300. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Suite, Waldorf Astoria, New York, October 5, 1956, 10:15 a.m.1
H.C. Lodge, Jr. notes on conversation between:
- His Excellency Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Minister of Britain
- His Excellency Christian Pineau, Foreign Minister of France
- The Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
(These notes have been verified by Secretary Dulles and Mr. Phleger)
Dulles: I thought it was a good idea to have an intimate meeting to discuss the questions of substance. We can have a procedural talk later.
There is a need for clarification between us. In your countries there are those who don’t understand American policy, and here are those who don’t understand your policies. We feel somewhat out of touch with your thinking. I was so much surprised when I got out of the plane on my return from London to find that a decision to come to the United Nations had been taken overnight.
This raised a question as to your real purpose. Was it to be an attempt to find a peaceful settlement? Or was it to be an attempt to get the UN behind you to clear the way for a greater freedom of [Page 640] action and stronger measures? We don’t know whether the purpose is to promote a negotiation or do things that you think must be gone through with without hope or real desire for positive result.
Now, there must be real understanding as to what is planned. None of us can take for granted that the other will go along blindly. The issues are too momentous for that.
The United States believes in the principles of the 18–power resolution—not every detail necessarily, but that there must be some measure of international participation in the operation of the Canal. We think that resort to force is a desperate measure which is not to be considered until a genuine effort has been made to exhaust all other possibilities.
It is the military estimate of President Eisenhower, who assuredly is well qualified to have an opinion, that military measures would start a war which would be extremely difficult to bring to an end, and that before it was ended the sympathies of all the Middle East, Asian and African peoples would be irrevocably lost to the West—and lost to such an extent as to pose a very grave problem for the next generation. If we do not retain the sympathy of those people they will, in all probability, go over to the Soviet Union.
Elections in this country are not a factor, contrary to what has been said, in some quarters in your countries. We are doing precisely the same thing that we would advocate under other conditions. There are indeed some who think the re-election of President Eisenhower would be assured if there was a war. A prominent Democrat said the other night that a war would make the Democratic prospects absolutely hopeless and that if there was a question of a war President, there would be no choice but President Eisenhower. You can be assured that our policies are not swayed by political considerations.
We favor a peaceful settlement by all possible means. War would be a disaster for the interests of the West in Asia and Africa. We assume that you have invoked the United Nations in that spirit, but it would be helpful if you gave us a frank statement as to whether you agree or disagree with what I have said.
Lloyd: I take the full blame for the decision to come to the Security Council. I thought we had indicated in London that we would go to the UN at some time. The decision was taken Saturday2 morning after you left London, and not while you were in the air. We felt that the impact of SCUA was less than was hoped for. We found that the Scandinavians would not come into SCUA without the UN having been invoked. The timing was due to a hint which we had received from an Indian source that the Russians were [Page 641] talking about bringing the matter to the UN. We could not afford even the remote risk that the Soviet Union would beat us to it.
The British purpose is quite genuine. We do not want to “railroad through” our proposal. We have always realized that in coming here we expose ourselves to a period of negotiation. But we cannot be here more than 10 days. In other words, next week something must happen. The 18–power resolution is the best basis and we want Security Council endorsement of that. If there is a veto or nothing happens, we must consider what to do next.
We would favor economic pressure if it would show results within two weeks, but we do not believe that this is practical. Force has tremendous disadvantages: there is the question of how to get out once you get in? and how do you justify it? We think that if we were to resort to force we would denounce the 1954 agreement and would go back to the Suez Canal Zone on that basis.
We are very much moved by a feeling that there is a conspiracy afoot in the Middle East—to kill the King of Libya, and to upset the regime in Saudi Arabia. There is a young officer movement in Iraq. Nuri is losing ground. So, it may be, that the Menzies Mission having failed, and the UN having failed, force will be the lesser evil.
Pineau: The time has come to show our cards. French public opinion on this subject is clear. It is noteworthy that for the first time, the President of the National Assembly referred to a difference existing between France and England on the one hand, and the United States on the other. The whole question of the existence of NATO is raised. I assure you that I will never, as Foreign Minister, agree to give up NATO, but the state of European public opinion being what it is now (and what Adenauer said the other day shows it), these things must be faced. They are of extreme gravity and the destruction of the North Atlantic Alliance would be the greatest Soviet victory. We must, therefore, remove misunderstandings.
