539. Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)1

On being informed by Mr. Hoover (who had been called by the President) that the President had received a call from Eden this morning2 in which Eden asked for and obtained the President’s agreement to his coming to Washington with Mollet tonight, Governor Adams and I met with the President to take up with him some questions that seemed to arise in connection with such a visit. The major point was the possible appearance that we were now concerting action in the Middle East independently of the UN action. The President said he had made clear that there could be no departure by the French and British from their agreement on cease-fire, and said that Eden had asked for the meeting because of the developing threat from Russia.

The President talked to Eden a second time,3 indicating that the [Page 1044] United States is committed to the Hammarskjold plan, and that he had considered the meeting’s purpose to be to concert our positions in NATO and for the future. If, by any chance, Eden and Mollet were not in agreement, it would be very unfortunate to have a communiqué issued which would indicate we are in disagreement.

While the call was in progress, Mr. Hoover came into the President’s office. When the call had ended he said we must be very careful not to give the impression that we are teaming with the British and French. He said he had talked to Secretary Dulles by phone, who said he was very much opposed to the visit at this time. I suggested to the President the desirability of letting Hammarskjold know about the visit, so he would not be thrown off balance in his efforts. Mr. Hoover said we would have to get out to the world that we have not changed our principles and our position. He said the Soviets have offered Egypt 250,000 volunteers (I left the meeting to call Allen Dulles for a check of this.) Mr. Hoover also said there is danger of a complete turn-about by the Arabs in this matter, placing themselves in opposition to Hammarskjold’s efforts. The Russians are making great efforts to put themselves in the position of liberators.

Governor Adams asked the President whether he was still thinking of having the Congressional leaders in on Friday, and the President said he was. After further discussion the President decided to call Eden again and say that the timing of the visit was bad, and that it should be postponed.4 In discussion it was suggested that he might refer to the dangers of throwing Hammarskjold—who is having a hard time getting the Egyptians and Israelis to unconditional agreement to cease fire—off balance, the possibility of having General Gruenther—who is known to have the complete confidence of the President—go up to London to see what the British view the Russian threat to be, etc.

Secretary Humphrey (who joined the meeting) said he appreciated how hard it was for the President to tell a man that he wouldn’t talk to him, but thought that the timing question was overriding. The President said he had really looked forward to talking with Eden, and was quite disappointed. The President then called Eden who accepted what the President said, though with obvious disappointment.

[Page 1045]

I obtained at this point additional intelligence data which gave increased indications regarding the Russian threat, although nothing solid seemed to be involved.

G
Colonel CE, US Army
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.
  2. See Document 536.
  3. See supra.
  4. See infra.