557. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 8, 1956, 10:45 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Proposal that Israel Prime Minister Visit the United States
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
- NEA—Mr. William M. Rountree
- NE—Mr. Donald C. Bergus
There was a discussion of the transmission of the President’s message of November 7 to the Israel Prime Minister. Mr. Shiloah stated that a copy of the text which he had transmitted at 2 a.m. Washington time on November 8 had arrived in Israel at 8 a.m. Washington time.2
[Page 1090]Mr. Eban said he had had two telephone conversations with Mr. Ben Gurion and was exchanging telegrams with him regarding the broad international context of recent developments. A profound process of reconsideration was going on within the Israel Government. Mr. Eban had talked to the Prime Minister in the early hours of the morning. Ben Gurion’s concern was so great that he wished to come to the United States for discussions with the President and the United Nations Secretary-General. Mr. Eban asked if this could be arranged. He recommended that Mr. Ben Gurion be brought to the United States within the next day or two. The President’s message had been a profound document, but more than documents were needed at this time. A suitable formula for Mr. Ben Gurion’s visit could be worked out. It could be said that he was coming as head of the Israel Delegation to the United Nations. Mr. Ben Gurion would not set out on this journey, however, unless he was assured that the President would receive him for substantive discussion.
Apart from that, Mr. Eban was pressing his Government for a reply to the President’s message. He thought the reply would be in the direction the United States wished but he did not know what degree of finality it would have.
Mr. Rountree indicated that he would take up this matter urgently with the highest levels of the Department. He was sure they would hope that Mr. Ben Gurion did not intend to await our views on his proposal to visit the United States before replying to the President’s message. Mr. Eban confirmed that he was expecting a reply to the President’s message within the next few hours.
Mr. Eban said that in yesterday’s conversation in the Acting Secretary’s office, Mr. Rountree had rightly referred to Mr. Ben Gurion’s assurance, conveyed to the Secretary by Mr. Eban on November 1, that Israel would not hold on to any territory occupied as a result of present military operations. Mr. Eban confirmed that he had given this assurance and said that he had reminded the Prime Minister of it last night. It was still the Prime Minister’s position that Israel would withdraw from the territory under conditions which would assure Israel’s security and maritime freedom. A United Nations force at the Suez Canal might leave a vacuum in Sinai which fedayeen and other irresponsible elements could exploit to Israel’s detriment. To leave a vacuum in Sinai would be irresponsible. The question of Israel’s withdrawal involved not only what Israel did but how Israel did it.
Mr. Rountree pointed out that the United Nations had asked for immediate withdrawal unconditionally. We felt that failure to respond would endanger world peace. Mr. Eban mentioned remarks made in the General Assembly by Ambassador Lodge about a [Page 1091] phased solution. Mr. Rountree pointed out that Mr. Lodge had spoken of phasing in terms of days, not in terms of a solution.
Mr. Eban stated that there were many aspects to be considered in an Israel withdrawal in favor of a United Nations force. Such questions as the place where the United Nations force is stationed, the effect on Israel’s maritime communications, were not details but matters of cosmic importance. The questions as to how these things were done could make the difference between peace and war. It was such matters as these which the Israel Prime Minister wished to discuss.
Mr. Rountree agreed that the question of Israel’s withdrawal was a decision of peace or war. Mr. Eban said that Israel would not live the next eight years in manner she had lived during the last eight. Mr. Rountree said that we agreed that the situation could not go on as it had. That was why the United States had put forward its two resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly. There was a profound feeling that the next and immediate step was the withdrawal of Israel forces. This was important not only in terms of the Near East but also in Western-Soviet relations and the relationship between the United States and Israel.
Mr. Rountree felt that before a definite response could be given to Mr. Ben Gurion’s request to visit the United States, there should be an opportunity to consider his reply to the President’s message.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A/11–856. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on November 9. The time of the meeting is from a memorandum from Rountree to Hoover, November 8. (Ibid., 784A.13/11–856)↩
- See Document 550 and footnote 1 thereto.↩
-
In a memorandum to Hoover dated November 8, Rountree summarized the remarks made by Eban at this meeting and commented that the Israeli Ambassador had left the impression that Israel still intended to attach political conditions to a withdrawal. Rountree also noted:
“We believe that among the motives behind the Israel request [for Ben-Gurion to visit the United States] are: 1) stalling for time; 2) a desire in this dramatic way to give the rest of the world the impression that close collaboration between the United States and Israel continues. We believe the visit would be construed as bypassing the UN and would bring unfavorable reactions both among the Afro-Asian group and the NATO countries.”
Rountree recommended to Hoover that the Department should await Ben Gurion’s written reply to the President before answering Eban, and he advised that his current inclination was to inform Israel that the United States could not consider a meeting between Eisenhower and Ben Gurion until Israel had complied with U.N. resolutions. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.13/11–856) A marginal notation on this document reads: “Approved by Acting Secy and the Pres on firm basis—‘after compliance’.”
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