Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

641. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, December 8, 1956—1:43 p.m.

4056. Urtel 3171.² Department’s views on role of SCUA as follows:

1. U.S. believes SCUA should be continued and will pay its share of SCUA expenses.

2. SCUA should have important role re future Canal regime which should be determined in connection with negotiations between UK, France, and Egypt under Hammarskjold’s supervision based upon six principles set forth SC Resolution Oct 13. SCUA should not attempt unilaterally to take any of actions specified in Para X, A thru D, urtel.³

3. Undoubtedly, as consequence of negotiations on six principles, SCUA will require enlargement so that it will be organization capable of speaking for all users of Canal prepared to join it, and its functions will need to be altered from what they now are under declaration of Sept 22.

4. Since arrangements for clearing of Canal including financing being developed by UNSec Gen, believe unwise for SCUA to inject itself into problem.

5. Agree Bartels comments regarding six points and eighteen-power proposals, penultimate paragraph urtel.⁴

6. Agree Barbour’s comments injection dues problem unrealistic and likely prejudice negotiations this time.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/12–656. Confidential. Drafted by Metzger; cleared by Shaw, Wilkins, Rockwell, Hoffacker, Rountree, and Lister; and signed by Rountree for Dulles.
2. Telegram 3171 from London, December 6, reported on a meeting of a small group of SCUA Council members, during which Acting Chairman Stikker had circulated draft remarks intended for an informal Council dinner meeting. The Embassy requested the Department’s comments on Stikker’s draft and general guidance on the subject. (Ibid.)
3. The points included a series of questions as to whether SCUA should either formally or informally contact Hammarskjold to inform him of SCUA’s existence and/or emphasize the importance of clearing the Suez Canal, consult on the problem of dredging the Canal, and discuss the costs involved and the problem of freedom of navigation; discuss internally whether Egypt should help bear the cost of clearance and whether SCUA would have a role in any reinvestment problem.
4. Bartels thought that SCUA should not seek agreement from its members to the six points of the Security Council resolution or to Hammarskjöld’s elaboration of them in his letter of October 24, as this might reopen discussion of the Eighteen-Power proposals which were outdated.