423. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
445. Re Palestine. We met with Dixon (UK) and Cornut-Gentille (France) this a.m. to invite them to co-sign our letter on [Page 859] Israeli attack.2 I told them President Eisenhower was most anxious to maintain tripartite cooperation on this problem.
Dixon replied that while UK was anxious work together with us on this matter, they were not a bit anxious emphasize tripartite approach publicly. Dixon said he could not possibly co-sign letter if it included last para indicating our objectives. I asked him if he could sign it without last para. Dixon said he would have to ask for instructions and there wasn’t sufficient time. Summing up, he said he could not join in signing the letter at all because of public statements which had been made last night (referring obviously to news stories out of Washington) and which were not in accord with the objectives of HMG. He said he could make a statement before the Council saying “it seems to me right to have called the meeting” if the last para of our letter were dropped. He said he didn’t want to be quoted as saying: “I agreed with them beforehand”.
I asked if France would agree to my saying before the Council that meeting was called with their concurrence. They replied they could not. Cornut-Gentille said he couldn’t agree because of long list of Egyptian attacks against Israelis. Cornut-Gentille said he had instructions to see me to say France does not want to be put in position of having to state publicly she was opposed to US stand. But he said if we proposed to condemn Israel in res, France could not go along with US. France, he said does not agree with our objectives.
Both Dixon and Cornut-Gentille were white-faced and hostile to any conciliatory suggestions. Their only contribution to the meeting amounted to proposals of dilatory tactics. I gave them every opportunity suggest alternatives including postponement of morning’s [Page 860] meeting, but they declined on basis they had different objectives.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A./86/10–3056. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 4:39 p.m.↩
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The text of the letter which Lodge later forwarded to the President of the Security Council, reads as follows:
“The Government of the United States has received information to the effect that in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory. This military action commenced October 29, 1956 and is continuing in the Sinai area. The situation makes imperative an immediate meeting of the Security Council, charged as it is with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as responsibility for the observance of the Armistice Agreement.
“I have the honour, therefore, in behalf of my Government to request you to convene a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to consider The Palestine question: steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt.’” (U.N. doc. S/3706)
↩ - In response to the U.S. request for an urgent meeting, the Security Council convened at 11 a.m. Lodge asked the Council to consider steps to bring about the immediate cessation of Israeli military actions. He told the Council that the United States considered it imperative that the Security Council act promptly in determining that a breach of the peace had occurred and in affirming that the Israeli armed forces should be immediately withdrawn behind the established armistice lines. Lodge also gave notice that he intended, on behalf of the U.S. Government, to introduce a draft resolution at the afternoon meeting under which the Council would call upon Israel to withdraw and would indicate steps to assure such a withdrawal. (U.N. doc. S/PV.748) For text of Lodge’s remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1956, pp. 748–749.↩