Office of the Historian

618. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President in Augusta, Georgia, and the Secretary of State in Key West, Florida, November 27, 1956, 9:25 a.m.1

November 27, 1956, 9:25 a.m.

The President said he has a message from Pug Ismay which is very desperate in tone.2 They have been the best of friends over the years—but now he is adopting the European conviction that we deserted our two friends in their hour of trial, and now won’t even help them out with oil and gas, etc. Whereas, we are trying to time it properly so as to help them out permanently—which they don’t seem to understand. Ismay says that the man who now seems to be kicked out will come back for sure; thinks they have done a terrible thing, and that NATO might be broken up.

Message from Britain says the boys are ready to go along with UN on assumption that cleaning up the Canal can proceed. The President thinks it is about time for us to try to make it clear that the second we know this, we can say that now we are going to make plans. Wadsworth had a talk with King Saud—and Saud seemed reassured when they gave him timing on troops being brought out.

Mr. Dulles mentioned George Humphrey’s conversation yesterday with Rab Butler.3 Dulles’ feeling is that we will just have to give them those few days.

The President agrees on taking no action. But since we said the second they gave just an indication, we would resume our great effort. (Citing an example, from Dillon’s message of transmittal: [Page 1203] service stations are refusing to fill American cars with gas; taxis are refusing to pick up Americans.)

Mr. Dulles said of course that is bad—but it is awfully hard to see how we can begin to use that oil to meet their needs before they have indicated that they would comply with the UN Resolution. The President said the public does not know this, and wondered if we shouldn’t let it be known? Mr. Dulles thinks the public need not know, that a public statement might do more harm than good because it would look as though we were publicly subjecting them to pressure, which would be resented. He feels they would prefer to act under their own steam. The President’s only thought was to say that we understand they are going to comply.

The President will reply to Ismay by saying simply that this is exactly what we are working on and to please sit tight. We are doing everything that is humanly possible.4

[Here follows discussion of Secretary Dulles’ schedule.]

Mr. Dulles said we must make it clear that our position does not in any way mean we are trying to be friendly with the Arabs for the price of our British friendship. Once that principle is recognized, everything else falls into place.

This gave the President the idea that, while the Secretary could develop this subject in a press conference, he should perhaps say something on that order right now. He will get up a very short statement, which he will ask Jim Hagerty to phone back to Mr. Dulles for approval.

The President expressed concern about the kind of thing that is beginning to spread through documents: “might compel their withdrawal from the UN.”

The Secretary said it was they who double-crossed us, and now are trying to put the blame on us. He said, “Nothing has been stronger and clearer than your letters to Eden.”

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Prepared in the Office of the President. Eisenhower took a working vacation in Augusta November 26–December 13. (Record of the President’s Daily Appointments; ibid.) Dulles was in Key West November 18–December 2, convalescing after surgery. (Dulles’ Appointment Book; Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
  2. Lord Ismay’s message to Eisenhower consisted of oral remarks Ismay made to Dillon in Paris on November 25. Dillon transmitted Ismay’s message in a telegram. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Name Series, Lord Ismay, and Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–2756)↩

  3. No memorandum of this conversation has been found in Department of State files. Humphrey spoke to Eisenhower on the telephone at 9:30 a.m., November 26, and described his conversation with Butler as follows: “He [Butler] told a couple of encouraging things, and some suspicious. One encouraging thing: He was very grateful for picking up right where we left off. The principal thing he wanted was time. He said he has a difficult situation, and, if we could just not interfere with him—not have any more resolutions—he would appreciate it very much indeed. He wound up by saying we would hear from him as soon as he could get his affairs arranged.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

    Butler describes a telephone conversation with Humphrey which took place around the end of November in The Art of the Possible, The Memoirs of Lord Butler (Boston: Gambit Inc., 1972), p. 195.

    ↩
  4. Eisenhower’s message to Ismay, dated November 27, was transmitted through Dillon. Copies are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Name Series, Lord Ismay and in Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–2756. Subsequent correspondence between Eisenhower and Ismay on this matter is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Suez Crisis.↩