671. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 28, 1956, 4:05 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Israel
PARTICIPANTS
- Mrs. Golda Meir, Israel Foreign Minister
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- The Secretary
- NEA—William M. Rountree
- NE—Donald C. Bergus
After an exchange of greetings, Mrs. Meir said she wished to discuss the future. She regretted that there had been differences of opinion in the recent past but Israel had believed that it had been forced by circumstances and had had no alternative. She was happy that the Secretary had stated that the situation in the Near East could not be permitted to return to the status quo ante. Egypt had not complied with all of the provisions of the November 2 United Nations General Assembly resolution; there had been at least 21 fedayeen raids on Israel since December 2 and the Cairo radio openly boasted of them.
Israel would have evacuated more than half of Sinai by January 7. Israel was worried about what would happen in Sinai after its forces withdrew and hoped that there would be a wide strip occupied by the United Nations Emergency Force between Israel and Egyptian forces. In the negotiations on the Israel withdrawal, the United Nations Secretary General had suggested that the problems of Sharm al Sheikh and the islands of Tiran and Sanafir (positions commanding the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba) and Gaza be left to the end. This meant that at some time after January 8 the Secretary General would wish to open negotiations on Israel withdrawal from these two areas. Israel did not wish to annex either Sharm al Sheikh or Gaza. Israel wanted assurance that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba would not be reinstated. The United Nations and the United States must oppose a blockade of an international waterway. Gaza presented a simpler problem in that it had never been Egyptian territory. Israel did not wish to annex the strip but insisted that it not be returned to Egyptian control. The presence of United Nations [Page 1342] forces in the strip would not solve the problem but would only provide a shield behind which fedayeen could operate. Israel could administer the Gaza strip until a permanent solution could be found. If a permanent solution involved Israel’s taking over the strip, Israel would assume responsibility for the indigenous population of the strip and a share of the refugees there. Mrs. Meir hoped that the United States would suggest to the Secretary General that he not press for immediate Israel evacuation from Sharm al Sheikh and Gaza for a few weeks so that all concerned could work diligently for a permanent solution.
Mrs. Meir thought it important that the Israel position on these points be made clear so that the United States would not feel it had been taken by surprise. Israel public opinion would not permit Israel evacuation of these two areas in the absence of assurances that the blockade would not be reinstated and that Gaza would not be used as a base for fedayeen activity. Israel hoped to avoid a conflict with the Secretary General on these points which could lead to a General Assembly resolution calling for immediate evacuation which Israel would have to violate. Israel did not wish a conflict with the United States.
The Secretary made it clear that the recent United States misunderstandings with Britain, France, and Israel were not based on the fact that we had not been informed in advance but on our disapproval of the nature of the action taken by them. In the course of three months’ consultation with the British and French we had conveyed fully our view that the United States would have to oppose a resort to force in Egypt or we would face virtual destruction of the United Nations with the resulting breakdown of world order and risk of World War III. We had not had an equal opportunity to express these views to Israel because we had not known that Israel contemplated forceful action.
Action had been taken through the United Nations which stopped the warlike activities before there had been disastrous consequences. The Secretary had stated publicly that there had to be processes remedying injustice as a counterpoise to the renunciation of force. The adequacy or inadequacy of those processes was not justification for the use of force; however all who wished to avoid force must see the injustices remedied. The Secretary thought we all knew that these processes of justice and accommodation did not work well in an emotionally charged atmosphere. The Israel action in Egypt did not make it easier for the United States to deal with problems where we agreed with Israel on the merits of the case.
The Secretary was perplexed as to now Israel regarded its long term future. The Secretary felt that it depended on amicable relations with Israel’s Arab neighbors. If Israel remained surrounded by [Page 1343] hostility there was no military strength which could protect it. Israel’s principal outside support came from the United States. There were many American citizens who were loyal supporters of Israel. There were many others who disapproved of the course on which Israel seemed to have embarked. Despite the friendship and sympathy of this Administration for Israel, there was no feeling of close cooperation between the two countries. If there had been any Israel efforts to win Arab friendship, they had been ineffective. The United States had hoped that common long term policies could be worked out with Israel so that we could align ourselves effectively. We had not found them. Israel came forward with piecemeal suggestions which did not form a pattern which we could understand. Israel needed good relations with the Arabs to assure its future. What Israel had done in Egypt had deferred this possibility for perhaps a generation. The Secretary could not see where Israel’s present course could bring about any solution to Israel’s problems.
Mrs. Meir stressed the fact that close relations with the United States was a basic objective of Israel foreign policy, not only because of Israel’s need for United States support but also because of the common ideals of the two countries. Israel sincerely believed that if peace in the Near East were dependent on Israel, there could have been peace at any time since 1948. The only condition which Israel required was that Israel exist. Efforts to reach peace in the Near East had failed only because Israel insisted on that point which the Arabs would not accept. The Secretary felt that the responsibility for the failure to reach peace lay mostly elsewhere but not wholly. Israel’s retaliatory policies had prevented the establishment of better relations. Mrs. Meir said that since 1948 the number of Israelis killed and wounded by Arab incursion was the same proportionally as though 150,000 Americans had been killed and wounded by armed forays from Canada and Mexico. What would the United States have done in such a situation? The Secretary mentioned the possibilities for an improvement which could have arisen from the Secretary General’s visit to the area and his efforts to carry out practical measures through the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to strengthen security along the armistice lines. Mrs. Meir insisted that the armistice agreements had to be enforced as a whole, that the Arabs could not be permitted to select which provisions would be enforced. The Secretary felt that if the only basis for Arab hatred of Israel were Israel’s existence, we would have seen a decline in such hatred in the nearly ten years since Israel came into being. Such had not been the case. There was more hatred now than in 1948. Mrs. Meir said this resulted from Nasser’s use of the Arab-Israel issue as a means of carrying out his ambitions. She did not maintain that the Israelis were angels, but on this point Israel’s [Page 1344] conscience was clear. She could not agree that Israel had responsibility for the lack of peace in the Near East.
The Secretary concluded his general remarks by saying that it was of concern to us to learn about Israel’s plans for its long range future in due course. With regard to the specifics which Mrs. Meir had mentioned, the United States was not in a position to come to agreements with Israel over matters being dealt with by the United Nations Secretary General. We were supporting him in his efforts to reopen the Suez Canal and to effect a withdrawal of troops. Mrs. Meir had presented Israel’s case ably. With regard to Israel’s use of the Suez Canal, we would stand by our previous position that Israel had the right to send its shipping through it. We believed that the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway. Conditions for its use would have to be worked out with the Secretary General. We had no ideas regarding the problem of Gaza, which was quite complex. It was not Egyptian territory, neither was it encompassed by the Israel armistice line.
The Secretary would be seeing Mr. Hammarskjold in the course of the next few days. The topics mentioned by Mrs. Meir would in all probability be touched on in the course of that conversation.
Mr. Eban felt that the problem could be worked out in time but at least four or five days were needed. Both the Secretary General and Israel were flexible about Gaza. Neither could work well against the threat of another United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for immediate withdrawal.
As Mrs. Meir and the Ambassador left, the Secretary expressed the hope that there had been no misapprehension regarding our dedication to Israel and to the fact that there was no lack of close sympathy. The United States felt that Israel’s future lay in a friendly Near East and that some of Israel’s policies were not in line with this belief.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2856. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on December 29. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) A briefing memorandum, dated December 28, prepared by Rountree for Dulles is in Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2856.↩
- On December 30, Eban forwarded to Dulles a summary of Israel views concerning the Gulf of Aqaba, not printed. (Ibid., 980.7301/12–3056)↩