Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

499. Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower¹

London, November 5, 1956.

Dear Friend: It is a great grief to me that the events of the last few days have placed such a strain on the relations between our two countries. Of course I realise your feelings about the action which we felt compelled to take at such short notice. But if you will refer to my message of September 6 I think you will agree that what I said then has already begun to be confirmed by events.

I have always felt, as I made very clear to Mr. Khrushchev, that the Middle East was an issue over which, in the last resort, we would have to fight.

I know that Foster thought we could have played this longer. But I am convinced that, if we had allowed things to drift, everything would have gone from bad to worse. Nasser would have become a kind of Moslem Mussolini and our friends in Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and even Iran would gradually have been brought down. His efforts would have spread westwards, and Libya and all North Africa would have been brought under his control.

It may be that we might have obtained by negotiation a settlement of the Canal question which gave us a part of what we needed. But at best it would have taken a long time. Meanwhile Nasser would have been taking the tricks all round the Middle East. His last action in making a military command with Jordan and Syria was bound to provoke the Israelis, and of course it did so. They felt themselves imprisoned and naturally tried to break out. We were of course relieved that they broke in the direction of Egypt rather than of Jordan. But once they had moved, in whatever direction, there was not a moment to be lost. We and the French were convinced that we had to act at once to forestall a general conflagration throughout the Middle East. And now that police action has been started² it must be carried through. I am sure that this is the moment to curb Nasser’s ambitions. If we let it pass, all of us will bitterly regret it. Here is our opportunity to secure an effective and final settlement of the problems of the Middle East. If we draw back now, chaos will not be avoided. Everything will go up in flames in the Middle East. You will realise, with all your experience, that we cannot have a military vacuum while a United Nations force is being constituted and is being transported to the spot. This is why we feel we must go on to hold the position until we can hand over the responsibility to the United Nations. If a barrier can be established in this way between the Arabs and the Israelis we shall then be strongly placed to call on the Israelis to withdraw. This in its turn will reduce the threat to the Canal and restore it to the general use of the world. By this means, we shall have taken the first step towards re-establishing authority in this area for our generation.

It is no mere form of words to say that we would be happy to hand over to an international organisation as soon as we possibly can. As you can imagine, no one feels more strongly about this than Harold³ who has to provide the money. We do not want occupation of Egypt, we could not afford it, and that is one of many other reasons why we got out of Suez two years ago.

I know how strongly you feel, as I do, the objections to the use of force, but this is not a situation which can be mended by words or resolution, it is indeed ironical that at this very moment, when we are being pilloried as aggressors, Russia is brutally re-occupying Hungary and threatening the whole of Eastern Europe, and no voice is raised in the United Nations in favour of intervention there. It may be that our two countries can take no practical action to redress that situation. But the Middle East is an area in which we could still take practical and effective action together.

I am sending you this message in the hope that you will at least understand the grievous decisions which we have had to make. I was deeply moved by your last message before our initial action, although I was not able to reply to it as I would have liked at the time.

After a few days you will be in a position to act with renewed authority. I beg you to believe that what we are doing now will in our view facilitate your action. I would most earnestly ask you to put the great weight of your authority behind the proposal which we are now making to the United Nations.

I believe as firmly as ever that the future of all of us depends on the closest Anglo-American cooperation. It has of course been a grief to me to have had to make a temporary breach into it which I cannot disguise, but I know that you are a man of big enough heart and vision to take up things again on the basis of facts. If you cannot approve, I would like you at least to understand the terrible decisions that we have had to make. I remember nothing like them since the days when we were comrades together in the war. History alone can judge whether we have made the right decision, but I do want to assure you that we have made it from a genuine sense of responsibility, not only to our country, but to all the world.

Yours ever,

Anthony⁴

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Delivered to the White House under cover of a note from Coulson to Eisenhower which reads: “The Prime Minister has asked me to give you the enclosed personal message.”
2. The airborne assault on the Canal Zone began at dawn on November 5, when British and French paratroopers began landing in the environs of Port Said.
3. Harold Macmillan.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.