Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

644. Memorandum of a Conversation, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, December 10, 1956, 5–7 p.m.¹

USDel/MC/5

Paris , December 10, 1956, 5–7 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Dillon
  • Mr. C.B. Elbrick
  • Mr. R. Bowie
  • Mr. W. R. Tyler
  • Mr. A. Berding
• France
  • Foreign Minister Pineau
  • Mr. L. Joxe
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Mr. J. Daridan
  • Mr. Crouy-Chanel
  • Mr. J. Roux

SUBJECT

• General Discussion of Current Situation

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; see Document 647.]

THE PROBLEM OF Nasser

Mr. Pineau resumed the conversation by asking “Quid with regard to Nasser”? He said that his government was still resolutely against him.

The Secretary said that the US government had lost confidence in Nasser sometime ago. The action we had taken was not because we love Nasser or wanted to keep him in power. We felt that if we did not stand up against the use of force to remedy such injustices as Nasser had committed, we would then have no valid argument against the use of force in other parts of the world, for example: Korea with Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa. We also had to consider the possibility that there might one day be a government in Western Germany which would want to reunite Germany by force. There were some people who felt that Hungary should be liberated by force. We feel, said the Secretary, that we must stand by the UN charter under Article 1. There was a great danger, otherwise, that smaller wars might materialize in such a way as to lead to World War III. We do not want to defend Nasser, he said, but to support the principles of the Charter of the UN, and we do not want to argue either the merits or demerits of recent actions. He said that we had not acted because we preferred the Arabs to the UK and France. We have close traditional and sentimental ties with these last two countries, whereas we have no particular ties with the Arabs… . The Secretary went on to say that he did not feel that one could change foreign governments by direct action. To try to do so usually had the opposite effect. It tended to solidify the government in question and to rally support to it. We felt that political and economic pressures against Nasser would work. On the other hand, we believe that there are certain policies which will lead the Egyptian people to feel that Nasser is not a very good leader. There are Arab leaders, the Secretary said, outside of Egypt, who are jealous and afraid of Nasser. The Egyptian economy is in bad shape, and the US had taken economic measures immediately after the seizure of the Canal, such as halting our economic aid program, our agricultural aid program, and cutting off all tourists from the US. These measures had not been taken avowedly against Nasser, but on the ground that his policies were not such as to justify normal friendly relations with Egypt. The Secretary said we had encouraged Saudi Arabia in the direction of independence of Nasser’s policies, and had given support to the Baghdad Pact and to Iraq. We think our policies will work, the Secretary said, but we do not think we can achieve our objections by directing our policies personally against Nasser. He said we can already see certain signs of disaffection in Egypt. We do not want to support Nasser, but we do not think it works to try to remove the head of any government. We say this, not because we like Nasser, he added, and recalled that he himself had said pretty strong things against Nasser publicly. However, it very rarely worked to try to force out a foreign government because this rallied support to it.

Mr. Pineau said that he had never asked the US government to choose between the Arabs and the West. He recalled that he had already mentioned the case of Nasser to the Secretary of State at the time of the bilateral talks in Washington in June, and had said that Nasser was a Soviet agent. On this point, said Mr. Pineau, he would speak very frankly and say that he regretted that the UK and France had not continued their military action for another two days so as to occupy the whole of the Canal. It was now a question either of building up Nasser or of letting him fall of his own weight, and he felt the second solution was the right one. The Secretary said he believed that the Arab countries and the Egyptian people themselves would take care of Nasser. It was the US view that if we go for Nasser and make him a symbol of martyrdom the Arabs will rally around him. The Secretary said that he believed that our policies will have the effect of discrediting Nasser, and that the Arabs will desert him, since they do not approve of his introducing Communism into the Middle East, but we should not make Nasser an open target. Mr. Pineau said that any loans should go first to the task of clearing the Canal, and that in any case no loan should be made to Nasser which he could use to buy arms from the Soviet Union. The Secretary observed that the US had no thought of extending a loan to Nasser.

ISRAEL

Mr. Pineau said that it was essential to give Israel a sense of security with regard to her neighbors, otherwise next time the situation might be worse still. He said that we must do away with the armistice regime and bring about a peace treaty. He said that he had already told Mr. Hammarskjold this. The Secretary recalled the proposals he had made on August 26, 1955, which had been supported by the UK and France, calling for a peace settlement, with defined boundaries for Israel guaranteed by the UN, and followed by the granting of loans and the development of the water resources of the region. The Secretary said that we had tried to get the Arab countries to make peace with Israel, but in vain. The possibility of achieving this was doubtless impaired by the fact that the Arab countries were already preparing to obtain arms from the Soviet Union. We were at that time unaware of the full scope of the arms negotiations with the USSR. The Secretary said that, looking back, we can now see that Egypt was striving to achieve a position of strength with regard to Israel. While it is true that Egyptian arms have now been captured in quantity by Israel, the situation has become greatly embittered by the Israeli action. The Secretary went on to say that it is important that a peace treaty be achieved, instead of an armistice. However, it is very difficult to extend guarantees to a country which does not have firm boundaries. He said that we had made a treaty with Korea, whereby we agreed to protect an Armistice line, but this was quite a different kind of line, with observer and a neutral strip of territory between the 2 parties. Mr. Pineau said that Israel was more worried by Soviet bombers in the hands of Egypt, than by the Egyptian army on the ground. The Secretary said that, in this sense, any real protection for Israel against planes is impossible. It was difficult enough for the US to figure out a way to protect itself from possible attacks by Soviet planes from 5,000 miles away; it was impossible for Israel to be effectively protected against planes from 5 miles away. He said that the bitterness of the Arabs against Israel would take a long time to die away. He thought that any Arab government now proposing the conclusion of a peace treaty with Israel would be overthrown, and that the situation was highly emotional. We had tried our best, but there was not much else we could do at this time. Mr. Pineau said that one form of reassurance to Israel would be to prevent the building of air forces in neighboring states. He said that Israel wanted to build a pipeline of 8 inches or perhaps even larger from Aqaba to Haifa, with private Western capital. He thought this would be a good idea. Mr. Pineau expressed himself in favor of introducing the US resolution on the Palestine question in the UN. The Secretary said he did not know whether we could get a ⅔ majority for it in the General Assembly because the Arabs were opposed to it. Mr. Pineau said he thought the Asian countries were less opposed to the Resolution than the Arabs were, and the Secretary agreed.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; see Document 647.]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 814. Secret. Prepared by the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting. The Embassy in Paris transmitted a summary of this conversation to the Department of State in Secto 6, Document 647.