Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

620. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 27, 1956—10 p.m.

Delga 201. Re Palestine/Suez. In meeting this morning between Hammarskjold and Phleger, the Secretary-General dealt with following points:

[Here follows an account of Hammarskjöld’s remarks concerning the size of UNEF, the availability of forces, and the use of Canadians in UNEF.]

4. UNEF role in Canal clearance: Hammarskjold said nothing had happened to cast doubt on using UNEF for protecting Canal clearing operation but matter had not been brought any further than when he last reported.

5. Israeli attitude on withdrawal: Hammarskjold agreed that status quo ante with respect to freedom of transit in Canal and the occupation of islands in Gulf of Aqaba should not be reestablished but at same time it was a question of when was the best time and what was best manner to deal with these problems. He anticipated that Israelis would put conditions on their withdrawal under cover of satisfactory arrangements for functioning of UNEF. Hammarskjold said he had told Israelis that if this occurred, he would take matter to General Assembly. Hammarskjold agreed that UNEF should ultimately end up on Israel’s borders.

6. Financing: Hammarskjold regarded ten-million-dollar fund voted by General Assembly² as enabling establishment of force, but he would expect to turn to regular procedures for financing rest of project. He said that in passing resolution yesterday, General Assembly had not necessarily agreed to financing force on basis of regular scale of contributions. He himself was thinking in terms of loan basis for financing rather than through regular contributions. He believed that some body, like Advisory Committee, should study and report on matter. He thought that Swiss offer to assume its airlift costs provided a very good precedent.

7. UK position on withdrawal: Hammarskjold said that he had seen Selwyn Lloyd on Sunday. Lloyd had stuck to his position that withdrawal should come at end of a four-week period for establishing UNEF with clearance of Canal to begin now. Lloyd said he would give Hammarskjold a definite date on withdrawal when he was satisfied that arrangements for clearing operation were in order. Hammarskjold said Fawzi (Egypt) had told him that clearance operations could begin the day after withdrawals had been completed. Hammarskjold said he considered that Selwyn Lloyd had given clear indication that as soon as UNEF could be presented to world as going concern, British forces would withdraw. Hammarskjold felt next move would be for Lloyd to give Secretary General date on which withdrawal would be completed. In his talk with Fawzi on Sunday, Hammarskjold had asked Fawzi to obtain Egyptian government’s agreement to hold up any action on British and French nationals in Egypt which Fawzi had undertaken to recommend to Egyptian Government.

8. SYG plan for linking withdrawal and clearance: Hammarskjold said that instead of working out an agreement under which UK and France would leave it to Secretary General to determine when UNEF was sufficiently established and withdrawal would be a phased operation in agreement with General Burns, he would prefer to deal with problem of withdrawal on basis of three announcements. These should be (1) that on a certain date UNEF will have reached a specified, sufficient strength; (2) that on a certain date UK and France will have withdrawn their troops; and (3) that on a certain date clearance of Canal would begin. He believed that while these three announcements should not be presented as one dependent on other, they would in fact have a connection in nature of things. He recognized that many people believed Egyptian position on clearing Canal was unreasonable, but as an executive of General Assembly he had to act in accordance with fact that General Assembly has given clear priority to withdrawal and there was as yet no reason why withdrawal should not take place.

9. Contractual arrangements for Canal clearance: Hammarskjold said that McCloy would enter into contracts for clearance operations to which Egypt’s consent would not be required. He believed, however, that “heads of agreement” between Egypt and the UN should be established. UN would take responsibility for clearance project but he did not consider it feasible to ask Egypt to pay for it. He recognized that McCloy would have to obtain credit and UN would thus have to underwrite a loan. He was thinking of final payments coming from Canal tolls, but to try to get General Assembly to say that Egypt should pay would raise question of responsibility for present situation and this would lead to sterile debate and great difficulties.

10. Latest UK thinking on withdrawal: Phleger saw Secretary General again at 1 p.m. Secretary General said talk he had just had with Lloyd had provided some basis for encouragement but he felt he could not reveal substance at this time. He said he would react as soon as possible to latest UK views and that meanwhile Lloyd would be consulting in London.

11. SYG views on Suez settlement: Phleger then pointed out present situation must not be permitted result in status quo ante and asked whether Secretary General believed Egypt now ready negotiate in good faith on Suez settlement.

