Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

511. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 5, 1956, 6:15 p.m.¹

Washington, November 5, 1956, 6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Maneuvers on the Middle East Situation; Franco-American Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Alphand of France
• Minister Lucet, French Embassy
• Mr. Murphy, G
• Mr. Elbrick, EUR
• Mr. Bennett, G

Ambassador Alphand said that since he had arrived at the Department he had been handed a news ticker regarding reported Soviet messages to Eden and Mollet in which the Soviet Union spoke of its “full determination” to settle the Middle East situation by force if necessary and raised the specter of attacks on Britain and France from a “stronger power”, if they did not desist in their Suez action.² The Ambassador expressed concern over this news. Mr. Murphy commented that the Soviets were obviously trying to divert attention from their actions in Hungary through a propaganda move on the Middle East. He went on to say that this was evident also in the approach to the United States inviting us to join with the Soviet Union in intervening in the Middle East. All of these things taken together might mean that Soviet reactions and policy are developing in a spirit of recklessness with respect to the present situation.

Ambassador Alphand then declared in an accusing tone that all this could have been foreseen. He himself had foreseen the Soviet brutality in Hungary on last Saturday when he had encountered a certain optimism in the Department over talks between the Soviets and the Hungarians and the possibility of a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. He said that we must look at the situation with our eyes open and must realize that the Soviets have not changed. It will be a great mistake if we allow the Soviets to get away with their attempt to link their brutal actions in Hungary with the British and French action at Suez. Mr. Murphy responded that American eyes have been open for a number of months on this issue and that was why we had been so convinced that allied military action in the Middle East would precipitate a whole chain of events, not all of which could be foreseen or controlled. The Ambassador replied with some heat that he could not agree that the UK-French action and the Soviet behavior in Hungary are connected in any way. He stressed his long association with Soviet affairs and expressed his regrets over the way the American press has been linking the two situations. He implied that the press had been receiving official guidance in treating the two situations as linked together and said that he had been told by a “high source” that the press treatment had been inspired by the Administration. Mr. Murphy advised the Ambassador very emphatically that there was no truth in this information. There had been no such guidance to the press on the part of the U.S. Government. He said that it was undeniable, however, that many nations around the world do see the situation just that way and, unfortunately, do draw a connection between the two situations. Ambassador Alphand replied that he could not accept the “bad example” of the UK and France in the Middle East as parallel with the Soviet behavior in Hungary. Mr. Murphy reiterated that there is no desire or intention on the part of the U.S. Government to link the two situations but that it cannot be denied that the Soviet Union is exploiting the situation propaganda-wise. That is the problem—the allied action in Suez has made it possible for the Soviet Union to divert attention from its own misdeeds in Hungary. The Ambassador said he could not accept that interpretation. Mr. Murphy repeated that this government has never said the two situations were similar and said that he hoped the Ambassador would not make any such report to Paris. Mr. Elbrick pointed out to the Ambassador that the French and the Americans understand the difference between the two situations but unfortunately many other countries around the world do not understand the difference. Mr. Murphy emphasized that this was an important point, and we would want it clearly understood in Paris that the American Government had taken no such position. Later in the conversation the Ambassador again reverted to the alleged guidance to the press by the Administration, and Mr. Murphy once again repeated that there was nothing in the story. He went on to say that, if it would be of assistance to the Ambassador, we would be glad to clarify the matter with the correspondents. Mr. Murphy expressed regret that the Ambassador would give credence to such a story in view of his long familiarity with the American scene, and the Ambassador insisted that he had not given any credence to the story but had just reported what he had been told.

Mr. Murphy then said that he believed it was time to bring up a problem which is of great concern to this government. He referred to critical statements about the United States reported as being made by Foreign Minister Pineau. He said that one statement in particular regarding the activities of our Embassy in Cairo is unthinkable.³ Mr. Murphy went on to say that Mr. Pineau’s suspicions of the United States appear to be past belief. He stressed that intimate Franco-American relations are in fact a cornerstone of American foreign policy, and this government has been deeply concerned over attitudes taken by the French Foreign Minister. He told the Ambassador that we would appreciate anything he might do to create a better feeling in Paris and to restore the warmth of US-French relations. The Ambassador said that the fostering of good relations between our two countries is indeed his mission in this country, and he pledged himself to do everything in his power to improve the situation.

