470. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 2, 1956, 2:32–3:25 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Dulles
- Secretary Hoover
- Colonel Goodpaster (for part of meeting)
When I joined this meeting, the President was discussing the idea of a neutral strip around Israel, and explaining to the Secretary his thought of proportionate contributions to the width of the strip by the countries concerned—on the basis of their over-all land area.
The discussion next turned to the proposals that had been mentioned in New York that the President and Nehru might serve together to develop a solution to the Middle East dispute. Mr. Dulles spoke of the possibility of their serving as an elder statesmen “board of appeals”—he thought that they should not take responsibility for primary developmental action. He thought Britain and Israel will soon be coming to the United States for economic cooperation. There are several questions that must be considered in connection with the proposal. Does it build up Nehru too much? How strenuously would the Pakistanis object? Mr. Hoover commented that Nehru is likely to be offensive to the UK. The President said he thought Nehru was important to the UK economically. Mr. Hoover said he believed that India’s trade was not as important as formerly but the President said he thought it was larger.
The President, referring to the plan for two committees,2 said the key will be to find names which will bring maximum moral pressure on the participants. Mr. Dulles said there was good possibility that Mr. Pearson of Canada would suggest the Eisenhower-Nehru approach. The President thought it might be better to start out with the committees and to set up himself and Nehru later if [Page 937] needed. There was then further discussion of possible names for the committees, including Lange, Aranha3 and Amini (on the assumption that Nehru would be “saved” for the higher group).
Mr. Dulles said we need to move quickly, keeping momentum and keeping out in front in the rapidly developing action. We should avoid any implications that we are simply going back to the situation that formerly existed in the area.
The President asked if there would be any point in having one or two others serve with Nehru and himself, and Secretary Dulles brought out that the Soviet Union might then press to serve. He added that the objection to Nehru might not be so great if someone other than the United States suggested his name.
The President asked whether the two committees could be handled separately, or whether the two questions were linked. Mr. Dulles thought that they could be kept reasonably separate, and the President indicated agreement to trying to set up the two committees.
Mr. Dulles said he would retain the idea of the President and Nehru serving if the suggestion could come from elsewhere. He thought it would be important for them not to take on the primary staff or detail responsibility.
Mr. Hoover suggested not getting into the matter too early because there is still bloodshed ahead. The President said the UN has ordered a cease-fire, but there must then immediately be machinery for straightening out the situation.
The President concluded by saying that if it were thought that he could be useful serving in this way, there should be no worry about preempting too much of his time.
Colonel CE, U S Army
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 5. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.)↩
- Later on November 2, the Department of State transmitted to the Mission at the United Nations the texts of two draft resolutions. The first, which dealt with the Arab-Israeli problem, called for the establishment of a five-nation committee which would prepare recommendations regarding the settlement of major problems outstanding between the Arab states and Israel with a view to establishing the conditions of permanent peace and stability in the area. This committee was to replace the current Palestine Conciliation Commission. The second draft resolution, which concerned the Suez Canal problem, called for the creation of a three-nation committee which would assume responsibility for the taking of measures for the immediate reopening of the Suez Canal as a secure waterway and for the preparation, adoption, and execution of a plan to operate and maintain the Canal and freedom of passage through it. (Telegrams 237 and 238 to USUN, November 2; Department of State, Central Files, 320/11–256)↩
- Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Representative at the United Nations.↩