502. Draft Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden 1
Dear Anthony : I have both your cables. First off, let me assure you that you cannot possibly feel more saddened than I about the temporary but admittedly deep rift that has occurred in our thinking as respect of [sic] the Mid East situation. It cannot fail to have some harmful effect upon our joint efforts as we pursue the great objective of a peaceful world.
This morning I have news that your troops have begun landing. In a sense this creates a new problem, but I believe that the peace plans under development in the United Nations are sufficiently flexible so that this incident will not completely defeat them.
The big thing now is to prevent the situation from becoming more tense and difficult. It is possible that Nasser, knowing the United Nations is working on a peaceful solution might take the “cease fire” very seriously and temporarily accept the landings without opposition. Thus he would avoid actual military contact until he could see what might develop. It would appear that the basic objective of your own military action would be largely accomplished by the landings themselves, providing no serious fighting or disorder ensues. If no serious fighting came out, I think your [Page 990] position in the area and before world opinion would be tremendously eased.
One way in which serious disorders might be avoided would be keeping troops out of contact with any heavy concentrations of the civil population. In this way you would not get a great police function on your hands which you might not be able to drop easily.
If we could have for the next two or three days a period of relative calm while your troops did nothing but land, we might much more swiftly develop a solution that would be acceptable to both sides and to the world.
I have no doubt that you have thought over all these things most carefully and prayerfully, but I think at the same time that the French, in what has seemed to me to be a rather irrational approach to this whole matter, could be far less restrained and therefore make greater difficulties for all of us.
As you say, Harold’s financial problem is going to be a serious one, and this itself I think would dictate a policy of the least possible provocation.
In the meantime, no matter what our differences in the approach to this problem, please remember that my personal regard and friendship for you, Harold, Winston2 and so many others is unaffected. On top of this, I assure you I shall do all in my power to restore to their full strength our accustomed practices of cooperation just as quickly as it can be done.
New subject. Since dictating the above, I have been informed that the Soviets have made the move that from the first I feared would be their reaction. I am told that in Moscow they have released a statement to the effect that they are demanding that the United States join them in an immediate military move into the Mid East to stop the fighting. I understand that aside from making the proposal directly to us, they are placing it before the United Nations in the alleged hope that that body will give its sanction to this preposterous proposition.
I have not yet seen the text of the message so I cannot comment on it in detail.
With warm regard,
As ever,