Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

494. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 4, 1956—5 p.m.

Delga 4. For Hoover from Lodge. Re Palestine. I just met with Hammarskjold who gave me following report:

1. Cease Fire²

Hammarskjold said that he had received in three different forms (orally from Dixon–UK, by letter and by telegram from Selwyn Lloyd) that the UK Cabinet was considering urgently his appeal to them following last night’s meeting for a cease fire. Hammarskjold regarded this as evidence that the door was open to their eventual acceptance. Lloyd asked that this message be circulated to the members of the GA. Hammarskjold felt that he should not do this at the present moment. SYG said that he had, as a result of his letter to the British and French,³ made clear to them that the three conditions for a cease fire previously laid down by Eden⁴ were out of the picture and that if they did not accept the UN cease fire proposal, they would be preventing cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. Hammarskjold said that he felt that the British at least understood the predicament they were in. The time limit he had set for the cease fire (2000 hours GMT) would, however, be an hour before the French (Mollet and Pineau) would be arriving in London today for consultation. SYG said for practical reasons he had switched deadline from 2000 hours to 0500 GMT tomorrow which would be 12 midnight tonight NY time. What he intended to do instead of circulating British note about Cabinet meeting would be to put covering note on his cables to the parties saying that because of practical communications problems he had changed the deadline and circulated this. Hammarskjold said he expected, however, a reply from the British and French between 7 and 8 pm this evening. The GA would be in session at 8 pm and would have to act in light of the British-French reply.

2. UN Forces

Hammarskjold said his morning he had met with Pearson (Canada), Engen (Norway), Lall (India), and Urrutia (Colombia).⁵ Engen had agreed for Norway to furnish forces. Pearson had said that in principle they were in agreement and would furnish one battalion temporarily from Germany but this required final Cabinet decision. Urrutia said that one battalion would be made available at once if it could be transported. He did this on the authority of the President of Colombia. Lall’s attitude was “very promising”. Hammarskjold said that following this he planned to discuss the furnishing of troops with Denmark, Sweden, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, Iran and Ethiopia. He excluded Italy and Turkey for historical reasons and he did not like to ask Yugoslavs although he might mention possibility to them expecting refusal. He would exclude all permanent members of SC. He said that he believed that the UN today could reach a decision on the establishing of a UN command, and that the GA could appoint General Burns as head of the command.

He intended make full report on these developments to the GA and on the basis of this report hoped that a resolution would be introduced today to set up the command. Canada, Norway, India and Colombia strongly favored his making an immediate report along these lines. I told Hammarskjold we would be delighted have General Burns as commander.

3. US Participation

Hammarskjold said that if all went well, he would like to make final report at about 5 pm on Monday. In his final report, he would like to say that in view of special difficulties of getting forces immediately to the area, the US Government had expressed willingness to help with an airlift. He would like to go on and say if there were unavoidable delays in the availability of the forces from the countries furnishing them, the US would consider supplying a number of forces as a stop-gap and temporarily, until the others could arrive. He said he felt sure this would raise no difficulties with USSR, Arabs, UK and France because obviously the US had no intention of occupying bases in Arab world. (Egyptians have indicated to USUN officers that they had contemplated possibility of US forces exclusively coming in and on that basis had been favorable to UN force idea.) I told Hammarskjold US would attempt help with airlift but question of US forces as stop-gap would have to be determined at highest US Government level.

4. Pay and Equipment

Said that we contemplated that pay and equipment of the forces would be furnished by the countries whose forces were involved and that the UN would pay their maintenance of which we would, of course, pay one-third. Hammarskjold said that this seemed right and UN budgeting could be done on that basis.

[Here follows the verbatim text of a draft report by Hammarskjold on the first stage of discussions on a U.N. command, which he planned to deliver that evening to the General Assembly. The final version of Hammarskjöld’s report, entitled, “First report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force requested in resolution 998 (ES–I) adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956” was later circulated as U.N. doc. A/3289.]

I raised with Hammarskjold the Israeli-Jordan situation and said that we were extremely alarmed over information that Israel was attempting provoke Jordan. I urged Hammarskjold to use all possible pressure on Israel. He agreed to do so.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5774/11–456. Secret; Niact. Received at 7:35 p.m.
2. Early in the morning of November 4 Hammarskjöld received from the Permanent Representative of Israel an Aide-Mémoire, dated November 3, which affirmed that: “Israel agrees to an immediate cease-fire provided a similar answer is forthcoming from Egypt.” The Aide-Mémoire also maintained that repeated hostile acts on the part of the Egyptian Government over the years had made a fiction of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement and that the only answer was the establishment of peace between Israel and Egypt by direct negotiations. (U.N. doc. A/3279)
3. On November 4, in accordance with General Assembly Resolutions 997 (ES–I) and 999 (ES–I), Hammarskjöld sent cables to the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Great Britain, and France asking, among other points, that all the parties halt military actions in the area by 2000 GMT (8 p.m. London time), November 4. Hammarskjöld subsequently extended the deadline to 500 GMT (5 a.m. London time), November 5. Egypt promptly responded that it accepted Resolution 999 and was ready to halt all hostile military actions as requested, and took note that Israel was also being asked to withdraw its forces behind the armistice demarcation lines. (“Report of the Secretary-General on communications with the Governments of France, Egypt, Israel and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 997 (ES–I) and 999 (ES–I) dated 2 and 4 November 1956,” U.N. doc. A/3287. Hammarskjöld’s cables and the Egyptian response are printed as annexes to the report.)
4. See Eden’s statement of November 3, Document 476.
5. Colombian Representative to the General Assembly.