Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

431. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 30, 1956, 3:28 p.m.¹

Washington , October 30, 1956, 3:28 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Israeli-Egyptian Conflict

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Hervé Alphand
• Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• William M. Rountree, NEA
• C. Burke Elbrick, EUR

The Ambassador handed the Secretary a copy of the message from Prime Minister Mollet to President Eisenhower ² regarding recent developments in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. He said that it was the hope of the French Government that the United States would not press for the passage of a resolution in the Security Council until Israel and Egypt had answered the Anglo-French “appeal” for a cease fire. He said that the time limit for answering this appeal expires at 11:30 P.M. Washington time today.

The Secretary said that it was not clear to him why the Anglo-French action, which he could only characterize as a brutal ultimatum to Egypt, should cause a suspension of consideration in the Security Council. He could not agree to any such suspension. He pointed out that the ultimatum does not demand that the Israeli forces retire to their own frontier. If the British and French think that it is possible to reach an agreement on the basis of the ultimatum he felt that they were sadly mistaken. He went on to say that both the British and the French had deliberately kept the United States Government in the dark for the past two weeks, though we had reason to suspect what was going on. He felt he must say, frankly, that the French Ambassador had told him nothing about these plans. There was nothing personal in this criticism and the Secretary admitted the possibility that the Ambassador himself had not been informed. He felt that this was the blackest day which has occurred in many years in the relations between England and France and the United States. He asked how the former relationship of trust and confidence could possibly be restored in view of these developments.

The Ambassador said that Nasser’s action in seizing the Suez Canal could not possibly be accepted by the French Government. He did not know whether there was any connection between the Suez crisis and the present intervention in Egypt but it was clear to him that the French Government had to take action to “stop” Nasser. The Secretary said he understood this attitude but that he could not understand why the French and the British employed a method which could destroy the United Nations and gravely impair relations with the United States. The Ambassador said that the North Atlantic Alliance is of the greatest importance to France. The Secretary said that France was making no effort to preserve it and that the action today by the French will be judged very harshly by the American people. He said it is a great tragedy, when the world stands shocked at Soviet brutality in Hungary, that the world should also be confronted by similar action on the part of the British and French in Egypt.

The Ambassador said that he felt that three power agreement is vital and that he wished to help in any way he could to reach such agreement. He asked whether the United States would table its resolution in the Security Council today, to which the Secretary replied in the affirmative. The Secretary said that the resolution calls, in essence, for Israeli forces to go back to Israel and not just ten miles from the Canal. He said the Security Council is due to reconvene at 4:00 P.M. today.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–3056. Confidential. Drafted by Elbrick. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. Infra .
3. On November 1, in telegram 2124 from Paris, Dillon reported that, according to Pineau, the French Government had been very upset by Alphand’s report of his interview with Dulles. Alphand informed his government that at one point in the conversation Dulles said that in his opinion there was no difference between Anglo-French intervention at Suez and the utilization of the Soviet army against the civilian population of Budapest. Alphand reported that he had gotten up to leave and that Dulles had then modified this statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 684a.86/11–356)