Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

559. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 8, 1956¹

Washington, November 8, 1956

SUBJECT

• Withdrawal of Israel Troops from Egypt

PARTICIPANTS

• The Acting Secretary
• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
• NEA—Mr. William M. Rountree
• NE—Mr. Donald C. Bergus

Mr. Eban handed the Acting Secretary copies of Mr. Ben Gurion’s reply to the President’s message (attached).² A similar message had gone forward to the United Nations Secretary General who had expressed satisfaction.³ The Secretary General wished to discuss arrangements with Mr. Eban on November 9.

The Acting Secretary asked if the Israel Prime Minister were agreeing to withdraw behind the armistice line. Mr. Eban said he was not authorized to interpret the Prime Minister’s message but that he could say he was instructed to take up these arrangements with the Secretary General. The Acting Secretary inquired concerning Gaza. Mr. Eban said that Israel did not want vacuums created in the area and for this reason he had been told to begin discussions with the Secretary General on this point as well as other arrangements. Israel’s response to the call for withdrawal had been similar to that of the British and French. The Secretary General had said that Israel’s response would enable him to act.

Mr. Eban said that the Israel Government had been concerned over reports of Soviet activities in the area, including the concentration of weapons in Syria and Egypt and the inspiration of fedayeen activities. He pointed to the recent upsurge of fedayeen activity from Syria and Jordan. Israel had asked the Secretary General to express to Soviet representatives Israel’s fears on this point. The Acting Secretary pointed out that the United States had thought for a number of months that these developments might take place.

Mr. Eban said Israel felt that the reassertion of Western unity in the Near East was one of the best things that could happen. The Soviet Union was probably telling the Arabs that the Soviet intervention had had its effect. This would raise Soviet prestige to new heights.

Mr. Eban said that Israel took very seriously the promise of the President’s letter⁴ that there would be no going back to the status quo ante. This was very urgent with respect to Egypt. The Egypt-Israel armistice agreement was in ruins, the others remained. We would lack statesmanship if we did not seize this opportunity. As for the draft resolutions submitted by the United States, Israel had some suggestions which Mr. Eban would be presenting to Ambassador Lodge. Israel felt that the resolution should put responsibility on the parties to negotiate.

The Acting Secretary pointed out that our draft resolution created a Commission with very broad powers and responsibilities.

Mr. Eban referred to Mr. Ben Gurion’s desire to visit the United States. Mr. Ben Gurion felt that Israel and the United States should be drawing closer together. Once the ceasefire and withdrawal had been implemented there would be a great opportunity. Mr. Ben Gurion would still like to come and discuss these matters with President Eisenhower. Mr. Ben Gurion had not been to the United States since the President assumed office.

The Acting Secretary said he did not know the President’s plans for the next few weeks and that he was unable to answer for him. Israel’s action in withdrawing its forces would be taken with the great feeling that all were gratified that Israel was complying with the General Assembly’s request.

Mr. Eban referred to the third paragraph of the Prime Minister’s message. While these were not conditions they were very important matters requiring United Nations action. This was Israel’s policy.

A discussion was held at the conclusion of the meeting concerning the release of the President’s letter and the Prime Minister’s reply. Mr. Eban was sure that the full text of both communications would be read by the Prime Minister in a speech which he had probably already started to give in Israel. Accordingly, it was agreed that the White House would release both texts at 7 p.m. on November 8.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–856. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on November 9.
2. Infra.
3. U.N. doc. A/3320.
4. Document 550.
5. For texts of both letters, see Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1956, pp. 797–798. Copies are also in Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–856.