Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, October 29, 1956—11:17 a.m.

1537. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Bits of evidence are accumulating which indicate that French Government, perhaps with British knowledge, is concerting closely with Israelis to provoke action which would lead to Israeli war against Egypt with probable participation by French and British.

We have conclusive but highly secret evidence that French have supplied Israelis with more than double number Mystere-4 planes which was reported to NEACC.

There has within last few days been very large British-French air buildup in Cyprus. French are sending two of their principal naval units to Eastern Mediterranean.

There has been virtual total mobilization of Israeli military forces as to which French Ambassador yesterday said he was “uninformed.”

There has in general been almost complete blackout of information from French and British with us regarding Middle East matters.

There are other items of information which cannot be reported here but which substantially round out picture.

It seems as though the action would take either or both of two forms—(1) an alleged “retaliatory” military movement by Israel which would quickly take over Jordan west of the river. Then when Egypt came to Jordan’s assistance there would be an attack on Egypt; (2) an effort, as is reported, to put an Israeli ship through Suez Canal on assumption that if it is stopped that would then be occasion for British and French to act to enforce Treaty of 1888 and recent “principles” adopted by UN Security Council.

As you know, it is profound conviction of President and myself that if French and British allow themselves to be drawn into a general Arab war they will have started something they cannot finish and end result may very well be an intensive anti-Western sentiment throughout Middle East and Africa and intimacy with Soviet Union which will impair for long time indispensable relations of Europe with Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, the process will greatly weaken economies of France, Britain and Western Europe. Under circumstances it is unlikely US will come to aid of Britain and France as in case of First and Second World Wars where they were clearly victim of armed aggression.

We have no doubt that it may be calculated that Jewish influence here is such as to assure US sympathy with such operations as are outlined. However, if this is calculated we think it is a miscalculation.

This is for your background information with discretion for you to take, or to recommend to us that you be authorized to take any steps which might still avert what we believe to be very dangerous course of action. We must, however, bear in mind it is only matter of hours rather than days before situation may become irrevocable.²

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles, cleared by Rountree, and approved by Dulles. Repeated to London eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary.

   Prior to the drafting of this telegram, at 10:22 a.m., Dulles telephoned Allen Dulles. Their conversation went as follows:

   “The Sec. said he is weighing the desirability of telling Dillon that there are a lot of pieces which were fitted into a pattern which suggest a high degree of cooperation between the French and the Israelis. To the Sec’s mind the evidence is almost conclusive. Some of the evidence can’t be told. AWD mentioned the buildup on Cyprus. AWD said that could be mentioned and the Sec. said the Mysteres could be too. AWD asked if the Sec. heard the report that there is a plan to force an Israeli ship through the Canal and use that as an excuse for force. That from the Air Attaché at Tel Aviv. AWD will be over at 4. AWD worried that a spark in the ME could give the Soviets a shield to do things they can’t do now—he mentioned the clock might be turned back in Central Europe.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

2. The response to telegram 1537 was transmitted to the Department in telegram 2041 from Paris, October 29. Evidently drafted before news of the Israeli invasion reached Paris, telegram 2041 requested authorization to convey the next morning to Pineau a personal message from Dulles proposing a tripartite démarche to Israel and warning that the United States would be obliged to disassociate itself publicly from any support for offensive action. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–2956)