What is the great misunderstanding regarding Suez? We don’t think the United States Government realizes the importance that France and the UK attach to Suez. It is not merely the Canal, but all the Middle East, Algeria, Morocco, and, Tunisia, that are involved. The Prince of Morocco told us recently that he cannot stay in power if Nasser wins. Communistic elements of Istiqlal3 will come into power. In Tunisia, Bourguiba says the same thing. All of the top people in these countries say why have you not used force? The Turkish Foreign Minister said to the French Ambassador the other day: “We hesitate to go to the SCUA. Experience shows that it is better to be allied with Russia than it is to be allied with France, the [Page 642] US and the UK.” We risk much more than an economic difference over the Suez Canal. We are risking all of our influence in that part of the world. We do not desire to use force, but it is nonetheless true that the presence of the Franco-British troops on Cyprus account for such good treatment as we have had there. We are willing to do all in our power not to use force, but Nasser surely will go farther and farther. He will take over the French and British positions because they are nearest, but then he will go after the US positions. Russia is back of him. The chief of all navigation in the Canal Zone is now a Russian. We risk Russian domination of the whole area.
The temporizing tactics of the US alarm us. We will play the game in the Security Council but we will not get bogged down in procedure. SCUA is not very much, but let us try to negotiate on the basis of the 18–power policies, and if not, then give us our liberty of action.
Dulles: The U.S. would not want to say that circumstances might not arise where the only alternative would be the use of force. Sometimes one must use it without prospect of a satisfactory outcome, but force is not a measure which will improve our prospects in Asia and Africa, and it is a great illusion to think that it would.
I do not agree with your assessments of the results of the use of force or of the situation in the Near East.
The Pakistan Government is having a hard time to maintain its pro-Western orientation. If force is used, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Iran will all go against us.
You had your choice in May of 1953 whether to stay or whether to get out of Suez. You decided not to stay, and I think rightly. Your position is much harder now. To try to turn the clock back creates a worse situation than that of 1953.
The use of force in violation of the Charter would destroy the United Nations. That is a grave responsibility. If you think the renunciation of force in the Charter was a mistake, it would be a great disillusionment to the United States.
I don’t think the situation is deteriorating. Perhaps it is in Algeria, but there are many developments against Nasser in the Middle East. The situation in Jordan is clear. Egypt cannot help Jordan. Egypt has taken her troops out of the Negev and out of the Gaza Strip, which gives a chance for Iraq to move into Jordan. King Saud is seeking a rapprochement with Feisal. The situation in Syria can be improved. The whole situation is not deteriorating. It is true that economic pressures will not yield quick results. But what is the basic long-term trend? Nasser’s prestige is beginning to decline and he is not getting the money he hoped for.
[Page 643]We need not decide here what the ultimate decision is going to be, but we must decide whether we will make a sound, sincere effort to obtain a just settlement in the UN. I agree with Mr. Pineau that you should keep your forces in being and it should be made clear that if good faith UN efforts fail, force may become a permissible alternative to be considered. I intend to re-affirm my London statement that peace and justice are two sides of the same coin.
If the UN can’t do justice, the UN has failed. But there must be an honest and determined effort to get a settlement on the basis of the 18–power declaration. We are glad to note that in the UK memorandum there is a statement not ruling out the possibility of negotiation.
We need not, however, consider the ultimate decision now today, but we must consider the penultimate decision. If we are merely trying to clear the decks for the use of force, we will be condemned for having destroyed the UN, and that the US cannot agree to do.
Pineau: I cannot see that Nasser’s prestige is any less. I am surprised that you cite Algeria as the one exception, since it is precisely there that we have the least trouble. The greatest difficulty is in the independent countries, that is, Morocco and Tunisia. Time is not working against Nasser.
The choice is not one to negotiate or to use force. The question is of negotiation on a proper basis. We would prefer to use the Security Council itself rather than a special negotiating body. It would be better to work in the whole Security Council rather than take 5 or 6 or 7 members. Then we would be taking Bulganin’s proposal and there would be no end of it. If Egypt is willing to negotiate on the basis of the 18–power statement, fine. If not, and we negotiate on some other basis, we would be led to a capitulation to Nasser and that would be a catastrophe.
Lloyd: We have always said that we would not use force without going first to the UN, and we believe in doing all that we can to make the UN phase successful. But we can’t get drawn into a long-term negotiation. I think that after the general exposition is finished there should be a private meeting, beginning Tuesday, then we could adjourn for two or three days, resume Friday, and if anything can come out of negotiation that should be enough time. We would prefer to negotiate on the basis of the 18–power declaration, but we will certainly look at any other basis for negotiation. We think that to take a week is not rushing.
