375. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
1956. Eyes only Secretary and Aldrich. Your 1471.2 To answer first your question, I am certain that such an invitation would be welcomed by Mollet and by French parliamentary and public opinion. [Page 780] It would be generally looked on as concrete opportunity to discuss common problems on worldwide basis which is project dear to French and to Mollet personally.
In answer to question 3 I feel that it is immaterial whether Mollet informed in advance. French do not expect any new initiatives from United States until after election and accordingly are prepared to let relations with United States coast until then. Main advantage of prior intimation of invitation would be opportunity to sound out Mollet before invitation made public. I feel this should be done in any event. Danger is the always present possibility of an inadvertent leak to press. All in all, if project adopted I would be inclined to recommend informal approach to Mollet and Eden on November 8 followed by formal announcement as soon thereafter as could be coordinated.
Finally as to basic question of my views re idea, I feel that such a meeting could serve a most useful purpose provided it is reasonably successful. Present misunderstandings are serious and contain seeds of grave difficulties in future. Therefore every attempt to reach a common understanding is worth the effort. On the other hand a failure at such a meeting would have gravest consequences. To reach an acceptable area of understanding will undoubtedly require give and take on both sides. On United States side in particular if agreement is to be reached on a Suez policy which excludes war as instrument of policy, we must be prepared to be more forthcoming than heretofore regarding possibilities of economic aid to Western Europe in case Egypt bars passage through Canal. Exim Bank loans are not enough, there must be reasonable prospect of government aid to cover substantial share of extra costs entailed in use of cape route. Great advantage of such a conference would be opportunity of talking face to face with Mollet rather than with Pineau. Therefore provided we can enter talks with reasonably flexible position both on eventual use of economic sanctions including possible grant aid to cope with Suez question and on upcoming NATO problems, I would strongly favor such a meeting. If our objective, however, is limited to attempt to sell United States position to French and British without any possibility of compromise, I would doubt usefulness of exercise. I say this even though Mollet had deep admiration approaching veneration for President and would be deeply influenced by President’s views. However, vital interests of France are at stake which would tend minimize effects of personal influence in persuading French agree to any program that they felt compromised these vital interests.
Meeting to be effective should permit working sessions on two consecutive days, followed by session on third day to approve communiqué.
[Page 781]In view precondition laid down in last paragraph reference telegram I am not certain French and United Kingdom would accept invitation but my guess is that they would, thus delaying any precipitate action which they might otherwise contemplate.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684a.86/10–2556. Secret. Received at 3:42 p.m. Repeated to London. On October 26, Dulles forwarded a copy of telegram 1956 from Paris and telegram 2268 from London, infra, to President Eisenhower under cover of a note which reads in part: “I think that the points made by Dillon require careful appraisal”. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)↩
- Printed as telegram 2950 to London, Document 371.↩