Office of the Historian

391. Special Watch Report of the Intelligence Advisory Committee1

No. 325A
Washington, October 28, 1956.

The Intelligence Advisory Committee approves the following findings of its Watch Committee at a special meeting held this date to review the possibility of hostilities between Israel and the Arab countries:

1.
The Watch Committee has examined new evidence of heavy Israeli mobilization on a scale which would permit Israel to:
a.
occupy Jordan west of the Jordan River;
b.
penetrate Syria as far as Damascus and occupy portions of this territory;
c.
penetrate Egypt to the Suez Canal and hold parts of Sinai for a considerable time, depending on logistical limitations;
d.
break the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and keep the waterway open to Eilat;
e.
gain air superiority over the Egyptian Air Force alone, or in combination with air forces of the other Arab States;
f.
probably carry out any or all of the above, even in the face of the combined resistance of contiguous Arab States.
2.
The motivations for such an Israeli mobilization were considered to be:
a.
to launch a retaliatory raid on Egypt, prepared in case such a raid leads to broader fighting;
b.
to launch a major but limited assault on Egypt or Jordan or both, before Arab forces pull ahead of Israel in military strength and while the USSR is preoccupied in Eastern Europe;
c.
to prepare to take advantage of opportunities in the chaotic Jordanian political situation which is showing clear pro-Egyptian orientation;
d.
to provide a diversionary threat against Egypt in order to afford greater freedom of action for France and the UK in the Suez situation and to relieve Egyptian pressures on France in North Africa.
3.
The scale of the Israeli mobilization and its damaging effects on the economy, together with Egyptian preoccupation in the Suez, Soviet preoccupation in Europe, French material support to Israel and the complicated inter-Arab rivalries in and over Jordan, particularly the growth in Egyptian influence in Jordan, all provide a favorable opportunity for a major attack. Past Egyptian provocations, the key role of Egypt in the Arab threat and UK involvement with Jordan indicate the attack will be launched against Egypt in the very near future, under the pretext of retaliation and exceeding past raids in strength. The scale of the mobilization indicates that Israel is prepared to meet or exploit such situations as may arise during such an attack.

  1. Source: CIA Files. Top Secret. The Watch Committee met in emergency session at noon on October 28. A copy of a two-paragraph memorandum entitled “Conclusions of the Watch Committee Meeting at 12:00 Noon Today”, dated October 28, is in Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Middle East Crisis 1956 (Arab-Israeli Crisis). The first paragraph, which bears the marginal notation “Prepared for the Secretary”, corresponds to the final paragraph of the Special Watch Report printed here. The second paragraph reads:

    “Highly sensitive information indicates that the British have brought up their air strength on Cyprus in the last 48 hours to 63 Canberras (medium bombers), doubling previous strength. French transport aircraft to the number of 18 have arrived within the last 24 hours making a total of 21 and giving capability of airlifting 1500 men.”

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