Dulles: If you have ever argued in an Egyptian bazaar in Cairo you will know that they don’t work that fast. There is merit in Mr. Lloyd’s suggestion that after the general debate, in closed session, informal discussions be held to see if there is a possibility of serious [Page 644] negotiation. But we couldn’t have 12 people in the informal negotiations. One secret meeting will be enough. Then, after that, three or four days with no formal proceedings at all. If Egypt will accept the heart of our proposal, that is, that the Canal be operated free from politics, then there are different ways of working it out. The U.S. has not encouraged any go-betweens and we have had no contacts with Egyptians. Is it your idea that we should talk to the Egyptians or others, if they wish, to ascertain what they are prepared to do?
Lloyd: Yes. We think you should have such contacts if there is an opportunity. I have talked in this way to Popovic and Shepilov. Shepilov says why not have a committee of six, including India? … Shepilov and Popovic appeared to agree with the idea of direct talks. We should fight off the idea of a negotiating subcommittee. If that happened, I would go home. Shepilov and Popovic agreed to try to conclude next week. I do not want to hurry, but I think that there should be a real sense of urgency about this.
Pineau: There seems to be some confusion concerning the negotiating body. As I see it, there is a first stage, to make Egypt admit that they will negotiate on the basis of the 18–power resolution. Then, if we get somewhere on this basis, we can set up a negotiating committee, but it should not be a committee of small countries—it should be a committee of principal powers.
Dulles: I agree that there should be some kind of negotiating body consisting of all the parties at interest.
Lloyd: I told Popovic it was no good talking of guarantees without defining them. What kind? Who would negotiate?
Dulles: I agree. We don’t need new words, we have enough words now.
Pineau: What will we do after the general discussion?
Dulles: After the general discussion there will be one secret session of the Security Council, then recess for three or four days for informal contacts outside. Then we three meet again to decide whether any of our soundings hold any hope. Then the formal session is resumed and the resolution is acted on one way or the other. Then we decide what to do next.
Pineau: The secret meeting would come on Wednesday.
Lloyd: If we can eliminate consecutive translation for the set speeches, we could finish the general discussion Tuesday morning and have the first secret meeting Tuesday afternoon.
Dixon: summed up the conversation by saying that all had agreed that the objective was the endorsement of having negotiations on the basis of the 18-power declaration.
Dulles: That statement does not cover everything.
Lloyd: If we agree on procedural tactics there is an advantage in announcing them publicly as soon as possible.
[Page 645]Pineau: Let us fix Friday as the last day.
Lloyd: I suggest a secret session Tuesday afternoon.
Dulles: I plan to make a brief statement at the end of today’s session that the U.S. stands on the 18–power statement.
Pineau: As President,4 I plan today to recognize Dulles, then to read the Israeli-Arab letter,5 then to recognize Lloyd, then recognize France, and then to recognize Dulles.
Lloyd: If the three days are fruitless, we can hear the Israelis then.
Dulles: We must hear Israel some time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–556. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Lodge. The time and place of the meeting are from a note attached to the source text from Macomber to Howe, dated October 6. According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, Dulles and party (Phleger, McCardle, Wilcox, Bowie, Tyler, Ludlow, Macomber, Bernau, Asbjornson, and two others) left Washington by air at 7:55 a.m. and arrived in New York at 9:15 a.m., October 5.↩
- September 22.↩
- The Istiqlal, or Independence Party, was the dominant political party in Morocco.↩
- The French Representative at the United Nations served as President of the Security Council during the month of October 1956. Following Pineau’s return to France, Bernard Cornut-Gentille and Louis de Guiringaud served in the position.↩
- At the 735th meeting of the Security Council, which began at 3 p.m., October 5, the President of the Security Council noted that he had received a letter, dated October 3, from the Representative of Israel (U.N. doc. S/3663) requesting that the Israeli Representative appear before the Security Council to speak on the matter of free passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal. The President of the Security Council also noted that he had received a letter, dated October 4, from the representatives of seven Arab States (U.N. doc. S/3664) requesting permission to participate in the discussion on the Suez situation. The Yugoslav Representative then proposed that the Council not make an immediate decision on either of these requests. The proposal was adopted without a vote. (U.N. doc. S/PV.735)↩