Office of the Historian

110. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, February 18, 1957, 1:33 p.m.1

Washington Bern, February 18, 1957, 1:33 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO AMB LODGE

The Sec said the Pres is planning to come back and have a meeting Wed a.m.2 The Sec is going to have a visitation from a group of Jews and he hopes we can at least persuade some to back the adm. The Sec thinks we are going to have to have time on this—don’t know how it is shaping up. L said he sent word to Wilcox—the Afro-Asian meeting is at 6 re the res we have here.3 The Russians have one—an Assembly res but telling the SC to take it up. The Sec would not mind if it is referred back to the SC—you would get a French veto and then back to the GA. L said he favors voting for the Afro-Asian res and get it over with. That will have maximum effect to get them to withdraw. The Canadian and French ideas can’t be gotten in as conditions. L has to say something this evening. The Sec said the Pres sent word he hoped they would not be too tough. L will try to get it changed if the Sec will have someone wire him changes. The Sec said the condemnation is not the sticking point. L does not know how to make it milder and do what you want done. The Sec passed on this thought for what it may be worth: Outside of the US Israel gets its greatest help from Germany which is not a member of the UN. The Sec spoke to Krekeler this a.m. who said his govt does not want to cut it off.4 The Sec said he knows that but they could make them get nervous and Krekeler said he would cable them. The Sec mentioned making it apply to all nations. Then the Sec said he would not make that move right away. L said he has to tell them something. The Sec said L’s solution is easiest from where he sits but not from where the Pres sits and he does not want to commit us irrevocably until he talks with Congress. L will try to put it off—what shall he say? The Sec said we have a practical situation which everyone realistically must appreciate whatever the technical provisions of law are. You can’t carry out a law which the great majority don’t agree with. The Pres is trying to create public opinion which will support him. No use trying to start on something that will break down with you. The law we invoke is a fragile reed—it [Page 200] was passed when we fought in Korea. We have taken govtmental action all right. L can say the Pres is coming back to meet with Leaders and the Sec said they would be resentful if we commit ourselves first. We are the key to it. The Br and Fr won’t carry it out nor the Canadians. L will do his best.

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.↩
  2. Hagerty informed Dulles of this in a telephone conversation which began at 1:02 p.m. on February 18. (Ibid., White House Telephone Conversations)↩
  3. See the memorandum from Wilcox to Dulles, supra.↩
  4. A memorandum of the conversation between German Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler and Dulles is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 64 D 199.↩