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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI
  4. Document 308

308. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Suite, Waldorf Astoria, New York, October 7, 1956, 7:15 p.m.1

New York, October 7, 1956, 7:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Arab-Israel Participation

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Lodge
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Phleger
  • Mr. Wilcox
  • Mr. Berding
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. Macomber
  • Mr. Ludlow
  • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • Mr. Coulson
  • Sir George Young
  • Mr. P.M. Crosthwaite
  • Mr. Beeley
  • Mr. D. S. Laskey
  • Mr. Adam Watson

Mr. Lloyd raised the question of whether the Israelis should be allowed to come before the Security Council.

The Secretary said that our position was that they should. Mr. Lloyd asked whether the Secretary had in mind their coming to the closed session, and the Secretary replied that he thought they should appear before the Security Council some time later on in the week at the end of the general debate. Mr. Lloyd said he had talked with Ambassador Eban and had tried to dissuade him from pressing the matter on the grounds that it might influence countries like Iraq toward lining up with Egypt. However, Eban had said that Israeli prestige was involved and that his government insisted that Israel should appear briefly and then leave, but not participate in the discussions. Mr. Lloyd said he understood that Pineau had it in mind to play a role in this matter and try to “keep the Arabs in order”. Mr. Lloyd said he did not think this would be useful.

Mr. Lloyd queried whether the Arabs and Israelis could be restricted from the private session. He commented that Pineau, as President, was not really the best one to keep the Arabs in order on [Page 659] their participation. Ambassador Lodge hoped the entire matter of Arab-Israeli participation could be put off until Friday.2

The Secretary and Lloyd agreed that it would be desirable to postpone. The Secretary went on to comment that it would be very difficult to oppose Israeli participation. He therefore suggested that it would be better to have the closed sessions and secret negotiations and then to take up the Arab-Israeli participation matter later. At that point, participation might be either academic or it might be desirable to inject the Israelis into the Suez matter. He pointed out that one of the strongest indictments of Nasser was his conduct vis-à-vis Israel.

Nasser had now withdrawn the major portion of his forces from the Israeli frontier because of his preoccupation with the Suez matter. Iraqi forces moving into Jordan might soon make an impression upon the other Arabs since the Palestine question and not Suez was their major interest. The stationing of some Iraqi forces in Jordan, if soon carried out, might undermine Nasser’s position in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, and cause the Jordanians and other Arabs to turn more to Iraq in view of Nasser’s action in giving priority to Suez over the Israeli question. It might actually therefore be of some advantage to us in the later stages of discussion if the matter did develop in the Security Council.

Mr. Lloyd indicated relief at our willingness to postpone the matter of participation. He said that Eban had indicated his desire to be heard on Tuesday3 and that he thought this would present serious difficulties in debate.

The Secretary said he hoped that his speech would be a good wind-up of the Council debate on the matter at this stage prior to going into secret session, which he assumed we might anticipate Tuesday afternoon.

Mr. Lloyd inquired if the speakers in the Council debate had been lined up, and he expressed the hope that we would be able to get into private session on Tuesday.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–756. Secret, Drafted by Ludlow. At 6:45 p.m., Dulles and Lloyd, who had been meeting alone (see supra), were joined by their advisers for a series of discussions. The U.S. record of these discussions was made according to the subjects discussed: NATO, the Suez Canal Users Association, Arab-Israeli participation in the Security Council debate on Suez, Cyprus, Libya, and Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations. Separate memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 788 and CF 794. The discussion on the Suez Canal Users Association is summarized in Document 314.

    Also on October 7, Eban sent Dulles a letter, marked “Personal and Urgent”, containing a summary of Eban’s discussions with Pineau and Lloyd on Israeli participation at the Security Council session. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 796)

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  2. October 12.↩
  3. October 9.↩