Secretary General said he not discouraged by Fawzi’s vague reply to his memo elaborating possible understanding on basis six principles,³ although it is clear Egypt will not make a concrete proposal which other side could turn down. Secretary General believes he should continue try to get both sides to accept his elaboration of principles as basis for further talks. Once this is done, he believes Egypt will agree renew discussions, but timing is critical.

He stressed he must first bring about firm understanding on withdrawal of forces and beginning of Canal clearance. Once this achieved in “publicly-presentable” form, he will press on Suez negotiations. He plans set date for resumption these negotiations as soon as possible after withdrawal-clearing agreement obtained, but two questions must appear to be separate.

Phleger then asked whether pending US resolution on Suez would be useful in this regard. Secretary General said that advantage of our proposal was that it would regularize negotiations and perhaps add a new form of pressure. However, he still believed it would be preferable to maintain his role and to seek to have discussion resumed on basis of his memorandum. At some time it might be useful to have a resolution merely asking him to press on with his efforts toward a Suez settlement, but he was not at all sure about this.

Secretary General indicated that he could not hope to get Egyptian agreement now to resume these negotiations since Egypt fears United Kingdom and France would try to use presence of their forces as form of pressure. However, Secretary General is now convinced that while United Kingdom is still seeking to use presence of its forces as form of pressure to bring about an effective UN force and agreement on early clearance of Canal, United Kingdom is no longer seeking to use their forces as a means of bringing about Suez settlement along lines of their original ideas.

He also stated he did not believe Soviet Union would attempt involve itself as a party in negotiations for Suez settlement so long as US did not do so. He did fear that India might seek to become involved through Menon but said that it was very clear to him that neither Fawzi nor Nasser wished to have Indians involved.

11. [12.] SYG views on Palestine settlement: Phleger pointed out there were disturbing indications that Nasser appears to be riding “new crest of influence”. Nasser’s activities in Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Ethiopia indicate that unless we obtain a Palestine settlement soon, Nasser may emerge as strong as ever. Secretary General said that there was no one he liked to deal with less than Nasser … . However, … Israeli action has forced us into position of appearing to support Egypt, he said, and we are still caught on that dilemma. He added “we must play Arabs down, but play them down by fair means.”

Secretary General said there was now firm evidence of Nasser’s unpopularity in much of Arab world and he felt this was card which could still be played. This, however, could only be done by US, and to do this US would have to utilize to full its new prestige in most of Arab states. He felt that US must work with stable elements in Arab world and use them to build up reaction against Nasser and in favor of an acceptable Palestine settlement.

Equally important he said was need to bring Israel to realization of need for moderation. Without Sharett, the Secretary General said, he has no channel to Israeli Government. Eban is only channel he can now use and he does not regard it as very satisfactory one.

Secretary General then commented in very general way about kind of Palestine settlement which should be sought, pointing out that refugee question would have to be handled rather separately and that any discussion of border changes would have to include some form of guarantees.

Phleger then asked Secretary General whether he thought that pending US resolution on Palestine should be kept in its present form or be made somewhat more specific. Secretary General said that it would not help to make it more specific and thought it would be dangerous to refer to past resolutions. As to timing for action on US-Palestine resolution, Secretary General said that he would have to have at least one week to nail down withdrawal-clearance problem. After that, and perhaps early during following week, it might be timely to bring up for discussion Palestine resolution. It would be a pity, he said, if nothing were done to stress UN interest in Palestine settlement before the Christmas recess. If we moved shortly after he has pinned down withdrawal-clearance matter, there would be time for adequate discussion of Palestine resolution before Christmas recess.

Secretary General also threw out name of Galo-Plaza, ex-President of Ecuador, as possible member of committee mentioned in Palestine resolution. He did this after Phleger had noted that Lieras Camargo had been named for Hungarian investigating committee.

Secretary General also pointed out that Lieras would still be available for Palestine committee.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5780/11–2756. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:49 p.m. An unsigned memorandum which lists the points made by Hammarskjöld during this conversation is ibid., 320.5700/11–2756.
2. Reference is to General Assembly Resolution 1122 (XI), adopted on November 26. The resolution authorized the Secretary-General to establish a UNEF special account with an initial amount of $10 million.
3. Reference is to Hammarskjöld’s letter to Fawzi on October 24 and Fawzi’s response on November 2. (Exchange of Correspondence Between the Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, U.N. doc. S/3728)