Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

645. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 10, 1956—8 p.m.

Delga 307. Paris for Secretary from Lodge. Re Palestine (Depcirtel 482).² This morning I called on Hammarskjold for discussion of planning on Palestine and Suez questions. I asked Hammarskjold his views on timing of further GA action and his estimate of best time to bring up two US resolutions for GA consideration. I told him of Secretary’s great interest in keeping momentum and asked his view on bringing up Palestine resolution before Christmas recess.

Hammarskjold said that he continued believe best approach to Suez question was to avoid further discussion in GA and reactivate negotiations between British, French and Egyptians on basis of Security Council’s six principles. Existence of these negotiations would achieve purpose of our US resolution. He said Selwyn Lloyd was prepared enter these discussions promptly as was Fawzi but as yet French position was uncertain. He believed that these discussions could begin with withdrawal of British and French forces from Port Said and that since this was proceeding well, negotiations could begin very shortly. He intended in fact to begin making necessary arrangements for negotiations with parties at once. Hammarskjold said it was not only his own feeling that GA discussion was undesirable, but also feeling of parties themselves. He thought therefore that we should not proceed with our Suez resolution.

Hammarskjold said that Canal clearance operation was proceeding well although there had been difficulties over weekend about use of British ships and personnel. UK had taken position that it should be all or nothing. Either their total force of some 40 ships and some 2,000 civilians should be used or nothing. Hammarskjold said had taken position, on basis of political realities of situation, that he could not agree to this and his plan was to use only 6 of their salvage vessels. Cordier later told us only British personnel to remain on ships would be 3 on each for short time for training purposes and then ships would be operated entirely by Danish and Dutch personnel.

Re Palestine resolution, Hammarskjold was definitely opposed to raising Palestine question in Assembly before Christmas recess. He believed it could only produce bitter debate, harden positions, and make solution more difficult. This was particularly true in view of what he called “scorched earth” policy being taken by Israelis in Sinai Peninsula. He said Israel had systematically torn up the three roads running through Sinai Peninsula for a distance of 75 kilometers and had torn up as well 30 kilometers of the railroad. This was going to make it extremely difficult for UNEF to move into Sinai. Hammarskjold said General Burns had requested Israel to desist from their destruction of communications through Sinai and they had given unsatisfactory response. Result of this action by Israel, Hammarskjold feared, would be to further exacerbate Egyptian-Israeli relations.

I asked Hammarskjold if he did not think that a resolution which was basically procedural could be submitted with some chance of avoiding full scale debate. Hammarskjold said he doubted very much that this was possible. He felt previous resolutions would be brought up and debate would range over whole area of Arab-Israeli relations. He thought it might be easier to deal with procedural resolution in the SC at the appropriate time, but then only after more progress had been made on Suez settlement, including progress on Israeli freedom of transit. On latter point Hammarskjold thought Egyptians might agree to let ICJ decide Israeli rights as part of Suez settlement. Israeli contention that armistice agreement with Egypt was “dead letter” had been tactical error in his opinion and left Israeli rights to be determined in light of 1888 Convention, if Israel persisted in its attitude toward Armistice agreement.

Recommendation: I believe Near East crisis definitely impaired chances for successful negotiations on either Suez or Palestine and that in neither case would it be constructive at this time to engage in public diplomacy. Sharp focus private talks, on the other hand, are clearly desirable.

Paris telegram Secto 2³ just received. In addition to information contained in foregoing, further information re Canal clearance in immediately following telegram.⁴

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1056. Secret; Niact. Received at 9:16 p.m. Also sent to Paris.
2. Document 642.
3. In Secto 2 from Paris, December 10, Dulles reported that Lloyd had told him that day that the United Kingdom was not willing to permit its salvage vessels to remain without British crews. Dulles responded that he would undertake to obtain the latest information regarding the clearance operation. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/12–1056) A memorandum of the December 10 conversation is printed as Document 643.
4. In Delga 308, December 10, Lodge reported to the Department of State that Hammarskjöld had telephoned to convey his serious concern over insistence by the British that their crews remain with their vessels. Hammarskjöld warned that the British position would jeopardize everything that he had been doing and that otherwise arrangements for clearing the Canal were proceeding smoothly. The Secretary-General also informed Lodge that, according to what Lloyd had told the Swedish Ambassador in Paris, at a recent meeting of SCUA members an unnamed “American Ambassador” had taken the position that all SCUA members should urge upon their governments support for the use of British salvage vessels and personnel for clearing the Canal. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1056) Delga 308 was also sent to Paris.