Office of the Historian

370. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, October 24, 1956, 11:30 a.m.1

White House, October 24, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

2.

I discussed the Suez situation and my concern at the lack of progress in resuming negotiations. I reported what I had learned about Hammarskjold’s intentions to attempt to formulate a position and ask the Egyptians whether they accepted it.

We referred to Aldrich’s cable (#2215) reporting Monckton’s resignation because of disagreement with the “force” policy.2

We reviewed the prior suggestion I had made to the President that we might invite Eden and Mollet to come to Washington toward the end of November. We discussed whether or not to convey that invitation before the elections or immediately after. It was agreed that I would send a private message to Aldrich and Dillon inviting their comments. The President wanted it clearly understood that the invitation would not stand if in the meantime the British and the French engaged in military action against Egypt.

3.
I reported to the President the developments in North Africa resulting from the French seizure of the Moroccan plane containing the Algerian leaders. I expressed great concern lest the British and the French commit suicide by getting deeply involved in colonial controversies in an attempt to impose their rule by force on the Middle East and Africa. The President indicated that he fully shared my concern in this respect.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

JFD
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.↩
  2. In telegram 2215, October 23, Aldrich reported that Walter Monckton had told him, in confidence, that Monckton had given up his position as British Minister of Defense not only because of physical exhaustion but also because he was convinced that the use of force in Suez would be a great blunder. Monckton also said, according to Aldrich, that Dulles was on the right track regarding this matter and that he, Monckton, could not remain as Minister of Defense and take the actions necessary if force should be used. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–2456)↩