561. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

1406. Took advantage call on Nasser re UN Force (Embtel 1404)2 also to discuss Soviet moves in line Deptel 1457 and circ 372.3 Nasser replied “you need not worry about that” and then repeated familiar theme that Egypt had had long struggle to get rid of foreign domination and did not intend repeat that experience. [Page 1097] Added “I don’t trust any big power.” Laughed when I mentioned Soviet proposal to join with USG in ousting British and French by force. Did not however give impression of feeling anything especially involved except expediency.

Nasser then launched into discussion of events last 10 days. Said although air force hit very hard army still in good fighting trim. Most important, however, was morale Egyptian people which was higher than ever before and unity of Arabs which stronger than before. British and French on other hand had gained nothing except loss prestige and increased hatred of Arabs which made impossible their maintaining position in area, and prospect of severe economic strain in France and Britain when impact of canal closing becomes felt. He professed be unable understand why British and French had embarked on such a senseless venture.

The asserted collapse of prestige of Britain and France in area led Nasser to oft-repeated conclusion that if tie with West was to be maintained it would have to be with US, which would however be handicapped to extent that it might be bound by British and French or Israeli ties. However a United States steering an independent course should have no special difficulty in reaching an understanding with Egypt and other Arab states.

In conversation Nasser referred to destruction in Port Said in lurid terms of a city ¾ destroyed by fire, terrorized population, 10,000 refugees, etc. Difficult conclude whether he more or less believed or accounting for effect.4

Hare
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5780.11–856. Received at 1:38 a.m., November 10. A marginal notation by Goodpaster on a copy in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series reads: “Noted by President 12 Nov. 56”.
  2. In telegram 1404 from Cairo, November 8, Hare reported that Nasser was still considering Hammarskjöld’s message of November 7 which had asked whether Egypt would object to the participation of Canadian, Colombian, Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish troops in the force to be stationed on Egyptian territory. Nasser told Hare that he would be meeting with his advisers on the subject and raised the question of public impact, if “Her Majesty’s British troops were replaced by Her Majesty’s Canadians”. Hare stressed to Nasser the importance of an immediate and favorable response to Hammarskjöld. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5780/11–856; the text of Hammarskjöld’s November 7 message is in Delga 24 from USUN, November 7; ibid., 320.5780/11–756)
  3. Documents 530 and 552, respectively.
  4. In telegram 1419 from Cairo, November 9, Hare verified that photographs of Port Said showed extreme damage and many grim human details. (Department of State, Central Files, 684a.86/11–956)