377. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1166. Paid courtesy call on Foreign Minister Fawzi yesterday afternoon. Discussion centered entirely on Suez except for incidental reference to Algerian problem which Fawzi hoped would not interfere with progress Suez negotiations. He said might be maintained that Suez had political ramifications affecting various other problems but manifestly impossible solve all of them at one time; therefore must continue steadfast search for Suez solution.
Fawzi confirmed acceptance Hammarskjold invitation meet British and French later in month (Embtel 1156)2 and said had been led to believe he might expect be informed replies of British and French by today.
Remainder of conversation devoted to lengthy discussion of demands being made by British and French for specific government of Egypt proposals. Fawzi maintained that this demand unreasonable since British and French already have ample material on which to negotiate if they really wish do so; if they persist in their demand it will be indication of bad faith and in that case there would be little use in resuming negotiations. In such event he would be most regretful but, if British and French wanted it that way, Egypt could face the prospect without being unduly perturbed but onus would not be on Egypt.
I said could see how Fawzi might have reached this conclusion if he was thinking only of negotiating position with British and French but this was question in which whole world now interested. Was Fawzi convinced that this position vis-à-vis world opinion would not be clarified if government of Egypt had something on record as specific as 18 nation proposals? As matters stand public, as [Page 783] distinct from private, record is somewhat out of balance and rightly or wrongly impression could be given that Egypt was not being forthcoming.
At first Fawzi remained completely adamant, maintaining that advancing formal and detailed proposals would be like beginning treaty negotiations by submitting draft treaty. Not only was this too much to ask but it could also affect negotiations adversely since various points thus presented could be seized on for public debate which might otherwise be quietly solved in private negotiations.
I then inquired whether, if Fawzi felt hitherto private record was so fully adequate as basis for negotiations, consideration might be given to making it public. At first, he was equally opposed to such an idea but as conversation continued he ended by saying that he would not want to make such a proposal himself but would probably not object if such suggestion was made by the British and French, although he doubted if it would help much. However if this idea were pursued, he thought it would be preferable to circulate government of Egypt proposals secretly to especially interested governments or to U.N. members as a whole, even though it was obvious that by so doing publicity would result. I made clear was talking purely personally and would not attempt make strong argument for this particular idea which was purely random thought which came to mind in exploring various possibilities. I felt however that some move by Egypt other than maintaining its present fixed position might be helpful.
Asked at end of conversation re status of Menon plan,3 Fawzi shrugged shoulders and said Egypt always appreciated efforts of well-intentioned persons to be of assistance but Menon plan as such not under active consideration. However certain ideas in it might be found useful.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–2556. Secret. Received at 5:23 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, New Delhi, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, and Jidda.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 374.↩
- For a description of the Menon plan, see Document 301.↩