Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

346. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 15, 1956, 12:07 p.m.¹

Washington, October 15, 1956, 12:07 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Various Aspects of Near East Developments

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• The Secretary, John Foster Dulles
• The Under Secretary, Herbert Hoover, Jr.
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—Fraser Wilkins

The Israeli Ambassador called on the Secretary prior to his departure for Tel Aviv this afternoon to discuss various aspects of Near East developments. Mr. Eban thanked the Secretary for arrangements which had been made for the presentation of Israeli views regarding transit through the Suez Canal before the Security Council. He said these arrangements gave the matter greater status and greater public impact.

Mr. Eban said he wished to explain why the Israeli Government was agitated regarding the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan. He recalled that Ambassador Lawson and Prime Minister Ben Gurion had discussed the question several weeks ago.² Israel greatly appreciated the content of Ambassador Lawson’s remarks. Prime Minister Ben Gurion had responded in a similar vein. There had been no element of force majeure. There had, on the contrary, been a meeting of minds. Mr. Eban said his own conversations with Mr. Rountree had been of a similar character.

Mr. Eban continued that Ambassador Lawson and Mr. Rountree had both pointed out the greater role which the United Kingdom played in this matter. Mr. Eban said that since the matter was first discussed there had been a considerable change and the Israeli Government now had a contrary reaction. Mr. Ben Gurion had stipulated the Israeli Government wished information re the size of the Iraqi troop movement and regarding the temporary nature of its mission in Jordan as well as assurances that there would be no annexation or territorial change. In subsequent conversations the United Kingdom had not been specific. There were reports that Iraq and Jordan were discussing the movement of an Iraqi division.

Two additional factors had now developed. The United Kingdom had referred to the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of 1948 and had warned or threatened Israel that if it moved against Jordan the British would respond under the Treaty. Mr. Eban said that some years ago following the inclusion of the west bank of Jordan into Jordan, the British had said that the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of 1948 did not apply to the west bank of Jordan. The British had also referred to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the maintenance of the territorial status quo. Mr. Eban said that if there was to be a change in the territorial status quo, Israel had a right to think of taking part in this change. Israel was astonished and alarmed when the United Kingdom referred to the Treaty of 1948 and the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and said it would use British forces if subsequent circumstances should so necessitate. The United Kingdom now seemed to be talking in the same way to Israel as it had to Egypt following the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The U.K. seemed to be taking advantage of the small countries of the Near East. Mr. Eban observed that the Declaration of 1950 was not a unilateral statement but was tripartite. He asked if the U.K. was speaking for the United States and France when they referred to possible action under the 1950 Declaration.

Mr. Eban said that recent Iraqi and British statements envisaged territorial change in the Middle East. It seemed strange that United Kingdom would pick this particular moment to reiterate its views regarding a compromise between the partition lines of 1947 and the armistice lines of 1948. Mr. Eban said that every statesman should be thankful that Israel prevented the continuity of the Arab world. The Secretary noted that under the Partition Resolution of 1947 the southern section of Palestine had been given to Israel.

Mr. Eban summarized Israeli views as follows: Iraqi troops of unknown numbers were entering Jordan. The U.K. now said that there were circumstances in which British forces would be used against Israel. The British had not said that if Jordan attacked Israel the British would defend Israel. Under present political and psychological conditions Israel felt that acquiescence in the Iraqi move as stated by Mr. Ben Gurion no longer prevailed. Mr. Eban hoped that the U.S. would at least disengage itself from the Iraqi move. He hoped there would be continuing discussions if it were not possible for the parties to change their attitudes.

The Secretary said that he thought the Anglo-Jordan Treaty had been extended to apply to the west bank of Jordan. Mr. Rountree said that was his understanding. Mr. Eban said he would check and would supply further details.

The Secretary said, with respect to Ambassador Eban’s remarks regarding Iraqi movement of troops into Jordan that there were a number of fundamentals involved. The U.S. was not directly concerned. The U.S. had no treaty either with Iraq or Jordan whereas the U.K. had treaties with both countries. When we had first heard of the possible Iraqi move we had been struck with its favorable aspects. It seemed to serve the basic interests of the U.S. as well as what we thought were Israel’s basic interests. It provided some substitute for the Arab Legion which now lacked the leadership of its former British officers. It would be desirable to preempt a position in Jordan in favor of Western interests rather than permit Egypt or possibly the Soviet Bloc to gain influence. We did not consider the Iraqi action as a move toward the fragmentation of Jordan but as a move to prevent fragmentation of that country. Because of developments relating to the Suez Canal, Egypt was not at the present moment in a position to react strongly. Mr. Ben Gurion’s conversation with Ambassador Lawson indicated that Israel held similar views. There had been consultation in advance.

