465. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
2121. Now that Franco-British military operation in Suez has definitely commenced, and despite manner in which their intentions and preparations were concealed from us, primary preoccupation this Embassy is naturally to limit insofar as possible damage to Atlantic Alliance, to narrow dangerous gap between France and United States and, to that end, to seek means by which divergent French and United States policies in Near East might possibly be brought to move along parallel and eventually converging lines.
Primary French objective is to overthrow or at least humiliate Nasser. We cannot conceive of French withdrawing from or limiting current operation until that objective has been substantially achieved, or has proved unattainable.
We have … felt it unwise for many sound reasons that military means be used. However, now they have been used, we would suppose it is in our interest they succeed and succeed rapidly. It is certainly preferable from overall Western viewpoint that they do so rather than that French and British fail or be involved in long drawn out guerrilla warfare. On this point our interest and theirs coincide.
It is also to our interest and theirs that conflict not spread. Once it starts spreading there is no telling where it would stop. Soviets have stressed this point. To extent United Kingdom and France can persuade Iraq and Jordan to keep out of war and perhaps can improve internal situation in Syria, to that extent chance of eliminating Nasser rapidly and of preventing conflict from spreading to ultimate advantage USSR will be enhanced. We could presumably play certain role along these lines in some Arab countries if we desired. This could be second coincidence United States–United Kingdom–French interests.
If we could hold the ring for a week or two, we might forestall some of more serious repercussions of armed conflict which we have foreseen. By that time presumably French and British will either have succeeded in their objective or have learned they cannot do so without prolonged and very costly campaign. By that time also we would expect almost universal pressure will have been exerted on French and British, inside and outside United Nations, to bring conflict to a close.
[Page 931]Our hope would therefore be that, while participating in United Nations action designed to bring about early cease-fire, we could (1) avoid taking individual lead in condemning French and British; (2) facilitate early and successful termination their operation by helping to prevent involvement other states; and (3) await, if operation not promptly successful, anticipated early effect on French and British both of military complications and world-wide political pressures.
We would feel that any purely United States attempt to force them to break off hostilities at this moment would be useless and would merely widen dangerous fissure in Atlantic Alliance, where two weeks from now either their objective will have been realized, or they will be in a far more chastened and amenable mood.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–156. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:45 p.m. Repeated to London.↩