Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

329. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) and Ambassador Hussein of the Egyptian Delegation to the United Nations, New York, October 11, 1956, 10:45 p.m.¹

New York, October 11, 1956, 10:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Suez Canal

Ambassador Hussein telephoned me at my hotel room at 10:15 p.m. and began expressing his deep concern over the turn of events in the tripartite talks October 11 between the Egyptians on the one hand and the British and French on the other. I had with me at the time Ambassador Lall of India² and suggested to Ambassador Hussein that we might discuss the matter privately a bit later. He invited me to his suite at the hotel and I met with him at 10:45 p.m.

The Ambassador reviewed in some detail the progress of the talks to date and emphasized the desire of Egypt to find a compromise solution. He said that on all the major points the Egyptians had been willing to go as far as possible without actually bringing about a collapse of the Egyptian Government as a result of yielding too far, particularly on the question of “international control” of the Canal. He commented there were a number of reasons why the Egyptians wanted a settlement as quickly as possible. A primary one was that they were terribly concerned about the growth of Russian influence in Egypt and the long-term if not immediate effect which it would have upon Egyptian independence. Egypt was extremely anxious to avoid a situation in which the Soviets again became the champions of Egypt by virtue of a veto of the British-French resolution.

The Ambassador said Egypt was convinced of the objectivity of the United States and particularly of Secretary Dulles in this whole affair. He realized that the Secretary was playing a relatively inactive role at the present time, hoping that the parties more directly concerned could make progress toward an agreement. As a result of the events earlier in the day, however, Foreign Minister Fawzi and the Ambassador were hopeful that the Secretary could inject himself more directly into the situation in order to prevent the collapse of present discussions and the creation of a new difficult situation.

According to the Ambassador, the talks in the presence of Secretary-General Hammarskjold had been going remarkably well, particularly as between Fawzi and Lloyd. The latter seemed earnestly to be seeking a workable arrangement and pursued each point with apparent sincerity. On the other hand, Mr. Pineau had shown considerable reluctance, but the situation had become more acute during the course of the afternoon tripartite session.³ At that time Mr. Pineau had taken the position, unrelated to any issue at that time under discussion, that he would insist upon calling a Security Council meeting in the immediate future and announce that the French would insist upon the 18-nation proposal and nothing else. He would then wind up the affair and return to Paris Saturday afternoon in order to attend meetings, his presence at which he attributed great importance. This attitude had been distressing to Fawzi and, the Egyptians believe, also to Lloyd.

At a subsequent meeting between Hammarskjold, Lloyd and Fawzi, the former two had stated that they would discuss the matter frankly with Secretary Dulles. It was not clear from what Ambassador Hussein said whether Hammarskjold and Lloyd had been critical of Pineau, and my efforts discreetly to draw him out on this point left me in some doubt, although Hussein was careful to avoid implying that there was an open breach between Pineau and Lloyd.

Emphasizing again that the Egyptians wanted a settlement, wanted to mend their relations with the Western world, and wanted to avoid if at all possible the further development of a situation in which the Soviets were the defenders of Egypt, Ambassador Hussein asked me to urge Secretary Dulles to do all that he could to prevent a breakdown of the talks and to persuade the French that it was in their interest, as well as that of the whole world, to assume a conciliatory attitude. He said the Egyptians believed strongly that it would not be helpful in the present situation to have representatives of various other countries trying to become the “heroes” by pressing their own plans for a solution. He mentioned particularly Spaak and Krishna Menon in this connection and gave me the impression that he and his Egyptian colleagues were not at all enthusiastic over the Menon proposal or his efforts to inject himself into the situation.

During the course of the conversation, I responded only generally to Ambassador Hussein’s comments and I was careful to make no commitments. I told him that I would report to the Secretary the substance of our conversation, and I was sure that the Secretary would continue to do all in his power to facilitate a peaceful solution to this question. I said that we had not heard from Lloyd and Hammarskjold following the private conversation which Ambassador Hussein had indicated they had had with Fawzi. But I assumed that they would be getting in touch with the Secretary. I said that I would, of course, report the matter fully to Mr. Dulles.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–1156. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.
2. The memorandum of Rountree’s conversation with Lall is ibid.
3. Reference is to the meeting among Hammarskjöld, Fawzi, Pineau, and Lloyd, during the afternoon of October 11. Hammarskjöld’s account of this conversation is in the memorandum of conversation, infra.