Office of the Historian

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1

Tel Aviv, October 9, 1956—8 p.m.

340. Reference: Embassy telegram 339.2 Foreign Minister Meir told me this afternoon in serious and emphatic tones that even GOI’s conditional consent to, or acquiescence in, movement Iraqi troops to Jordan is withdrawn until GOI understands and approves relationship of plan to (1) Nuri Said’s reported statement that it time Israelis “forced” to accept 1947 partition plan (2) British Foreign Office spokesman’s statement to effect British welcome Nuri’s initiative and prepared to assist under terms Eden’s Guildhall speech.3

She said situation completely changed since Ben Gurion gave qualified agreement to proposal. Now Israelis would have to know number of things at once. She made it crystal clear that Ben Gurion’s cooperation even to extent indicated must now be considered [Page 676] as in abeyance until such time as he satisfactorily assured Iraqi troop movements are in no way connected with Iraqi-British program, objective of which is to force Israel into negotiations which would involve territorial concessions on her part or plan involving Iraqi-Jordan treaty if its invocation were for purposes detrimental to Israel’s present boundaries or security (Embtel 330).4 She asked if British were dreaming old dreams of merging not only Iraq and Jordan but also Syria?

Further details of conversation will be contained in following telegram.5

Lawson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/10–956. Secret; Niact. Received at 12:56 a.m., October 10. Repeated Niact to London, Baghdad, and Amman.↩
  2. Telegram 339 from Tel Aviv, October 9 (ibid.) reported that the British Chargé had not yet spoken with Israeli officials concerning Iraqi troop movements, as he still had not heard that Iraq had made the actual decision to move. The Chargé’s instructions were to inform Israel of the number of Iraqi troops, the date of their entry into Jordan, and Nuri Said’s assurances that he had no aggressive intentions. He was also to remind Israel that the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty remained in effect. Consequently, Lawson requested authority to convey to Israel what Iraq had told the United States concerning its troop movements (reported in telegram 576 from Baghdad, October 6; ibid., 684A.85/10–656).↩
  3. Reference is presumably to news reports in the Times of London on October 8 and 10.↩
  4. In telegram 330 from Tel Aviv, October 6 (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/10–656), Lawson confirmed that he had conveyed to Ben Gurion the views contained in telegrams 266 and 268 to Tel Aviv (see Documents 295 and 296). In reply, Ben Gurion requested specific information concerning the disposition of Iraqi troops in Jordan and requested clarifications from Washington on whether the movement was the first step in an agreed plan for Iraq to annex Jordan.↩
  5. Telegram 346 from Tel Aviv, October 10, contained an elaboration of points made by Meir which are summarized in telegram 340. Meir also asked for immediate full consultation with the United States and noted that Israel must know what Britain was about. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/10–1056)↩