Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

112. Report by Arthur H. Dean¹

New York, February 18, 1957.

Ambassador Eban came in to see me at 5:30 p.m. and has just left at 6:30 p.m. He said the following:

(1) If the role of the UN forces moving into the Gulf of Aqaba could be more specifically defined, it would be a great help, as at present it is only required that they move in but nothing specific as to how long they would stay or whether they would leave at the request of Egypt. He would like some phrase they would move in as the occupying forces pending a decision in the matter.²

(2) A letter from the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of Israel in which it would be set forth in general terms which would not juridically constitute a guarantee that if the Israeli forces were to leave the Gulf of Aqaba area on the basis put forth and if it were to come about that the Government of Egypt were to resume the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba so that this Gulf would not be open to the free passage of the ships of all nations, including the ships of Israel, the US would feel a deep sense of responsibility and would feel it incumbent upon them to take such steps as might be necessary to bring about a lifting of the blockade.³

(3) It should be made clear that the previous statement of the US with respect to free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba would become effective immediately upon (i) the Israeli troops leaving the Gulf of Aqaba area and (ii) when the Israeli troops or military forces⁴ leave the Gaza Strip.

Ambassador Eban feels it is not clear under the present statements when the US statement with respect to the free passage of the Gulf of Aqaba comes into force and there ought to be no doubt about the specific conditions which must be met when it comes into force.

(4) There should be a UN Mission sent to the Gaza Strip to make an investigation and to make recommendations with respect to the whole question of civil administration of the Gaza Strip.

He said that of course Israel would hope to be able following the withdrawal of their military forces from the Gaza Strip to work out a civil administration. He said he had just left Pearson, Canadian Secretary for External Affairs, and Pearson had said that he felt it would be very dubious that a UN mission would recommend an Israeli administration for the Gaza Strip. Ambassador Eban said that he was not clear that an Israeli administration was absolutely essential but he believed Israel would be willing to see a UN administration or some neutral form of administration,⁵ provided it was not merely a return to Egypt because in that event Egypt would close all roads, all water and electrical facilities, and Israel would again be faced with an enemy at its borders. He said that they wanted to be sure when their right to free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba vested and would not want to get into some argument that it did not vest because there was still some question about who was to administer the Gaza Strip.

He said that at a conference today with the Secretary, the Secretary had asked him the question “Assuming I were to accept this modification, are you, Mr. Ambassador, free to tell me that you accept it here and now on behalf of your Government?” Ambassador Eban said he had replied that he was not a plenipotentiary and that he could not bind his government.⁶

He said nevertheless that he thought that if the Secretary could tell him in principle that a solution along these lines would be satisfactory to the Secretary, that he believes he could persuade his government to accept. He is leaving for Israel either tonight or tomorrow morning and in the meantime is staying at the Savoy Plaza Hotel in New York. He said that if the withdrawal of both Israeli troops and civil administration from the Gaza Strip meant the Egyptians would come back into control,⁷ he thought he would have exceptional difficulty with his government, but that they would accept a UN control of the Strip and that since UN would have the responsibility for policing the area and for the refugees, he ventured to express his personal opinion that the UN could not carry out its duties if the Egyptians were to take over the civil administration.

He asked for my opinion as to whether the Secretary was merely asking him (Eban) a rhetorical question⁸ or whether he was merely trying to emphasize to Ambassador Eban that he Eban was not a plenipotentiary.

I replied that it was of course impossible for me to know what the Secretary had in mind but that in my opinion the Secretary did not play-act and I doubted if he were merely trying to point out the lack of power in Ambassador Eban.

Ambassador Eban is very anxious to work out something along these lines and subject to the foregoing believes he could sell it to his government. He is very anxious to know before he leaves whether something along these lines is feasible.

Arthur H. Dean⁹

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. The source text indicates that Dean dictated this report over the telephone from New York. The typed text was prepared by Proctor in the Department of State. A marginal notation on the source text by Bernau reads: “Sec Saw”.
2. A marginal notation in Dulles’ hand next to this paragraph reads: “only U.N. can define”.
3. A marginal notation by Dulles next to this paragraph reads: “already so”. Dulles also underlined the phrase “the US would feel a deep sense of responsibility”.
4. In this paragraph Dulles circled the words “troops or military forces”.
5. Dulles underlined the phrase “to see a UN administration or some neutral form of administration” and wrote in the margin next to it the word “Hammar[skjold]”.
6. Dulles’ Appointment Book for February 18 does not indicate a meeting between Eban and Dulles. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Presumably, the conference between the two mentioned here took place over the telephone, and no record of the conversation has been found in Department of State files.
7. Dulles underlined the phrase “the Egyptians would come back into control” and placed a question mark next to it in the margin. He also underlined the words “Egyptians were to take over the civil administration.”
8. Dulles circled the words “rhetorical question”.
9. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.