Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

663. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State ¹

Tel Aviv , December 23, 1956—2 p.m.

774. Called on Prime Minister at his Tel Aviv home at his request last night December 22. He immediately raised question of United States Suez-Sinai policy as it would affect Israel security after withdrawal military forces and said GOI wished very much coordinate [garble] with United States if possible. He requested earliest some indication our thinking pointing out vital policy decision for Israel must be reached first few days January. By that time Israeli forces will have been withdrawn to El Arish thus freeing almost all of Sinai. (In response my direct question he said strip adjacent Gulf Aqaba not within area to be freed by that time. Apparently agreement withdrawal these limits telegraphed Hammarskjold Friday following latter’s demand on Israel Thursday night in which those area and time limits designated by him.)

Reiterating early days January were vital days for Israel policy decision and stressing desire Israel “to coordinate its policy with United States policy if possible” he hoped he could be informed United States policy especially with regard:

1. Israel’s free transit Suez.

2. Freedom Israel transit Gulf Aqaba re which he said “we can never again permit a position of blockage to return”.

3. Possible reestablishment Egyptian military base in eastern Sinai and

4. Elimination Fedayeen attacks on Israel which now recurring from Jordan but under Egyptian orders.

In view grave security problems which must be considered in few days ahead he hoped for information permitting GOI coordination with United States policy. At this point he remarked “it is only when matters of life and death involved Israeli acts independently”.

He implied now Hammarskjold definitely assured by Israel to point satisfying him and presumably United Nations, could not United States government give some indication (to Ben Gurion in strict confidence if necessary) of present direction United States policy as it specifically affects security assurances Israel considers so vital to formulation of its policy in early January.

He said Ambassador Eban would seek appointment with Secretary without delay and Ben Gurion hoped it would be possible discussion points raised might take place December 26 or 27.

Eban agreed transmit his interest and wishes. At same time I pointed out broad United States policy underlining our determination support United Nations. I then commented specifically along lines Deptel 612.² I also referred to occasions when United States officials had informed Mrs. Meir we thought Israel should withdraw behind armistice line and at same time assured her United States would continue bear in mind such security problems as he had mentioned (Current Foreign Relations summary December 5).³ He recalled these generalizations but thought it important he now know “how United States bearing them in mind”.

Speaking of SYG’s negotiations with Israel and Egypt he felt there were unequal pressures exerted on Israel and stronger pressures should be exerted on Egypt in accordance with United Nations resolution on cessation of hostilities especially with regard freedom of Suez for Israel and cessation fedayeen operations against Israel. He said although his November 8 decision to withdraw Israeli troops had unanimous approval of GOI cabinet opposition developing rapidly in government and outside by press and among public. This he thought based largely on increase in fedayeen operations and Egypt’s insistence on maintaining state of war. Pressure on him to halt withdrawals very strong all week yet he had further extended them in accordance Hammarskjold’s demand.

The conversation which lasted about half hour was pleasant, unemotional and not marked by strong threatening or emphatic tone or words. Ben Gurion in Tel Aviv few days because of recurrence his lumbago under colder Jerusalem weather.⁴

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2356. Confidential. Received at 8:18 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Beirut, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, and USUN.
2. See footnote 6, Document 636.
3. Current Foreign Relations was a classified publication of the Department of State. (Master files are in Department of State, Current Foreign Relations: Lot 64 D 189) See also telegram 384, Document 628.
4. On December 23, Lawson transmitted to the Department of State the following supplementary report on his conversation with Ben Gurion: “During my talk with Ben Gurion he referred in strictest confidence to Eban’s talks of December 5 and 12 with Hammarskjold. Purpose of reference seemed to be to underscore point Israel now meeting Hammarskjold’s basic and agreed demands and that settlement problems withdrawal from Aqaba area remainder Sinai and Gaza expected to be left for later date but in meantime United States policy affecting basic security Israel and settlement Arab-Israel problem could proceed. Later Herzog of Foreign Office permitted me to have hasty glance at few passages of what he called copies verbatim record Eban–Hammarskjold talks believing Ambassador Lodge has access same… .” (Telegram 775 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2356)