509. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 5, 1956, 5 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Governor Adams
- Secretary Hoover
- Mr. Phleger
- Mr. Hagerty
- Emmet Hughes
- Colonel Goodpaster
Mr. Hoover observed that the President had read the Bulganin note, and Bohlen’s comment on it.2 He handed the President a proposed statement to be issued by the White House on the matter.3
The President said that there should be a passage indicating that the United Nations, including the United States, would oppose any effort to violate the UN plan. In other words, we should give the Soviets a clear warning.
The President said his concern is that the Soviets, seeing their position and their policy failing so badly in the satellites, are ready to take any wild adventure. He thought it might be well to have a full-dress session of the NSC to examine the matter.
Mr. Phleger said the Soviets are making their offer to go in through the UN, and the President said our representative should say to the Arab States, “do you want the Soviets in the Middle East doing what they are now doing in Hungary?”
Mr. Hoover said the British and the French may be in a position from which they cannot pull back until Nasser is out. The question may well be “Eden or Nasser.” He added that Nasser’s position is wobbly at the moment. The President said this is something quite [Page 1001] new since the British have always said their aim was to “deflate” Nasser. Mr. Hoover suggested for consideration the possibility that Hammarskjold tell Nasser he must resign… .
The President commented again how concerned he is over the possibility of Soviet armed intervention. He said the Soviets are scared and furious, and there is nothing more dangerous than a dictatorship in this state of mind. He referred to Hitler’s last days in this connection.
The President, in following a suggestion, said he would like to send a message to Nehru to bring Nehru’s weight to bear on the side of peace and a limitation of the hostilities.4
The President next reported that he intended for Governor Adams to send out on Wednesday a request for the Legislative Leaders to meet on Thursday or Friday. The group he had in mind would include the leaders on both sides, and the top men of both sides in the foreign affairs and military affairs committees.
The President then indicated, at the request of the State Department representatives, the general lines of the message he would like to send to Nehru.
Colonel CE, U S Army
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 7.↩
- Documents 505 and 506, respectively.↩
- Not found.↩
- Shortly after 1 a.m. on November 6, the Department of State transmitted to the Embassy in New Delhi for delivery the text of a message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Nehru dated November 5, which had been approved by Eisenhower at 11 p.m. The President also directed that the text of Bulganin’s message to Eisenhower of November 5 and the White House statement made in reply be sent to Nehru. In his message to Nehru, Eisenhower affirmed the need “to exert the greatest possible restraint lest this situation radically deteriorate”, and he expressed the hope that Nehru would add his “powerful voice to those counselling restraint with regard to this proposal for expanded military action.” Eisenhower noted that “the United States has only one purpose in this matter—to support the United Nations in removing the threat to peace, and to restore peace and justice in the area,” and he asked Nehru for any suggestions for additional action to assist in this situation. (Telegram 1176 to New Delhi, November 6; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–656)↩