337. Editorial Note

At the 741st meeting of the Security Council, which began at 5 p.m. on October 12, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld enumerated six principles and five modalities for implementing the principles concerning the Suez Canal. The principles were:

  • “1. There shall be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination overt and covert. This covers both political and technical aspects.
  • “2. Egypt’s sovereignty shall be respected.
  • “3. The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country.
  • “4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users.
  • “5. A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development.
  • “6. In case of dispute, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due.”

The modalities for implementing the principles included: 1) cooperation between the Egyptian Canal Authority and the users either individually or as a group, within the framework of specified conventions, codes, and regulations; 2) access to recourse for all parties to settle unresolved disputes or differences; 3) agreed arrangements on tolls and charges; 4) access to information and an” international element” in all branches of the Canal administration; and 5) an established relationship with the United Nations. (Telegram 345 from USUN, October 13; Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–1356)

After the meeting, Secretary Dulles telephoned President Eisenhower at 7:30 p.m. The memorandum of their conversation, transcribed by Bernau, reads as follows: [Page 713]

“The Sec. said he just got back from a 2-hour meeting at the SC. The British, French and Egyptians have agreed on 6 basic principles and the rest of the Council have accepted them including the Russians. The Sec. read them. There is no agreement on provisional measures—how to pursue these negotiations—but the Sec. thinks enough has been said and done to make it virtually certain that the status quo will be preserved for quite a while and there will be no use of force. This may revive … The Israel thing is acute and may mean the Egyptians will send their forces back to the Neguib and the Gaza strip. You can’t solve everything at once.

“The Sec. said between the two of them he does not think the British and French have done an awful good job here so far. The responsibility is entirely theirs which is the way it should be. This is the result of their talks with the Egyptians. They cannot outwardly at least place any blame on us if it works out badly. The Sec. said he had deliberately stayed out of it.

“The Pres. evidently asked re his press conference yesterday. The Sec. said he thought it was perfect—he has not had any … He did not get any adverse reaction here at all.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. The ellipses appear in the text of the memorandum.)