The Secretary continued that it was difficult to see how the fundamentals had changed in the situation unless Israel desired the fragmentation of Jordan and its annexation. He thought that the elements which had been set forth by Ambassador Eban on behalf of the Israel Government seemed superficial and not of such gravity as to upset the original calculations. It was no secret that Iraq had long held that the Partition Resolution of 1947 should provide a final basis for a solution to the Palestine question. Iraq had reiterated this position many times. Prime Minister Eden’s statement of November 1955,³ which was made without prior consultation with the United States, was also well known. The Secretary said he had been told that Selwyn Lloyd had stated that recent British Foreign Office comment on the Iraqi attitude was not to emphasize the territorial aspects but the peaceful aspects of the Iraqi statement. The Arabs had not during recent months referred to the possibility of a peaceful solution to the Palestine question because they felt more certain of Soviet support. The British explanation was not irrational. Neither the Iraqi nor the British statements seemed to alter fundamentally the situation as previously analyzed by the U.S. and Israel on which there had been agreement.

The Secretary noted, with respect to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, that there had been no consultation between the U.S. and the U.K. prior to the latter’s reference to this Declaration in its discussions with the Israel Government. We also understood that there had been no consultation between the U.K. and France. The Secretary said he did not wish to indicate it was not possible to take unilateral action under the Tripartite Declaration. He had not studied this aspect of the Declaration.

The Secretary also noted, with respect to the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, that it did not seem abnormal for the U.K. to refer to it. He could understand why Israel might be concerned. On the other hand some might interpret the matter differently. During recent Israeli actions there had been massive retaliatory raids against posts in Jordan which partook of the nature of acts of war. In the most recent incident three battalions carrying heavy weapons were reported as having been used. There were reports on the use of jet planes. (The Secretary asked Ambassador Eban for information re the use of jet planes.) These heavy blows by Israel were having the effect of weakening the Government of Jordan and hastening the fragmentation of that country. The Secretary drew a comparison between our mutual security arrangements and the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, observing that in both cases it was inherent in the treaty relationship for discussion to take place.

The Secretary continued that it would not be unnatural for Israel to believe that opportunities might arise in which it could acquire additional territory to augment its meager area. We were anxious, nevertheless, that there be a maintenance of the status quo and believed that the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan would have a stabilizing effect. We understood that there might be some delay in executing the move during which Ambassador Eban would have an opportunity to question his Government and clarify some of the issues.

The Secretary said that we could not take responsibility in regard to the situation because there were factors in it which we do not control. There are other Governments which have other responsibilities under other treaties. These Governments have already taken certain steps and certain moves have already started. If Israel had been against the proposition in the beginning perhaps we could have exerted our influence to stop it. We still believe, however, the Iraqi move into Jordan should take place. We believe the Israeli objections do not go to the heart of the matter. We believe Israel should favor the Iraqi move if it wishes to maintain the status quo, to prevent the fragmentation of Jordan and to diminish the possibility of Egyptian, and possibly Soviet Bloc, influence in Jordan. The Secretary was not surprised that the Israeli Government might be distressed and anxious re the confused situation. He said that he had spoken with the President and wished to emphasize that in the long run it was important that the U.S. and Israel should find ways to work together and that it would be disastrous if the Israel Government took action which might seem to put it on the wrong side of the general armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors and of the United Nations Charter. If there were aggression the Soviet Union would have an excuse to come in as a defender of the United Nations Charter. We were concerned that the magnitude of recent retaliatory moves against Jordan would place Israel on the wrong side of the moral judgment of the American people. We were concerned that Israel might find it expedient to seek a temporary advantage and move against Jordan. The Secretary hoped Israel would continue to bear in mind the basic principles which govern U.S.-Israel relations. Ambassador Eban said that Israel continued to favor the maintenance of the status quo in the Near East, but that if there were a new deal in the Near East Israel should discuss and take part in it. There were many in Israel who were pressing for a change in the status quo because of Egypt’s preoccupation with the Suez Canal, but the Israeli Government was resisting this advice. Ambassador Eban drew a distinction between retaliatory action and military efforts to change the status quo. He said the Israeli Government had changed its view regarding the Iraqi movement into Jordan because the psychological atmosphere in the Near East had altered.

The Secretary asked why Israel considered the Iraqi movement as doubtful today as the Iraqi force would be a small one and it would stabilize the situation in Jordan. Ambassador Eban replied that the British and the Iraqis had placed the matter in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute and had made reference to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. It was possible that the U.K. had given Israel the wrong impression. Israel believed British intentions were wider in scope.

The Secretary asked if Israel desired strong Egyptian influence in Jordan. Ambassador Eban said Israel did not and they had not reached final conclusions regarding the Iraqi move into Jordan. He said that the manner in which the U.K. had presented the matter to Israel had made it doubtful. He speculated that perhaps Israel had misunderstood the U.K. approach. The Secretary commented that although the British approach might have been awkward and “bad diplomacy”, he would think that Israel would wish to adhere to the fundamentals in the situation.

