador Eban had not yet arrived in London en route from Israel to the United States. Ambassador Caccia said he was unaware that Eban was coming by way of London. The Secretary informed him he had just checked by telephone with our Embassy in London and also that we had been informed that Eban would only arrive in New York Saturday night; that he had to meet there with his Foreign Minister Golda Meir, and would not arrive in Washington until Sunday afternoon. The Secretary pointed out that this made it a very tight timetable in view of the pressure in the United Nations for a showdown on Monday on the question of sanctions. He said it would be most difficult to hold up matters and avoid the U.S. taking a position. The Secretary referred to the draft Canadian text of resolution and expressed the thought that the Canadian text might be in harmony with the United States view. He emphasized that the withdrawal should take place concomitant with the remedial steps outlined in the text of the U.S. resolution and referred to the composition of the committee which would be set up to include Canada, Norway, Brazil, Colombia, India, and Pakistan representatives. He referred to the U.S. November resolution which is still pending and said that this would be in harmony with U.S. thinking. He said that the Secretary General is working on a plan for the administration of Gaza. He also expressed the opinion that Ben-Gurion has quite a difficult political problem.

Caccia noted that the U.K., Canada and the U.S. now find themselves working with the same objectives in mind. He raised the question regarding our attitude on sanctions. The Secretary said the U.S. resolution would contemplate a mild form of sanctions. Caccia said that present sentiment in the U.K. opposes the application of sanctions against Israel as just not fair. The Secretary said that in the circumstances it would be difficult to say just what is fair. The Secretary informed Caccia that according to Ambassador Lodge, Hammarskjold had made his report on Gaza, and Caccia was informed by the Secretary regarding the contents of the Hammarskjold report.

Caccia handed the Secretary the text of a message from Prime Minister Macmillan to the President (copy of which has been given to Mr. Elbrick).²

There was a discussion of the international law aspects of the Aqaba and Straits of Tiran question. Caccia handed the Secretary a copy of the British view of the question of the straits as an international waterway which seemed to harmonize generally with the U.S. point of view.³ The hope was expressed by Caccia that the U.S. would strengthen its guarantee of freedom of passage for Israel.

The Secretary referred to the need for several nations getting together on this subject. He said also that there is strong implication that Egypt would not oppose freedom of passage and that actually Saudi Arabia is giving us more concern on this issue than is Egypt. He referred to the Saudi point regarding the movement of pilgrims in the area and the Saudi notion that if the Israelis were permitted freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, the movement of pilgrims would be endangered. The Secretary said that this indicated an emotional feeling rather than a sense of geography. Ambassador Caccia expressed the opinion that perhaps we are not so far apart, the U.K. and the U.S., in this entire matter except on the issue of sanctions against Israel. The Secretary agreed, and said that Ambassador Lodge however indicates that it would not be possible to get a two-thirds vote in the GA for anything that does not have something in it in the nature of a slap on the wrist for Israel. On the other hand, it might be a disaster not to get something through now as failure to do so might lead to the outbreak of hostilities in the area. He said that Ambassador Lodge also had informed him that Pearson had postponed his statement until Monday. He thought that opinion at the United Nations was hardening against Israel since they seem to reject the U.S. Aide-Mémoire.

The Secretary also referred to a conversation he had had with Mr. Hemming of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the question of how long the U.K. could get along without the use of the Suez Canal. According to Flemming, Western Europe is now receiving 90% of its petroleum requirements. This of course is at the cost of that much depletion of U.S. oil reserves which we were reluctant to undergo. Nevertheless, we would be prepared to do so for an additional period if a theory were justified that this would improve our bargaining position in the Middle East. It would dispel a notion on the part of Egypt and the Arab States that we could not get along without the Suez Canal. The Secretary thought that we should have some common understanding of how we are getting along. Caccia said he was not really in a position to comment as he did not have the necessary information.

Caccia inquired further regarding sanctions as provided in the draft U.S. resolution text. The Secretary explained that the Government would refrain from aid but that this did not refer to private aid.

The Secretary again suggested that Caccia might wish to find out from his Government about the urgency of the need of the Suez Canal and that if possible we should offset the Egyptian feeling that they have us over a barrel. Caccia said he would do so.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/2–2257. Secret. Drafted by Murphy.
2. Infra. Attached to the copy of Macmillan’s message to Eisenhower was a short note from Macmillan to Dulles which reads: “I have thought it my duty to send a personal message to the President. I feel sure that as an old friend and colleague you will study it with sympathy and understanding.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Eden–Macmillan–Lloyd Correspondence 1955–1956)
3. The paper handed to Dulles by Caccia reads as follows: “In Her Majesty’s Government’s view the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through which the states bordering on the Gulf of Aqaba have a right of access to the high seas. Her Majesty’s Government also uphold the view that vessels of all nations have a right of passage through the Straits and will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping. Her Majesty’s Government are prepared to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.” (Ibid.)