362. Memorandum of a Conversation Among the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), White House, Washington, October 21, 1956, 11 a.m.1
I reported on the Suez situation. I said that I was really baffled to know the real purposes of the British and the French. Perhaps they did not know themselves. I had the impression that they felt that our policy was merely for election purposes and that after election we might back them in a policy involving the use of force.
I pointed out that the French because of their war in North Africa understandably wanted the British in as fighting allies. The British position was equivocal. They seemed at times really to be seeking a peaceful settlement—and I thought a reasonable one was in sight—at other times they seemed to feel that any settlement would not eliminate Nasser fast enough and that they must have a more rapid time schedule.
We were working with them on long-term economic projects. But they seemed also to have in mind a number of other possible alternatives such as:
- 1.
- An inspired attempt against Nasser which probably would fail but in failing bring about violent anti-foreign demonstrations which would justify the introduction of military forces to save foreign life and property;
- 2.
- Claiming that the Suez Base Evacuation Treaty of 1954 had been violated by the Egyptians’ violation of the 1888 treaty. Therefore, they had the right to go back to that basis [base?]; (At this point the President interjected that he thought it would be difficult for them to do so so belatedly.)
- 3.
- The introduction of troops into Jordan under cover of the Jordan Defense Treaty;
- 4.
- The introduction of troops into the area under cover of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration;
- 5.
- The cutting off of tolls to Egypt to a degree which would lead Egypt to stop passage through the Canal and then the use of force to get ships through the Canal.
I said I felt confident that the British and the French would not resort to any of these measures before election as they did not want to make it an election issue. I was more fearful as to what might happen after [the] election.
In this connection I said to the President that I had been thinking of the possibility of his inviting Eden and Mollet to come to Washington shortly after the election. I thought this invitation [Page 765] might have a stabilizing influence on the situation and that if accepted it would give an opportunity for a frank exchange of views at the highest level without danger that it would be interpreted as an election move. I said I had no firm recommendation to make, but I would like the President to be turning it over in his mind. The President said he would do so. I said, of course, I felt that the President ought to have some vacation immediately following the election but perhaps the latter part of November would be a suitable time.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.↩