Office of the Historian

6. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 27, 1956, 5 p.m.1

Washington, July 27, 1956, 5 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

  • Secretary Hoover
  • Colonel Goodpaster

The President had just received a message from Sir Anthony Eden,2 and had asked Mr. Hoover to come over to discuss the Suez situation. The message had requested a U.S. representative at discussions in London and indicated they would be happy to have Secretary Dulles come. It had also spoken of readiness to use force in the situation created by Egyptian seizure of the Canal Company.

On the first point, after discussion, the President decided to notify Eden that Deputy Under Secretary Murphy would go to London immediately, arriving on Sunday. He told Mr. Hoover that Secretary Dulles, on arriving from South America, could decide whether he felt he should join the conference. Regarding the possible use of force, unless the United States limited itself to providing arms, it would be necessary to call Congress back into session. Mr. Hoover said that if the United Kingdom intervenes with force, the appearance would be simply protecting its 400,000 shares of stock. On the other hand, if the British or the French were to pull out their pilots, insurance companies would not then cover ships in passage through the Canal; the result would be a halt in operations. If they tried to seize or hold the pilots, the UK would undoubtedly use force, and would undoubtedly be justified in the eyes of the world. (Later information indicated that the insurance [Page 12] companies would not cancel coverage if the European pilots were to leave.) Secretary Hoover said he felt we must be very cautious and reserved about thinking of going in with forces to carry out the broad objectives Eden had indicated. Before we come to that, there are several steps to be gone through.

The President said he doubted if we would use force unless they attacked our people. Secretary Hoover said, however, that it is his feeling, in which Secretary Humphrey agrees, that we must move strongly in the Middle East—otherwise the whole Western position will be quickly challenged.

After further discussion, the President asked Mr. Hoover to notify the top leaders of both parties in Congress on a most secret and confidential basis that the situation might get so serious that they might have to be called back into session. They could be told that this development has the most serious implications for the Western world. If the movement of oil were interfered with, or if the pipelines were cut, we would be faced with a critical situation. The President phoned the Vice President3 and asked him to convey the above to Senators Johnson and Knowland. He asked Secretary Hoover to talk to them too, and also to call Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Martin.

The President asked Mr. Hoover to bring the Joint Chiefs of Staff up to date on the matter. Mr. Hoover indicated he was keeping Arthur Flemming informed, and the President indicated that this action was correct.

The President dictated a brief note to Eden, which was quickly put into final form and transmitted. (I phoned it to Secretary Hoover’s office for dispatch.)4

G
Colonel CE, US Army
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 30.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. A summary memorandum of this telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Richard Nixon is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.↩

  4. The response to Eden, telephoned by the White House to the State Department at 5:30 p.m. for transmittal to London, reads as follows:

    “Your cable just received. To meet immediate situation we are sending Robert Murphy to London to arrive there Sunday or very early Monday. In view of Foster’s long trip, I doubt that he will be able to join in these talks, particularly since he could scarcely reach there Monday in any event.

    “I shall not take time in this cable to outline for you the trend of our own thinking. While we agree with much that you have to say, we rather think there are one or two additional steps that you and we might profitably consider. Murphy will be prepared to talk these over with Selwyn Lloyd.

    “We are of the earnest opinion that the maximum number of maritime nations affected by the Nasser action should be consulted quickly in the hope of obtaining an agreed basis of understanding. DE” (Ibid., International File) The message was transmitted in telegram 545 to London, July 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7–2756) It was delivered to Eden on the morning of July 28. (Telegram 513 from London, July 28; ibid., 974.7301/7–2856)

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