Mr. Shiloah interjected to remark that according to Israeli information, discussions between Jordan and Iraq were much wider than had originally been understood. Iraq was now planning strongly to bolster Jordan. Not only was Jordan to be stabilized, but there were to be new territorial arrangements in the area.

The Secretary replied that we had the most categorical assurances that the purpose of the Iraq move into Jordan was to prevent the breakup of that country. Mr. Shiloah further noted that when American and Israeli officials had first discussed the question in Tel Aviv, the U.K. had not been in touch with us.

Ambassador Eban also said that there was a difference between Ambassador Lawson’s discussions and the British discussions with the Israeli Government. Ambassador Lawson’s remarks had had a most important effect. It was important that there now be a meeting of minds between Israel and the U.S.

The Secretary said he understood the U.K. was further discussing the question in Tel Aviv today and that the entry of Iraqi troops had been held up for a day or two. During the interval perhaps misunderstandings could be cleared up. He wished to make the U.S. attitude clear. The Iraqi troop movement was a small one. It was being made for defensive purposes at the request of the Government of Jordan and would not proceed to the other side of the Jordan River. The Secretary said that we would not regard this movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan as legal or moral justification for an Israeli move against Jordan. We could hardly take that position as the U.S. itself has troops abroad under Mutual Security treaties. The Treaty arrangement between Iraq and the U.K. seemed similar in this respect. Ambassador Eban said that he would convey this view to the Israel Government.

Mr. Shiloah interjected that when Ambassador Lawson had confidentially discussed the Iraqi move with the Israel Government, Israel had urged that if there were to be any territorial changes, the sooner Israel was consulted, the more effective Israel would be. The Secretary replied that he could say without any qualification or reservation that we were not privy to any conversation or arrangement for the fragmentation of Jordan. We had heard no talk from the U.K., Iraq or Jordan which included the liquidation of Jordan. Although it had not been expressed it was possible that this concept was entertained by some. He could give no guarantee as to what some might be thinking, but as far as we were concerned, we were not aware that this was a objective. It was not now an element in the situation as we saw it.

Ambassador Eban said he wished to raise another subject. The Israel Government interpreted the recent Security Council Resolution on Suez as juridically strengthening the freedom of passage of all ships through the Suez Canal.

The Secretary said that before Ambassador Eban left he wanted to make certain he had made clear U.S. concern regarding reports that Israel had used jet aircraft during recent Israeli attacks against Jordan. The Secretary noted that the U.S. has used its own influence not ineffectively to assist Israel in strengthening its armed forces and had been assured that Israel’s new strength would be used for defensive purposes. Ambassador Eban replied that he had heard Jordanian reports Israel had used jet aircraft, but that he did not believe they were correct. Both Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah said that they could assure the Secretary that none of the planes which they had recently obtained were used against Jordan. The Secretary said he would like to have definite word before his press conference on October 16 as he anticipated correspondents would question him on this point.

Ambassador Eban concluded the interview by thanking the Secretary for the recent press release from the Export-Import Bank regarding Israel’s loan application for water development.⁴ Ambassador Eban promised the Secretary a copy of a release from the Israel Embassy touching on this matter.

Ambassador Eban said that he would probably be questioned by the press on leaving the Department. Ambassador Eban, with the Secretary’s agreement, said that he would merely indicate that they had had a general review during which they had touched on various aspects of the situation in the Near East, including the Suez Canal, Iraqi troops in Jordan, and other matters.

Note: Mr. Shiloah subsequently telephoned regarding jet planes and the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. Mr. Shiloah said there was not the slightest doubt no jet planes had been used during recent Israel moves against Jordan. Mr. Shiloah said the Israeli statement that the Anglo-Jordanian treaty did not apply to the west bank of Jordan was not correct. Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah had had an Israeli reservation to the extension by the British of the Treaty to the west bank. Mr. Shiloah asked me to correct the misleading impression which they had given the Secretary earlier today.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5/10–1556. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Regarding the Israeli reaction to this conversation, see footnote 1, Document 344. A briefing memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, dated October 15, is in Department of State, Central Files, 601.84A11/10–1556. A marginal note indicates that Dulles saw the briefing memorandum.
2. See Document 289.
3. Reference is to a speech by Eden delivered at the Guildhall in London on November 9, 1955.
4. On October 11, the Export-Import Bank announced its plans to send a team of experts to Israel in conjunction with Israel’s pending request for a $75 million loan. At the same time, Samuel C. Waugh explained that an on-the-ground examination of existing projects and potential resources for further agricultural development was customary before any definite steps could be taken on proposals of this nature. (The New York Times, October 12, 1956)