584. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions1
411. Following guidance relates to US actions and intentions regarding oil supply for Europe. It not for publication but may be used discreetly in response inquiries from senior officials various governments who have inquired or may inquire on these points. They also should be cautioned against publicity at this time. Principal purpose this information is to alleviate uneasiness based on [Page 1144] uncertainty re US intentions and remove any feeling US indifferent to European problem.
US Govt had established Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC) of principal oil companies which had prepared plan of action for dealing cooperatively with problem oil supply to Europe in event of shortages created by closure of Suez Canal which seemed, in August and September, likely result from action by Egypt. Committee is still in existence and still authorized work together on oil problem. It has not been active, however, since British, French, Israeli action against Egypt. Its plan somewhat out of date but American companies now attempting correct deficiencies therein.
US Govt’s decision initially to suspend committee work was due to desire appraise situation in light of new developments and different than anticipated cause for Canal closing. Decisions to date not to reactivate committee as yet have been based on two principal considerations:
- 1.
- We did not wish by action in MEEC, involving as it did British, French observers and requiring close cooperation with British, French industry committee in London, to give any impression of support British-French action against Egypt, especially as such impression would have seriously impaired our position in UN.
- 2.
- We wished avoid any impression which might have been created by starting committee that could have led Arab oil producing states either to sabotage additional facilities or impose additional restrictions on use of oil.
Both foregoing considerations and especially latter still seem valid though in lesser degree than week ago. We still do not wish upset by premature efforts at coordinating oil supply delicate negotiations regarding UN role in Egypt or give excuse for sabotaging Tapline in particular which would reduce the effectiveness of a coordinated effort to approximately same level as present uncoordinated effort.
Latter while less efficient than coordinated effort pooling same resources, facilities and shipping, nonetheless is important since all oil companies are doing utmost on individual basis maintain maximum supplies throughout the world.
We expect, assuming continued favorable development of situation in Egypt, to be able undertake coordinated supply effort soon involving cooperation through OEEC. This is not guarantee to do so. Still less is it attempt specify date for action. Nonetheless we seriously concerned with oil supply problems particularly in Europe which we following closely. Believe we have full appreciation possible consequences in economic, social, political, and military spheres if oil supplies to Europe should be markedly reduced and criticism [Page 1145] we would face plus damage our objectives in Western Europe if, when we able to help, we should withhold the additional efficiency which a coordinated effort would introduce to improve Europe’s oil supply.
Deeply interested your continuing appraisal of situation. Regret lack of earlier guidance. Will notify soonest any decision taken to activate coordination supply effort if, as now expected, this proves possible in near future.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.04/11–1756. Confidential. Drafted by Moline; cleared by Flemming, Beckner, Elbrick, Timmons, and Rountree; and approved by Kalijarvi. Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, Vienna, Oslo, Stockholm, The Hague, and Lisbon.↩