Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

651. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Paris, December 12, 1956—5 p.m.

Dulte 12. Eyes only Hoover and Lodge. Have considered Lodge’s 524² suggesting that economic aid for Middle East be contributed through multilateral UN program. While I do not exclude possibility some UN multilateral aid for area, my thinking at least when I left Washington was that after having considered various media for Middle East aid and in view of necessity of US making its presence felt in area to avoid vacuum, US should seek congressional authority for military and economic aid to area which would primarily be on bilateral basis in order to exert maximum influence upon policies of certain governments and so that we would have flexibility and maneuverability.

I would not exclude possibility of using some of this through Baghdad Pact or through UN but I doubt that political situation in area justifies exclusive or primary reliance on multilateral aid through UN. Whereas we would normally want to sterilize aid against political implacability in this particular situation we may not want to do so.

I trust therefore that there be no present commitment to use UN as primary channel. This would certainly be inappropriate for military aid and in many cases economic aid would need to be geared into and related to military aid.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0080/12–1256. Confidential. Received at 3:39 p.m. Repeated to USUN.
2. Document 646. On December 11, the Department of State repeated telegram 524 from USUN to Dulles in Paris and transmitted Hoover’s comments on it in Tedul 11. Hoover advised Dulles: “I believe in view of (a) our recent decision to conduct our Middle East foreign policy on a bilateral basis and to avoid multilateral commitments, and (b) the necessity, as never before, of having our economic policies working in full harmony with our political policies, any such proposal would be basically contrary to US security interests.” Hoover also suggested that Dulles cable his views to Lodge before such a proposal was further advanced or suggest to Lodge that action await Dulles’ return and further study and review. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.00/12–1156)