Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

368. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the Secretary-General (Hammarskjöld) and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge), New York, October 23 and 24, 1956¹

New York, October 23 and 24, 1956

SUBJECT

• Suez

I called Hammarskjold to express our concern with the bad state of affairs as regards the Anglo-French-Egyptian conversations over the Suez Canal.

Hammarskjold said he hoped the United States would bring its influence to bear and that he would call the French and U.K. Representatives.

At a lunch which I gave in honor of the next Brazilian Ambassador to Belgium, Sir Pierson Dixon (U.K.) took me to one side and told me the following: on last Thursday² night the SYG had told him that the Egyptians had an over-all proposal, some things in it that they liked and others that they didn’t. “Then”, he said, “something happened”. Evidently there were adverse instructions from Nasser and the whole project was dropped. Now the British “must have something definite”.

I said it would not be reasonable to expect the Egyptians to put in writing a final position before there had been any oral exchanges—which he agreed. But nevertheless, he said there had to be something more definite than now existed.

He said he was worried about the effect of all this on Anglo-American relations.

After talking to the Secretary,³ I talked to Hammarskjold again around 7:00 p.m. Tuesday⁴ and said that we would do what we could, but we have used up a great deal of our influence and relations are rather strained. I added: “We think that you (Hammarskjold) may have to bring this into the open and if you do we will concert our own actions carefully with you.”

Hammarskjold said: (paraphrase) I have tried to get both Cornut and Dixon together and was unable to do so. I have seen Cornut and he sees the situation exactly as I do. I described all the risks to him. I am seeing Dixon at 12 tomorrow, Wednesday, and will bring stronger pressure to bear on him.

I think it is quite true that as a matter of integrity this matter must be in public eventually. The time is not yet. I will bring up this possibility directly with Dixon. He and the French must both count on the possibility of my taking an open position when the time is ripe.

Wednesday morning Hammarskjold called me and said that he is very disturbed by the French and British meeting in London last night⁵ which is seeking to build up the impression that there is nothing to decide here in the meeting on October 29. He added the following: (paraphrase) Having thought it over I have decided to write a letter to Fawzi summing up my understanding of what has been proposed, that is, the detailed provisions which would go under the six major headings which we agreed upon when the Foreign Ministers were in New York. I would set this all down and then ask Fawzi: am I right or am I wrong?

Inasmuch as the French and British think that the Egyptians have done nothing, I must once again be the midwife and have a baby on the table.

I shall talk over the draft of this letter with Dixon and Cornut and then send it to Egypt. I want them to know what I am doing.

In a subsequent conversation with Ambassador Cornut-Gentille, I asked him if he had anything more on the Suez Canal negotiations, specifically the October 29th meeting. Ambassador Cornut-Gentille replied that the French found themselves in a dilemma as they could not see how they could meet with the Egyptians when the latter had not provided any concrete suggestions. He did not see how they could sit down without a piece of paper in front of them.

I said I did not see how the Egyptians could give the French and UK their final position as then it would make it impossible for the Egyptians to negotiate. I thought possibly they could sit down with the six principles of the Security Council resolution and use that as a paper for discussion. I pointed out that if the UK and France refuse to sit down with the Egyptians, they would be placed in a very bad position, vis-à-vis world public opinion. Whereas if they did sit down with the Egyptians they would be in a much better position, especially if the Egyptians remained adamant.

Mr. Ordonneau (France) pointed out that the seizure of the ship Athos, carrying arms from Alexandria to the rebels in Algeria, cast a whole new light on the problem. He pointed out the ship had originated in the military port of Alexandria and this was the fourth such ship which traveled between Egypt and the rebels in Algeria. He indicated the French would have to take this concrete proof of Egyptian collaboration with the rebels into consideration in dealing with the Suez problem.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–2356. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge. The last three paragraphs of the memorandum, which describe a conversation between Lodge and Cornut-Gentille, were evidently added at a later time. Norman Armour is indicated as codrafter with Lodge for this last section.
2. October 18.
3. See supra.
4. October 23.
5. According to The New York Times for October 24, Pineau attended an emergency high-level meeting with Eden and Lloyd in London during the evening of October 23. Following the meeting, a spokesman for the British Foreign Office told the press that Pineau, Eden, and Lloyd had discussed the Suez Canal Users’ Association proposal and the situation arising from the recent Security Council debate on the Suez Canal situation. Regarding Pineau’s visit to London, see Document 373.