489. Report by the Joint Middle East Planning
Committee to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff1
JCS
1887/298
Washington, November 3,
1956.
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
The Problem
1. To examine possible Soviet courses of action during the current
Middle East crisis.
Facts Bearing on the Problem
2. Military operations against Egypt by Israel, France, and the
United Kingdom have created a situation which the USSR may attempt to exploit.
3. To date Soviet reaction to the current situation has been confined
to diplomatic activity, particularly within the United Nations and
including the 23 August statement of Khrushchev that, “Egypt, if attacked, will not stand
alone”.
Discussion
4. For Discussion, see Enclosure.
Conclusions
5. The study contained in the Enclosure represents an appropriate
analysis of the possible Soviet courses of action during the current
Middle East crisis.
6. Based on the assumption that the USSR will not risk a general war at this time, it is
considered unlikely that they will take any military action which
will significantly affect developments in the current Middle East
crisis.
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Recommendations
7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the above
conclusions.
8. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to
commanders of unified or specified commands.
Enclosure
DISCUSSION
Analysis of Possible Soviet Courses of Action in the Middle
East
- 1.
- Introduction
- a.
- This study examines possible Soviet courses of
action in the Middle East crisis.
- b.
- It covers the current Soviet objectives in the
Middle East, the possible courses of action based
thereon, and examines the probability of
implementation of the various courses of action in
each country of the Middle East.
- c.
- No courses of action are included which from the
Soviet viewpoint would result in general war; this
on the assumption that avoidance of general war is
basic Soviet strategy at this time.
- 2.
- Soviet Objectives
- a.
- The broad and primary Soviet objective is to
eliminate Western influence in the area and
substitute therefor Soviet influence throughout the
entire Middle East. This would logically lead to
Soviet domination of the area with ultimate
subversion of individual governments into Soviet
puppets.
- b.
- Based on this broad objective, more immediate
objectives might be stated as:
- (1)
- To disrupt the NATO and Baghdad Pact
Organization.
- (2)
- To prolong and expand the conflict within
the Middle East without overtly advocating
same.
- (3)
- Without being identified with the action, to
disrupt the flow of Middle East oil and thus
weaken the West economically and militarily, while
at the same time adversely affecting the financial
position of various Middle East countries.
- 3.
- General. The courses of
action open to the USSR which are listed below are sensitive
to the element of time which is of key importance to
the USSR. It will
attempt to prevent the United Kingdom, French,
Israeli forces from the quick liquidation of
Nasser,
gaining control of the Suez Canal and the
stabilization of the military situation to the
advantage of the three allies. The USSR will
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attempt
actions which will enable Nasser to continue
military opposition for as long as possible.
- 4.
- Courses of Action. The
following courses of action are open to the USSR:
- a.
- Direct military intervention.
- b.
- Indirect military intervention
(volunteers).
- c.
- Strategic movements of Bloc troops on the
periphery of the Bloc.
- d.
- Attempt to broaden the conflict within the
Middle East.
- e.
- Reaffirm support of Nasser to include
guarantees to replace lost matériel and damaged
facilities and installations.
- 5.
- Direct Military
Intervention. The Soviets are capable of
direct military intervention, with ground, naval and
air forces in the Middle East area. In view of the
element of time, sufficient forces to affect the
initial course of hostilities could not be
introduced. Most important, however, the Soviets
almost certainly estimate that direct military
intervention would incur unacceptable risks of
general war. The possibility that Soviet submarines
under the guise of Egyptian nationality will be used
against UK-French
shipping and naval units in the Mediterranean cannot
be ruled out.
- 6.
- Indirect Intervention. The
USSR can
introduce “volunteer” ground and air elements.
However, as in paragraph 4 above, time would
preclude introduction of sufficient ground
volunteers to affect immediately the course of
hostilities. Furthermore, in the Soviet view the
introduction of significant numbers of “volunteer”
ground troops would be likely to incur unacceptable
risk of general war. In the case of “volunteer” air
crews, even the addition of relatively small numbers
would significantly improve Middle East air
capability, providing combat aircraft and air
facilities are available. It is possible, therefore,
that small numbers of combat aircraft and crews may
be flown into Middle East from the Bloc.
- 7.
- Strategic Movement of Bloc
Forces on the Soviet Bloc Periphery. Soviet
forces may engage in this type of operation with the
objective of engendering fear of general war, thus
increasing pressures worldwide to force withdrawal
of UK-French-Israeli
forces from Egypt.
- 8.
- Broaden the Conflict Within the
Middle East. By use of propaganda, agents,
and local Communist parties the Soviets can cause
extensive anti-Western rioting, sabotage, and
general disorder throughout the area, particularly
at Western oil installations. To direct and assist
in such operations the Soviets could introduce small
numbers of professional agents and saboteurs. The
Soviets also could attempt to encourage or engineer
coups in Syria and Jordan with the object of
establishing governments willing to attack Israel in
order to broaden hostilities. Such attempts are
considered likely.
