Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

302. Message From the Secretary of State to the President¹

New York, October 5, 1956.

Dear Mr. President: I have had a full day on what is now my fourth Suez Conference. It started with a “heart-to-heart” talk with Lloyd and Pineau.² I said that obviously there was not real understanding between us, and I pointed to a number of concrete illustrations. I said we could not get on this way and must at least know the purpose of their action in bringing the Suez to the United Nations. Was it for peace, or for war?

Both Pineau and Lloyd said in effect that they did not believe there was any peaceful way of solution and they argued that only the use of force against Nasser would restore Western prestige in Africa and the Middle East. I said I thought it would be just the contrary and cited the points you used in your prior letters to Eden. I concluded that all of Africa, the Middle East and Asia would be inflamed against the West and that Soviet Russia would have an easy time to pick up the pieces.

I do not think that either convinced the other, but I did say that if we cannot agree on the ultimate, let us at least try to agree on the penultimate, namely, the present proceedings in the United Nations. I said that so far as the United States was concerned, we were determined to make this an honest effort to reach a settlement and I hoped that they would do the same. The British agreed that they would do this, and Pineau grudgingly went along.

We then discussed procedure and tentatively agreed that after the general debate was over—perhaps Tuesday—we would have one restricted session of the Council and then recess for two or three days during which private talks would proceed and at the end of that time we would come together to agree on whether we thought that an acceptable formula could be found. If so, then a negotiating group would be organized to work out the details. It was understood that the United States would be free to play a role in the behind-the-scenes negotiation.

Then Spaak came in to see me,³ and I found that he was strongly opposed to war and greatly worried at the French position. He said it would be disastrous not to give the United Nations a real chance and that the whole world would go against the British and the French if it was apparent they were to blame.

Then Shepilov came to see me.⁴ He talked pleasantly about their desire to seek a settlement. I reminded him that when he had talked the same way in London, Soviet propaganda was doing its best to sabotage our effort by violent anti-Western propaganda. I said that while the United States was using its full influence to moderate the British and the French, the Soviet Union was merely trying to egg on the Egyptians to greater excesses. I said the measure of our respective efforts was to be found in the fact that I was today the most unpopular man in France and Britain and he was the most popular man in Egypt. Shepilov was obviously disconcerted but reaffirmed his real desire this time to try to accomplish a settlement. He talked about a negotiating group. I said there could be no negotiating group unless it was first ascertained that there was a real basis for negotiation so that the group would be working out details and not merely starting from scratch. The French and British, I said, would not accept that. Shepilov indicated that they might go along with my procedure.

After our formal meeting,⁵ Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, came to see me.⁶ He indicated a desire for settlement and emphasized particularly the importance of getting more money to develop the Canal and suggested that this might be the cover for some form of foreign participation in the Canal operations. I outlined the Conference procedure I had in mind and he indicated it would be agreeable. He also indicated that they would like to negotiate directly with us. I said of course we had no mandate to act for anybody else, but would be glad to exchange views. I suggested that their legal adviser who is quite an eminent international lawyer should work with Phleger. At this point Phleger came into the conversation,⁷ and is planning to meet with the Egyptian lawyer tomorrow, Saturday.

It looks as though these next few days would “make or break” the situation. If we can put into it the spirit which seems to have animated the Dodgers in the game today, then there is a chance we can make it.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–656. Top Secret. Transmitted to the Department of State in Dulte 1 from USUN, 11 p.m., which is the source text, with the instruction: “Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary”. Dulte 1 was received at 12:26 a.m., October 6. A copy is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.
2. See Document 300.
3. A memorandum of this conversation, which began at 12:30 p.m. in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 788. A summary report of the conversation was transmitted to the Department in telegram 313 from USUN, October 5. (Ibid., Central Files, 974.7301/10–556)
4. A memorandum of this conversation, which began at 2 p.m. in the Secretary’s suite, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 788. A summary report of the conversation was transmitted to the Department in telegram 312 from USUN, October 5. (Ibid., Central Files, 974.7301/10–556)
5. Reference is to the 735th meeting of the Security Council.
6. A memorandum of this conversation by Dulles, which began at 5:30 p.m. in the Secretary’s suite, is in Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–556.
7. Phleger drafted a memorandum of this second half of the conversation with Fawzi. It is attached to Dulles’ memorandum, ibid.