Ambassador Alphand said he would now like to turn to the subject matter which was the basis for his visit to the Department, namely, the messages today from the Soviet Government to the U.S., Britain and France and to the United Nations regarding intervention in the Middle East situation. Mr. Murphy said that with respect to Bulganin’s message to President Eisenhower suggesting joint US-Soviet intervention in the Middle East, that matter was under discussion at the White House at this very moment, and he did not know what decision would be made regarding a reply. He referred to the discourtesy shown by the Soviets in publishing the message before we had even received it and said that, despite previous Soviet provocations of this nature, the President had decided not to make public his message of yesterday to Bulganin on Hungary. The obvious propaganda effort made by the Soviets with respect to today’s Bulganin message, however, will provide an opportunity for the President to “lay it on the line” and make it emphatically clear that we will not accept unilateral action in the Middle East outside the efforts being made by the UN to solve the problem.

Mr. Murphy also referred to Shepilov’s message today to Secretary General Hammerskjold requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the Suez action and suggesting that the UN call on the U.S. and the USSR to give arms and other aid to Egypt. Mr. Murphy said that we had not completed our analysis of this message but that it seems to indicate one of two things: (1) a diversionary action to take away attention from the situation in Hungary and (2) a real intention on the part of the Soviet Union to intervene in the Middle East. Our impression is that their action was motivated by the first alternative, but we cannot afford to exclude the possibility that it is the second. Ambassador Alphand pointed out that, if the Soviets should intervene directly against British and French troops, NATO obligations would come into play. Mr. Murphy suggested that the Soviets might choose to operate indirectly, say through Syria or through the use of Moslem volunteers to fight on the side of Egypt.

Ambassador Alphand stated that the latest news in his possession indicated that Egypt now denies having accepted a cease-fire as was reported earlier today. He called attention to another report he had received to the effect that 350 French marines have been taken prisoner by the Egyptians and will be paraded through the streets of Cairo. The Ambassador expressed grave concern over where such an action by Egypt might lead. Mr. Elbrick pointed out that our military information is to the fact that Egypt has accepted the UN call for a cease-fire. The Ambassador commented that this would, of course, be advantageous for Egypt and, in response to a question from Mr. Murphy, said that he had no information indicating a weakening on the part of Nasser. Mr. Murphy said that we had received a few reports which indicated some desire on the part of Nasser to work out a compromise and that made it all the more important to have a full understanding between ourselves and the French and the British at this time.

Ambassador Alphand said that the principal purpose of his call was to learn how we planned to handle the Shepilov communication to the UN; Mr. Murphy replied that we were still studying it. In that connection, he thought our action in the UN speaks for itself. He thought it could be anticipated that our action would continue along the lines already being followed.

In a further reversion to the importance of Franco-American understanding, Ambassador Alphand said that we would be trapped if we allowed the Soviets to divide us. In that connection he mentioned another rumor that he had heard that the U.S. was planning to take the leadership of the Bandung powers against “colonialism”. Mr. Murphy commented that that was indeed a wild rumor and one without any basis whatsoever in fact. Ambassador Alphand went on to express the opinion that, even if the British-French action should succeed in Egypt in the next few days, it would not settle the Algerian question. He would still be recommending to Paris a more liberal policy on Algeria and in connection with other African problems.

Minister Lucet inquired regarding the position the U.S. would take at tonight’s session of the General Assembly.⁴ Mr. Murphy said that he had been busy with other matters and was uninformed as to late developments, but asked Mr. Bennett to look into the matter and telephone Mr. Lucet.

On departing, Ambassador Alphand mentioned the reported damage to oil pipelines in Syria and said to Mr. Murphy that he would want to have a talk in the near future about oil for Europe.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/11–556. Secret. Drafted by Bennett.

2. Between 9:45 and 10 p.m. Moscow time (2:45 to 3 p.m. Washington time) on November 5, the Soviet Home Service broadcast the texts of messages from Bulganin to Eden, Mollet, and Ben Gurion. The texts of these three messages are printed in United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957, pp. 183–188.

   In his message to Eden, Bulganin asked: “In what position would Britain have found herself had she been attacked by more powerful states possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction?” In separate messages to Eden and Mollet, Bulganin informed these leaders of his proposal to the United States “to use, together with other members of the United Nations, naval and air forces in order to stop the war in Egypt and to curb aggression.” He added the warning: “We are full of determination to crush the aggressor and reestablish peace in the East by using force.” In his letter to Ben Gurion, Bulganin strongly condemned Israeli actions against Egypt, expressed the expectation that the Israeli Government would “come to its senses before it is too late,” and informed Ben Gurion that the Soviet Ambassador in Israel was being recalled to Moscow.

3. In telegram 2186 from Paris, November 5, Dillon reported that, according to British Ambassador Jebb, Pineau believed that Nasser was prepared to resign on November 3 and that he only changed his mind after Ambassador Hare called on him and informed him of continued support of the U.S. Government and urged him not to resign. Dillon also reported that Pineau was apparently spreading this story throughout French Government circles in Paris. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/11–556)
4. The Security Council, not the General Assembly, met during the evening of November 5; see Document 514.