- 9.
- Reaffirm Support for Egypt to
Include Guarantees to Replace Lost Materiel and
Restore Damaged Installations. This is a
likely course of action aimed at precluding a quick
surrender to UK-French-Israeli forces and to gain time
for public opinion worldwide to crystallize in
Egypt’s favor and to allow the machinery of the
UN to work on the
side of Egypt. Additionally, the Soviet Union will
probably break relations with Israel and move for
that country’s expulsion from the UN. They may seek or take
advantage of any opportunity to have themselves
appointed by the UN
to restore order in the Middle East.
- 10.
- Analysis of Soviet Actions With
Respect to Middle East Countries.
- a.
- Egypt—In view of the
time element, sufficient forces to affect the
course of hostilities could not be introduced.
This coupled with the resultant risk of general
war, leads to the conclusion that direct Soviet
military intervention will not occur. An
exception, however, may lie in the use of Soviet
submarines under guise of Egyptian nationality
against UK-French
shipping and naval units. Indirect intervention
through the use of “volunteer” air crews and
aircraft is possible. However, such action is
limited by:
- (1)
- UK-French
control of the air.
- (2)
- Destruction of air facilities in
Egypt.
- (3)
- Extreme ranges involved.
- (4)
-
Possibility of overflight
difficulties.
It is likely that the USSR will reaffirm support for Egypt to
include offers to replace lost material and repair
damaged installations. This action would be aimed
at precluding a quick surrender and allow time for
the UN machinery
and the pressure of world opinion to work
favorably for Egypt. It would also provide an
entry for additional Soviet technicians and
propaganda into Egypt following the present
crisis.
- b.
- Syria—The Soviets may
introduce volunteers and additional Soviet
equipment into Syria. However, such action with
the exception of air units would have no effect on
the immediate situation in view of the time
element involved. Lack of indigenous air
facilities precludes introduction of significant
numbers of Soviet aircraft. Additionally, it is
likely that the Soviets will attempt to encourage
or engineer a coup with the object of establishing
a government more willing to attack Israel and
thus broaden and prolong the conflict. Also, it is
likely that propaganda will be intensified, and
sabotage encouraged against oil lines traversing
Syria. Three pipelines, of the five from the
Kirkuk field, which carry 500,000 barrels per day,
pass through Syria. (Western Europe is using
approximately 2,000,000 barrels per day from the
Middle East area.)
- c.
- Jordan—Introduction
of volunteers into Jordan is less likely than into
Syria. Propaganda is likely to be intensified, and
sabotage
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of pipelines encouraged. Two of the five Kirkuk
oil field pipelines pass through Jordan. In
addition, the Dhahran pipeline, which carries
300,000 barrels per day, traverses Jordan. Soviet
inspired attempts to dethrone King Hussein will
probably be intensified with the objective of
solidifying the pro-Egyptian forces in the
country.
- d.
- Lebanon—The
Government of Lebanon is more oriented to the West
than is that of either Syria or Jordan and hence,
there is less likelihood of Soviet action within
that country. Western installations as well as the
two pipelines that pass through Syria, and the
Dhahran pipeline (Tapline) might be subject to
sabotage.
- e.
- Iraq—Action within
Iraq would probably be limited to extensive
anti-Western propaganda aimed at disrupting the
Baghdad Pact. It is possible, but not probable,
that the oil pipelines emanating from Kirkuk would
be sabotaged within Iraq.
- f.
- Iran—It is estimated
that no Soviet activity will occur in Iran other
than intensified anti-Western propaganda aimed at
disrupting the Baghdad Pact, inasmuch as movement
of Soviet forces into Iran would probably
precipitate general war.
- g.
- Saudi Arabia—It is
estimated that Soviet activity in Saudi Arabia
will be limited to intensified anti-Western
propaganda, and encouragement of sabotage of oil
pipelines and facilities. It is highly unlikely
the Saudis would agree to any Soviet proposals for
assistance.
- h.
- General—Soviet forces
may engage in strategic movement on the Soviet
Bloc periphery with the objective of engendering
fear of general war. This would be calculated to
increase worldwide pressures for withdrawal of
UK-French-Israeli
forces from Egypt.
- 11.
- Summary. The following
appear to be the likely courses of Soviet action:
- a.
- Intensify anti-Western propaganda in all
Middle East nations.
- b.
- Provide Soviet volunteers, technicians and
equipment to Syria and Egypt.
- c.
- Encourage sabotage of oil pipelines and
facilities.
- d.
- Instigate the establishment of governments
in Syria and Jordan more willing to attack
Israel.
- e.
- Reaffirm support for Egypt to include offers
to replace lost material and repair damaged
facilities.
- f.
- Conduct strategic movement of large Soviet
forces on the Soviet Bloc periphery.
- g.
- Move for the expulsion of Israel from the
United Nations.
- h.
- Seek or take advantage of any opportunity to
have themselves appointed by the United Nations to
restore order in the Middle East.
